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controversies can be better understood.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
 
Perhaps no value is so fundamental to universities as academic freedom. As 
O’Neil (2000) observed, “The subject of academic freedom has been a central theme 
throughout the history of American higher education” (19). In a similar vein, Menand 
(1996) called academic freedom “the key legitimizing concept of the entire enterprise” of 
higher education (4). Yet the phrase “academic freedom” is more often invoked 
ceremonially than deeply understood. 
There is a sharp difference between the ideal of academic freedom and its 
practical application. In contrast to the first half of the 20th century, today academic 
freedom as a concept is almost universally praised and endorsed. Yet disagreements 
about the meaning and practice of academic freedom are more intense than ever 
(Rothman, Woessner, and Kelly-Woessner, 2010, 172). 
The evolution of academic freedom in America during the past century, from a 
virtually unknown concept to a widely embraced principle of higher education, has never 
been fully examined. It is only by exploring the changes in higher education, and the 
fight of professors for their rights, that the rise of academic freedom to its preeminent 
position can be understood fully. Academic freedom “has become its own myth: an icon 
to be revered above all else, an article of faith, an essentialist doctrine bearing pontifical 
 2 
 
force” (Pavlich & Kahn, 2000, ix). However, academic freedom is a pontifical force 
without a pontiff; the only widely-accepted, authoritative definer of academic freedom is 
the American Association of University Professors (AAUP). Yet, even the AAUP 
depends upon social sanction to enforce academic freedom rules. And the AAUP 
maintains a precarious balance between being a faculty union and a defender of academic 
freedom. 
There have always been critics of the idea of academic freedom. In the first legal 
decision to mention the term, a New York court in 1940 ordered the firing of philosopher 
Bertrand Russell from City College of New York. The judge declared: “Academic 
freedom cannot teach that abduction is lawful nor that adultery is attractive and good for 
the community” (Kay v. Board of Higher Education, 1940). William F. Buckley (1951) 
denounced academic freedom for professors in his classic, McCarthy Era tract, God and 
Man at Yale. Buckley wrote, "academic freedom must mean the freedom of men and 
women to supervise the educational activities and aims of the schools they oversee and 
support” (190). 
Herbert London, leader of the National Association of Scholars (NAS) in 1987, 
declared that “Academic freedom has become a refuge for radicals” (London, 1987). Les 
Csorba of Accuracy in Academia claimed, “academic freedom on college campuses is 
nothing more than a useful device which gives license to some people and silences 
others” (Csorba, 1988). Economist Thomas Sowell noted, “Tenure and academic freedom 
have not protected individual diversity of thought on campus but instead have protected 
those who choose to impose the prevailing ideology through classroom brainwashing of 
students and storm trooper tactics against outside speakers who might challenge this 
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ideology” (Sowell, 1993, 229). Thomas Short (1993) of the NAS wrote, “We need to 
explain that academic freedom, which ordinarily requires independence from outside 
interference, calls for just such interference when that freedom is being subverted from 
within” (60). 
Conservatives like Short (1993) depicted the past as a golden age of free speech: 
"Having enjoyed almost untrammeled freedom of thought and expression for three and a 
half centuries...American colleges and universities are now muzzling themselves." But 
the history of academic freedom in American higher education reflects a much different 
story, where colleges and universities did not "successfully fend off efforts by outsiders" 
to "constrain that freedom"(Short, 1993), but often failed to resist the influences of state 
legislators, alumni, and the general public, and also restrained freedom on their own 
initiative. Rather than a sharp decline from the "good old days," colleges and universities 
today have more freedom of thought today than at any other point in their history 
(Wilson, 1995, Gerber, 2014). 
Leftist critics have also questioned academic freedom. Jennie Hornosty (2000) 
observed: “Academic freedom is an important ideal, but what does it really mean when 
universities have been dominated by white male elites who define knowledge, 
curriculum, ways of being, and the organizational culture in their image?” (41). The 
leftist critique of academic freedom sees the term as compromised by its origins in a 
narrow view of education that reflected the dominant forces within the academy. Yet 
such a view ignores the potential for academic freedom to evolve to mean something 
different from what its flawed history may convey. 
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However, despite these critiques of the term, the greatest challenge made to 
academic freedom is the charge of hypocrisy: namely, that American colleges do not live 
up to the ideal of academic freedom.  
Most scholars would agree that academic freedom is a good thing, but there is 
little agreement about what academic freedom means. Even the opponents of academic 
freedom endorse its name, as when a Louisiana law claiming to “protect academic 
freedom” tried to compel public school teachers to teach “creation science” (Edwards v. 
Aguillard, 1987). 
Censorship in higher education is as old as the colleges themselves. In the 
colonial college and during most of the 19th century, academic freedom did not exist at 
all. The faculty were there as employees to inculcate students in the traditions of the West 
and prepare for the ministry (Veysey, 1965). Expression of original or controversial ideas 
was frowned upon, whether inside or outside the classroom. 
Even as academic freedom developed to help resist infringements of faculty and 
students rights, censorship has continued. The problem is that few definitions of 
academic freedom detail precisely what can and cannot be tolerated. Albert Einstein 
(1954) explained his meaning of academic freedom: "By academic freedom, I understand 
the right to search for the truth and to publish and teach what one holds to be true. This 
right also implies a duty; one must not conceal any part of what one has recognized to be 
true. It is evident that any restriction of academic freedom serves to restrain the 
dissemination of knowledge, thereby impeding rational judgment and action." But within 
these broad parameters of the freedom to teach and research, the meaning of academic 
freedom is constantly disputed (Schrecker, 2010). 
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Statement of the Problem 
Definitions of academic freedom reflect different interpretations of the meaning 
of academic freedom. Understanding the history of academic freedom is critical to the 
development of policies and institutions which can protect the intellectual inquiry that is 
the core purpose of higher education. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this historical study of academic freedom in American higher 
education is threefold: 
1) to explore the ideal and practice of academic freedom and how they changed 
during the past century;  
2) to define academic freedom in a way that can protect the values of intellectual 
inquiry that undergird the concept of academic freedom; and  
3) to suggest how conflicts within higher education over academic freedom can be 
resolved. 
Research Questions 
This study was guided by the following research questions: 
1. What were the origins of the concept of academic freedom in America?  
2. How has the idea of academic freedom reflected changing circumstances in 
American colleges and universities during the 20th Century? 
3. How has the definition of academic freedom, both in its ideal and its practical 
application, evolved over the past century, and what are the implications of this change? 
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Conceptual Framework 
In this study, I created three conceptual frameworks of academic freedom 
models—the Gentleman Scientist Model, the Liberty Model, and the Professional 
Model—in order to clarify the meaning of an ambiguous phrase like “academic 
freedom.” 
The Gentleman Scientist Model is the belief that academic freedom protects 
faculty so as they act in gentlemanly ways using scientific methods. The gentlemanly 
notion is the belief that faculty must act as gentlemen in the classroom by never engaging 
in indoctrination of students, and as gentlemen in their scholarship. Controversy is always 
avoided under the Gentleman Scientist Model, especially in public. Anything that might 
embarrass or harm the institution is a violation of these standards. Faculty are trusted to 
follow these gentlemanly and scientific traditions, but if a violation of these standards is 
publicly exposed, a professor is expected to offer a resignation and trust the college to 
provide fair treatment. The scientific half is the belief that faculty must follow scientific 
standards in their research and public speech. Faculty must strive to avoid bias and 
speculation. Under the Gentleman Scientist Model, academic freedom protects faculty 
only in their scientific work and when they behave properly (AAUP, 1915a).  
The Gentleman Scientist Model was the dominant theory of academic freedom 
among the AAUP and other advocates for much of the 20th century, and it continues to 
influence the idea of academic freedom today. But it has largely been superseded by two 
competing models of academic freedom: The Professional Model and the Liberty Model.  
The Professional Model developed as an update of the Gentleman Scientist 
Model, and a correction of some of its flaws. The Professional Model abandons much of 
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the gentlemanly part of the Gentleman Scientist Model. Polite conduct is not a 
requirement for academics under the Professional Model. Trust between faculty and 
administrators is replaced by rules and procedures to protect academic freedom. The 
scientific traditions are maintained, but with the caveat that the Professional Model 
recognizes that not all academic disciplines fit the scientific model. Instead, 
professionalism is the core value. Controversial academic views are protected under the 
Professional Model, but faculty must be careful to avoid controversial non-academic 
statements while engaging in their professional work. Under the Professional Model, 
academic freedom is the collective right of the faculty to engage in academic work 
without outside control.  
The Liberty Model developed in the 1960s as a reaction to the perceived flaws of 
the Gentleman Scientist Model. The Liberty Model espouses political freedom as a core 
value. Political speech must be protected under this model, and never punished. 
Controversy is to be encouraged and defended, even if a public backlash harms the 
institution. Under the Liberty Model, gentlemanly traditions are tossed aside, and 
scientific traditions are questioned. The Liberty Model emphasizes individual rights over 
the collective decision-making of faculty as the core value of academic freedom. Trust is 
replaced by policies, rules, due process, and unions to protect academic freedom. 
Significance of the Study 
The attacks on tenure, the growing use of adjunct faculty who lack due process 
protections, and the increasing corporatization of higher education all indicate the 
importance of a deeper understanding of academic freedom (Wilson, 2008). Although 
academic freedom is seen as fundamental to academia, no comprehensive history of 
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academic freedom in America exists. The standard historical works on the history of 
academic freedom were written in the early 1950s by Metzger (1955) and Hofstadter 
(1955), addressed few specific cases, and told the story of the development of academic 
freedom up through World War I. Only a few historical works on academic freedom 
(mostly case studies dealing with the McCarthy Era) have been published since mid-
century. Understanding the full scope of the history of academic freedom in America is 
critical to current and future controversies in higher education. This work contributes to 
the literature about academic freedom and higher education by providing a historical and 
theoretical analysis of the changes in the past century in what academic freedom means. 
Methodology 
My goal in this dissertation is to analyze the idea of academic freedom and how it 
has evolved in the past century, by doing an intellectual history of the concept as well as 
a historical analysis of how academic freedom existed in practice and the key threats to it. 
This study of academic freedom will be historical as well as an analysis of theoretical 
approaches to academic freedom (or the intellectual history of the idea of academic 
freedom).  
Historical method is appropriate for this study for the following reasons: 
1. Historical research is designed to describe clearly and accurately 
the past as it relates to education. However, historical researchers also aim to 
do more than just describe, they want to go beyond description to clarify and 
explain and sometime correct (as when a researcher finds previous accounts of 
an action or event to be in error) (Fraenkel and Wallen, 2009, 536). In other 
words, historical research method "attempts to systematically recapture the 
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complex nuances, the people, meanings, events, and even ideas of the past that 
have influenced and shaped the present” (Berg and Lune, 2012, 305). 
2. To make people be aware of what has happened in the past so they 
learn from past failures and successes (Fraenkel and Wallen, 2009, 534). 
3. To learn how things were done in the past to see if they might be 
applicable to present-day problems (Fraenkel and Wallen, 2009, 535). 
4. To help with future prediction. If a particular idea (academic 
freedom) or approach has been tried before, even under some circumstance, 
past results may offer higher education policy makers some ideas about how 
present plans may turn out (Fraenkel and Wallen, 2009, 535). 
There are four major steps in conducting historical study in education. These 
include the definition of the problem or question(s) to be investigated, conducting 
background literature review and locating relevant historical information (i.e. identifying 
primary and secondary data sources), summarizing and evaluating the information 
obtained from these sources, and then interpreting the evidence (Fraenkel and Wallen, 
2009, 536; Berg and Lune, 2012). 
Historical method is also the most feasible choice for studying the history and 
development of academic freedom. By analyzing the official meaning of academic 
freedom in key documents, the leading theoretical claims about academic freedom, and 
the actual historical events that shaped the development of academic freedom, a clearer 
picture of what academic freedom means, and how that meaning has changed over time, 
can be developed. 
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As a powerful idea, academic freedom cannot be understood without the 
intellectual history that underlies it. But as an important practice in higher education, 
academic freedom cannot be fully understood without analysis of the historical reality in 
how it was utilized. Academic freedom is more than an idea, and more than a description 
of historical reality. Therefore, neither a traditional historical analysis, nor an intellectual 
history, is adequate to describe the influence and evolution of academic freedom. This 
dissertation is an attempt to combine the intellectual history of academic freedom with 
the historical analysis of its impact on higher education. 
The study of intellectual culture requires historical analysis (Bevir, 2002). Actual 
historical practice and the implementation of ideas are crucial to understanding any 
intellectual history, but they are especially important to the idea of academic freedom. 
There are surprisingly few theoretical treatises about academic freedom. There has been 
(until very recently) no recognizable academic field where scholars hold conferences, 
create academic journals, and teach classes in the subject of academic freedom. The 
AAUP was not established to gain theoretical acceptance of a particular theory of 
academic freedom among scholars; it was created with the goal of getting the academic 
system to implement practical policies and procedures to protect academic freedom. For 
that reason, the intellectual history of academic freedom can never be disconnected from 
the actual history of academic freedom. 
As Gerald Graff noted, one of the challenges in writing intellectual history mixed 
with historical analysis is “to keep the argument from overwhelming the history” and 
allow readers who disagree with the intellectual history to gain the benefit of a fair-
minded examination of the historical facts (Graff, 2008, vii). Graff (2008) argued for 
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“history told from a point of view,” but one that illuminates the past by shining the light 
of present-day controversies upon it, rather than attempting to impose an ideology upon 
every aspect of the past. 
Berg and Lune (2012) noted that “methods impose certain perspectives on reality” 
(5). A multiple-methods approach can broaden the viewpoints available (6). Novick 
(1988) compared attempting to write intellectual history to “nailing jelly to the wall” (7). 
Novick argued that “historical objectivity” is “not a single idea, but rather a sprawling 
collection of assumptions, attitudes, aspirations, and antipathies” (Novick, 1988, 1). The 
same might be said of academic freedom. By examining both the intellectual history of 
academic freedom, and the historical analysis of academic freedom, a clearer picture 
emerges of what academic freedom meant a century ago, what it means today, and how 
the idea of academic freedom has changed. This work argues that recognizing the 
divisions in different interpretations of academic freedom, and the historical origins of 
these differences, allows us to see the contested territory of academic freedom more 
clearly. 
Three different aspects of academic freedom will be explored using various 
primary (AAUP) and secondary sources of data:  
1. A systematic analysis was conducted of AAUP statements, 
policies, and investigations since 1915, which revealed how the idea of academic 
freedom developed. The growing acceptance of the AAUP definition of academic 
freedom by colleges as official policies, and the incorporation of this definition 
into faculty contracts, showed how it became part of the dominant culture of the 
professoriate. 
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2. Theoretical: The theory of academic freedom in the 20th Century is 
comprehensively examined in essays, articles, monographs, and books about 
intellectual freedom in higher education. Although the literature on academic 
freedom is too vast to summarize completely, the most influential and widely 
cited expressions about academic freedom will be studied in detail. This historical 
analysis also shows how the ideal of academic freedom, as expressed by its 
leading advocates and its opponents, was altered with the changing landscape of 
higher education in America.  
3.  Historical: Most examples of academic freedom are based on 
anecdotal reports from a variety of sources. By examining the literature on 
academic freedom and other information, the theories and official definitions of 
academic freedom can be compared with how it has really operated in higher 
education. Although this aspect of academic freedom is necessarily limited to the 
incidents that were publicly reported, it provides an additional analysis beyond the 
theories about academic freedom. 
Hofstadter and Metzger (1955) argued that “to write only about the outstanding 
violations of freedom would be to treat the story of academic freedom as though it were 
nothing but the story of academic suppression” (v). As Hofstadter and Metzger (1955) 
pointed out, the goal of a history of academic freedom must be “to know what freedom 
has meant to successive generations of academic men, to what extent they have achieved 
it, and what factors in academic life itself, as well as in American culture at large, have 
created and sustained it” (v). 
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Hofstadter and Metzger (1955) wrote the most comprehensive historical analysis 
of academic freedom, but it is now more than a half-century out of date. More 
importantly, the idea of academic freedom underwent dramatic changes during the 
turmoil of the 1960s, changes that Hofstadter and Metzger could never have anticipated. 
To understand academic freedom today requires seeing how its meaning changed over 
the past century. 
A quantitative analysis of the history of academic freedom was not feasible due to 
the lack of available data. The historical record is simply too incomplete to allow for a 
useful quantitative analysis, and no truly reliable surveys about the state of academic 
freedom have been done. 
This is not an objective study of the history of academic freedom. Novick (1988) 
noted that pure objective history cannot be achieved, and that it is a “myth.” However, 
this study does attempt to achieve a better understanding of the history of academic 
freedom by presenting some of the different theories of academic freedom, and the key 
moments in the history of higher education when these theories were challenged and 
shaped. 
Limitations of the Study 
It is virtually impossible to undertake a complete and thorough study of academic 
freedom due to the vast literature on the subject. This study focused exclusively on 
American colleges, and looked closely only at the 20th Century history. By excluding the 
global understanding of academic freedom and its early cases in America, a certain 
amount of context will be lost, but it is necessary to reduce the scope of the study. This 
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study relied primarily upon secondary sources and AAUP reports of academic freedom. 
An in-depth analysis using primary sources was possible only for selected key examples. 
Because this study suggested a broader definition of academic freedom than what 
was imagined during much of the 20th Century, no comprehensive historical analysis was 
possible. Much of the evidence of racism and sexism in American colleges, as well as 
cases of political intimidation, has been buried in the historical record. 
Organization of the Study 
The history of academic freedom in America can be broken up into four main 
chronological areas. For each period, key cases were examined in depth to show how 
they affected the concept of academic freedom. 
Chapter II: Literature Review of Models of Academic Freedom 
The literature review examined the three core approaches to the idea of academic 
freedom, the Gentleman Scientist Model, the Professional Model, and the Liberty Model, 
and scrutinized some of the key philosophical advocates of each approach to reveal the 
similarities and differences between these models of academic freedom. 
Chapter III: The College in America, and the Rise of the University (1663-1915) 
The study of this period examined how the early college in America was often an 
authoritarian place, run fully by a president appointed by a board of governors. The 
creation of the land-grant university and public colleges established new institutions with 
different constraints, but the idea of academic freedom was barely emerging. The rise of 
the university, and the professor as researcher, accelerated the push toward academic 
freedom, and the idea of research as the highest achievement of higher education, and the 
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necessity of freedom for its success, began to dominate. The Gentleman Scientist Model 
was developed to provide greater intellectual freedom for faculty  
Chapter IV: Wartime Repression and Radicalism (1915-1940) 
The creation of the AAUP, along with world wars and depression, shaped the 
meaning of academic freedom in American higher education. The 1940 Statement of 
Principles by the AAUP, in conjunction with the Association of American Colleges, 
marked one of the key moments for the establishment of policies protecting academic 
freedom. 
Chapter V: The McCarthy Era and the Sixities (1940-1970) 
The McCarthy Era is the most studied period of academic freedom in American 
colleges, but often without the historical context of how it changed the idea of academic 
freedom. The 1960s marked the most dramatic changes in the AAUP's approach to 
academic freedom, and brought the rise of the Liberty Model and the Professional Model 
as alternatives to replace the outmoded Gentleman Scientist Model, culminating in the 
1970 Interpretive Comments. 
This approach to academic freedom is both historical and theoretical, exploring 
not only the ideal of academic freedom, but also the actual practice on college campuses. 
By combining historical and theoretical analysis, this study tries to go beyond the 
traditional understandings of academic freedom to show how the idea of academic 
freedom was not a fixed concept, but an ongoing struggle during the 20th Century over 
its definition and enforcement. 
Chapter VI: Conclusion 
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Chapter six summarizes an overview of the present study including brief 
statement of the problem, purpose of the study, research questions, and summary, and it 
presents implications for the study and recommendations for future research. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
In this study, three major models of academic freedom that I developed were 
employed to explain the primary conceptualizations of this idea: the Gentleman Scientist 
Model, the Professional Model, and the Liberty Model.  
It was useful to describe these broad models for several reasons. First, the 
different models roughly described the actual historical development of academic 
freedom in practice, as reflected in AAUP policies and the state of intellectual liberty on 
campus. Second, these three models provided a summary of the theories of academic 
freedom offered by many (albeit not all) commentators over the years. Third, these 
historical models shined a spotlight on current disputes about academic freedom, and 
illuminated the contemporary disagreements over the meaning of the term. 
Providing a theoretical understanding of how academic freedom has been 
interpreted was important because the subject of academic freedom is often written about 
in ways that downplay interpretive theories, and confuse the subject. The use of these 
three models helped to clarify how academic freedom was created and established, and 
how academic freedom has changed over the past century. Of course, these three theories 
do not describe the entire debate over the meaning of academic freedom. There have been
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far too many theories written about academic freedom to summarize them all fairly. And 
even advocates who are grouped within the same model of academic freedom often have 
strong disagreements about the nuances of the model, as well as profoundly different 
approaches about applying academic freedom in practice.  
This is particularly true of the Gentleman Scientist Model, which was dominant 
until after the McCarthy Era of the 1950s. The fact that virtually all commentators and 
advocates of academic freedom shared the Gentleman Scientist Model during most of the 
20th Century does not indicate a complete consensus about academic freedom. There 
were strong disputes about the meaning of academic freedom, and the AAUP and others 
struggled for many years to gain any broad recognition of academic freedom. And 
probably some advocates of the Gentleman Scientist Model personally believed in the 
Liberty Model approach and would have applauded its rise. However, the central debate 
about academic freedom in the first half of the 20th Century was held within the limits of 
the Gentleman Scientist Model and rarely strayed beyond its boundaries; it was a debate 
about whether or not academic freedom should exist, and the Gentleman Scientist Model 
defined the limits to its meaning. 
In part, this reflects the essential fact that academic freedom arose as a practical 
defense for faculty freedom on campus, rather than as a purely theoretical idea about 
higher education that was eventually brought into reality. As such, there were few 
theorists writing about an imaginary ideal of academic freedom, and far more pragmatic 
academics writing about the real harms caused by violations of academic freedom that 
needed to be redressed and prevented. Nevertheless, there were theoretical ideals 
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buttressing these practical defenses of academic freedom, and it is important to analyze 
the underlying theories. 
The Gentleman Scientist Model 
The best theoretical exponent of the Gentleman Scientist Model was University of 
Chicago sociologist Edward Shils. Shils, writing long after the Professional and Liberty 
Models became dominant, harkened back to the Gentleman Scientist Model as the old, 
true meaning of academic freedom which had been abandoned by many academics 
(including the AAUP). Analyzing Shils is useful because he advocated the Gentleman 
Scientist Model with a theoretical precision and ideological consistency that the AAUP 
never really had. 
Shils offered a classic Gentleman Scientist definition of academic freedom: 
“Academic freedom is a qualified right; it is a privilege enjoyed in consequence of 
incumbency in a special role, an academic role, and it is enjoyed conditionally on 
conformity with certain obligations to the academic institution and its rules and 
standards” (Shils, 1997, 155). Shils identified the two core beliefs of the Gentleman 
Scientist Model: it protects only the academic (scientific) work of academics, and it 
requires faculty to be gentlemen, that is, to conform to the behavioral rules and moral 
standards of their college. 
Shils critiqued the expanded meaning of academic freedom under the Liberty 
Model: “It is no longer that it has any close relationship to the search for or the 
affirmation of truths discovered by study and reflection. It has become part of the more 
general right of the freedom of expression” (Shils, 1997, 154). 
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Shils also attacked a core idea of the Liberty Model, freedom of political speech: 
“There was, I think, general consensus between university administrators and trustees, 
most academics and the American Association of University Professors that teachers 
were not entitled to claim the protection of academic freedom for the attempt to persuade 
students in classrooms to accept the teacher’s own points of view on political or parochial 
religious topics which were not germane to the subject matter of the courses being 
taught” (Shils, 1997, 161). 
Many of Shils’ ideas bear some similarity to the Professional Model, in the 
critique of the Liberty Model’s focus on free expression and political speech. What 
makes the Gentleman Scientist Model different is its focus on propriety and obligations. 
Sexual propriety was a particular emphasis of the Gentleman Scientist Model. Shils 
noted, “Adultery, for example, if exposed, was often followed by dismissal; 
homosexuality likewise. Unmarried cohabitation, the same. ‘Keeping bad company,’ 
giving or attending ‘wild parties’ at which alcohol was consumed and women smoked 
cigarettes might not alone be grounds for dismissal but, coupled with other infringements 
on conventional rules of conduct, could be grounds for dismissal or at least for the 
withholding of promotion or raises in salary. Nevertheless, those restraints on the 
freedom of conduct of academics were not regarded as infringements on academic 
freedom. The American Association of University Professors did not enter the lists on 
behalf of their victims….they have never been seriously regarded as falling under the 
protection of the right to academic freedom” (Shils, 1997, 158-9). The Professional 
Model would never accept the idea that a professor could be fired for adultery, or 
 21 
 
homosexuality. Misconduct, if proven, had to be a violation of professional ethics, not 
personal moral standards. 
Shils admitted to some of the failings of the Gentleman Scientist Model during 
the McCarthy Era: “There is no evidence that academic freedom in the more exact 
sense—freedom in teaching and research—was affected by the harassment conducted by 
the investigative committees. Nevertheless, their consequences were very significant” 
(Shils, 1997, 169-170). The fact that the dominant theory of academic freedom could not 
protect academics against the anti-communist crusades of the late 1940s and 1950s, 
despite the significant consequences of those investigations, created much of the pressure 
on academics and the AAUP to alter that model, which led to the rise of the Professional 
and Liberty Models. But for Shils, even these problems should not have led to the 
abandonment of this older model, because the Gentleman Scientist Model existed only to 
protect the narrow boundaries of academic freedom, not to resolve every possible 
injustice against professors. 
Shils claimed since the AAUP became a trade union beginning in the late 1960s, 
“This was an acknowledgement—unacknowledged in any explicit statement—that the 
civil freedom of academics, and of course the more specific substantive academic 
freedom, was now so well established that the academic profession and the officers of the 
American Association of University Professors could cease to be anxious about its 
protection” (Shils, 1997, 165). Of course, it’s ridiculous to imagine that the AAUP 
simply ceased to be concerned with academic freedom in the late 1960s, and turned its 
attention to unionizing and economic issues. After all, in the 1970s and beyond, the 
AAUP continued (and even accelerated) its statements on academic freedom, 
 22 
 
investigated campuses for violations, and placed more institutions on the censure list than 
ever before. In fact, unionization became one of the techniques used by the AAUP to help 
protect academic freedom and, in an era of declining membership, sustain the funding 
needed to continue its work on behalf of academic freedom. 
So why would Shils make such a grand, sweeping statement about the AAUP that 
was so factually wrong? The answer is that Shils was so caught up in the old Gentlemen 
Scientist approach to academic freedom that he could not imagine any other model 
defining it. When the AAUP in the 1960s shifted toward the Professional Model and the 
Liberty Model, effectively abandoning the Gentleman Scientist Model favored by Shils, 
to the advocates of the Gentleman Scientist Model this amounted to an abandonment of 
any interest in academic freedom itself, since they could not imagine any other model 
defining the concept. 
Shils argued that the concern about unions, tenure, and salaries reflected a shift in 
the perception of “academic appointments as ‘jobs’ for which they were ‘hired’ and from 
which they could be ‘fired,’ rather than as a calling or profession with its own proper 
moral and intellectual dignities and obligations” (Shils, 1997, 166). The language Shils 
invoked about “proper” “dignities and obligations” reflected the gentlemanly (“moral”) 
and scientific (“intellectual”) traditions embodied in the Gentleman Scientist Model, 
which was all about dignity and obligations. Although Shils never used the term 
“Gentleman Scientist,” his rhetoric reflected its concern with proper behavior by 
academics. 
From Shils’ point of view, the AAUP was a victim of its own success at 
establishing and institutionalizing the ideal of academic freedom: “the founders of the 
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American Association of University Professors have been nearly completely successful. 
Seldom has an ideal been so nearly attained as that of academic freedom” (Shils, 1997, 
173). As Shils correctly put it, “Academics in the United States enjoy unprecedented 
freedom to say and do things which fifty and seventy-five years ago were the objects of 
severe sanctions by academic administrators…” (Shils, 1997, 173). 
As a sociologist, Shils understood the power of institutions to sustain themselves 
over time. Shils believed that the AAUP in the 1960s should have declared victory and 
dissolved itself, having attained full recognition within courts and colleges of the 
Gentleman Scientist Model’s protections for academic freedom. Instead, like many 
institutions, the AAUP adapted and expanded, altering its own conception of academic 
freedom beyond the boundaries of the Gentleman Scientist Model to meet the demands of 
a different time. 
For Shils, this was a betrayal of the AAUP’s purpose, because he saw no meaning 
to academic freedom beyond the Gentleman Scientist Model: “What is there for academic 
freedom to protect except security of tenure and the prerogative of frivolity? That is not 
what the founders of the American Association of University Professors had in mind 
when they took in hand the strengthening of academic freedom in American colleges and 
universities” (Shils, 1997, 176). 
The Gentleman Scientist Model was a product of its time in the early 20th 
Century, when the idea of academic freedom was being institutionalized and the broader 
culture did not recognize extensive rights to freedom of speech. The turmoil in academia 
in the wake of the McCarthy Era led to the development of two competing models, the 
Professional Model and the Liberty Model. But as Shils showed, the Gentleman Scientist 
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Model continued to be an influential model for academic freedom, particularly among 
critics of newer trends in academia. 
The Professional Model 
Matthew Finkin and Robert Post are the most eloquent defenders today of the 
Professional Model, and their approach to academic freedom must be understood and 
grappled with. Finkin and Post (2009) define academic freedom as this: “academic 
freedom consists of the freedom to pursue the scholarly profession according to the 
standards of that profession” (7). This is the essence of the Professional Model of 
academic freedom. Finkin and Post argue that academic freedom is only “the freedom to 
pursue the 'scholar's profession.'”(Finkin and Post, 2009, 38). The Professional Model is, 
to a great extent, the Gentleman Scientist Model’s focus on scientific (or, more broadly, 
academic) standards with many of the archaic gentlemanly traditions removed. 
Finkin and Post reject the Liberty Model as dangerous to free speech: “The 
conception of academic freedom as an individual right seems superficially attractive 
because it appears to promise greater security for academic dissent, but in the long run it 
undercuts the professionals norms necessary for the external defense of academic 
freedom” (Finkin and Post, 2009, 63). Finkin and Post are correct to point to the 
popularity of the Liberty Model of academic freedom, which defines it as an individual 
right, in academic circles. 
Finkin and Post embody the Professional Model's distrust of individual rights: “no 
university currently deals with its faculty as if academic freedom of research and 
publication were an individual right to be fully free from all institutional restraint” 
(Finkin and Post, 2009, 59). Therefore, they conclude, academic freedom depends on 
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“professional norms” (Finkin and Post, 2009, 59). But no theory of free speech adopts a 
completely absolute freedom from any restraint. Indeed, the individual right of free 
speech requires some limits on free speech (such as death threats and shouting down 
speakers), and it does not remove all kinds of restraints on free speech. 
Moreover, universities rarely put any institutional restraints on research and 
publication, beyond a widely-accepted prohibition on fraud and plagiarism. The most 
significant academic restraint on research, Institutional Review Boards (IRBs), were 
largely created to fulfill government requirements and to protect human subjects. 
Although IRBs have expanded their reach in ways that are sometimes troubling for 
academic freedom, their existence does not negate the theoretical protections of academic 
freedom. Indeed, IRBs have at times shown the dangers of the Professional Model, when 
they are misused to try to restrain a particular style of research rather than to protect 
human subjects. As for publication, it would be unthinkable for a university to place prior 
review or other restraints on any professor's choice of publication. For the most part, 
research and publication are indeed treated by universities as an individual academic 
freedom right that cannot be limited. 
What Finkin and Post see as one of the great virtues of the Professional Model is, 
in fact, a reflection of the weaknesses of academic freedom in 1915. Finkin and Post 
(2009) argue that the 1915 AAUP Declaration “differs fundamentally from the individual 
First Amendment rights that present themselves so vividly to the contemporary mind” 
(7). The Professional Model embodies academic freedom as a collective right of the 
faculty to determine professional standards, rather than the individual right of a professor 
to express dissenting views. But this reflected how weak the protections were for 
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academic freedom, not the ideal limits. Collective faculty self-determination was a 
defense mechanism at a time when individual rights had few protections. The AAUP was 
formed in 1915 to try to provide this self-defense through collective action. In these early 
days of academic freedom, there were even mass resignations by faculty in response to 
violations of academic freedom. 
A second assumption of Finkin and Post's argument is that professional norms are 
“necessary for the external defense of academic freedom” (Finkin and Post, 2009, 42). 
According to Finkin and Post (2009), “In the long run, public support for academic 
freedom will endure as long as the public need for the creation of such knowledge. Such 
support would vanish, however, if academic freedom were reconceptualized as an 
individual right authorizing faculty to research and publish in any manner they personally 
see fit” (42). This assertion is far from proven. It is possible, of course, that if the public 
ceases to respect scholars as professional experts, they will endorse restrictions on 
academic freedom. But it is also possible that if the public regards academic freedom as 
belonging to a small group of professionals rather than to everyone, then they will tend to 
express less support for it. So far, the answer is unknown. There have been no truly 
reliable surveys of the public about academic freedom and what might cause them to 
increase their support for it. But in any case, the most legitimate theory of academic 
freedom should not be determined by a poll of the general public. 
Of course, it is always easier to defend academic freedom if some of the most 
unpopular victims are abandoned on grounds of unprofessionalism. But that simply 
amounts to an argument that academic freedom is better protected when we seek to 
defend less of it. Certainly, under the Liberty Model, more cases to defend academic 
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freedom will be fought and lost than with the more limited Professional Model. But a 
lower percentage of victories does not make the Liberty Model less effective, if it 
increases academic freedom overall. 
However, it is possible that the individualist approach of the Liberty Model would 
be less popular with the public because it is a more powerful form of academic freedom 
than the Professional or Gentleman Scientist Models. If the public wants to see 
controversial scholars fired, then the system most likely to do this will be the most 
popular. Yet, it is doubtful that any theory of academic freedom should be embraced 
based upon what approach receives the highest ratings in public opinion polls. Even if a 
theory of academic freedom caused the majority of the public to demand for all 
universities should be shut down, that could easily mean that the majority is wrong, not 
the theory. Defending academic freedom in even democratically-elected Nazi Germany 
would have been dangerous and perhaps foolish, but not philosophically incorrect. 
Pragmatic theories of academic freedom are inevitably flawed by this compromise with 
public opinion. The whole purpose of academic freedom is to provide protection for 
unpopular opinions, so any approach that obeys the whim of the majority will fall short in 
practice. 
Extramural Utterances and the Professional Model 
Perhaps the greatest vulnerability of the Professional Model is its inability to offer 
a coherent defense of extramural utterances. The 1915 AAUP Declaration of Principles 
identified the three categories of academic freedom: research, teaching, and extramural 
utterances. In the century since that document was written, cases adjudicated by the 
AAUP involving extramural utterances far outnumber those where freedom of research 
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or teaching was involved (Metzger, 2000, 79). While teaching and research have 
occasionally sparked controversy, the history of academic freedom cases is 
overwhelmingly a record of extramural utterances, where professors speak on 
controversial issues outside of their academic work. Therefore, any theory of academic 
freedom must make extramural utterances a priority. 
Finkin and Post admit, “The most theoretically problematic aspect of academic 
freedom is extramural expression” because it has no connection to “faculty expertise” or 
shared governance (Finkin and Post, 2009, 127). Finkin and Post claimed that the 
AAUP's 1915 Declaration of Principles was “genuinely diffident” on extramural freedom 
(Finkin and Post, 2009, 129). It's true that the 1915 Declaration does not emphasize 
extramural utterances, but that was only because the AAUP didn't seek to focus attention 
on it. 
Yet the Professional Model can scarcely offer a coherent defense of extramural 
utterances. In fact, Finkin and Post are forced to divide up the category of extramural 
utterances by creating an entirely new fourth category, one never separately embraced by 
the AAUP: intramural utterances. The intramural utterance refers to a professor's 
criticism of the internal workings of a university.  
The intramural utterance category of academic freedom owes its existence to the 
success of the AAUP in the past century at making shared governance a fundamental 
value of American higher education. It is only when the key duty of faculty is to help run 
the institution that intramural utterances become essential to protect that professional 
duty of internal critique. 
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Finkin and Post understand the importance of shared governance and the critical 
need to protect intramural utterances so that faculty are allowed to have a functional role 
in the university. If faculty could never criticize the administration of a university without 
fearing retaliation, then it would be very difficult for them to maintain any functional role 
in governing the university.  
Still, intramural utterances—and even the concept of shared governance—are 
difficult to justify under the Professional Model. After all, faculty are not experts at 
running universities, and they usually cannot claim a scholarly expertise in the subject. 
So if academic freedom requires expertise, how can faculty claim the right to comment 
on their university and its actions? 
On this issue, as with extramural utterances, Finkin and Post seem to violate their 
theoretical stand and instead make a pragmatic adaptation. Recognizing the practical need 
for faculty to speak out freely about their institution if they are to help manage it, Finkin 
and Post see intramural utterances simply as essential to the work of faculty as 
professionals helping to run a university. 
A key objection to the Professional Model is its failure to create a workable 
theory of academic freedom that actually can protect scholars in the overwhelming 
majority of cases where academic freedom is threatened. By making academic freedom a 
“privilege of expertise”(Finkin and Post, 2009, 40), Finkin and Post put the concept in 
danger of becoming a privilege that can only be rarely exercised. 
According to Finkin and Post, “the production of knowledge requires not merely 
the negative liberty to speculate free from censorship but also an affirmative commitment 
to the virtues of reason, fairness, and accuracy” (Finkin and Post, 2009, 43). No one 
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doubts that reason, fairness, and accuracy are important. And few academics can succeed 
for long in any field of study if their arguments are irrational and their facts are 
inaccurate. 
But academic freedom was never intended to provide all of the requirements for 
the production of academic knowledge. And when reason, fairness, and accuracy become 
requirements for faculty, academic freedom can be imperiled. That's particularly true of 
fairness, which has never been seen as essential to scholarly work. Even reason and 
accuracy can threaten academic freedom when they are used selectively to target 
controversial faculty.  
Stanley Fish and the Professional Model 
Stanley Fish has proposed a more radical version of the Professional Model, one 
that takes a partial step back toward the Gentleman Scientist approach in its aversion to 
political speech. Fish argued, “While there are no limits to the subjects academics can 
investigate—the truth of anything can be inquired into—there are limits to the controlling 
motives within which investigation is to be conducted. It must be conducted (to return to 
the l915 Declaration) 'in a scholar’s spirit', that is with a view to determining what is in 
fact the case and not with a view to affirming a favored or convenient conclusion” (Fish, 
2014).  
By invoking the AAUP's 1915 Declaration and its vague language about “a 
scholar's spirit,” Fish seems to be utilizing the old Gentleman Scientist Model. But Fish’s 
language about academic work being “just a job” rejects the Gentleman Scientist view of 
academia as a higher calling. Fish's approach matches the Professional Model more 
closely because he hews to the Scientist part rather than the Gentleman one. In Fish's 
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view, gentlemanly behavior is irrelevant to academic work. To Fish, a scholar has no 
obligation to avoid controversy; in fact, a scholar may be obligated to raise controversial 
issues if they are relevant to the academic work. The key for Fish is that the controversy 
must be academic, not political. 
To roughly summarize the three models on this point, the Gentleman Scientist 
Model decries controversy and puts the burden on professors to, as the 1940 AAUP 
Statement put it, “be careful not to introduce into their teaching controversial matter.” 
The Liberty Model (seen in the 1970 Interpretive Comments) embraces controversy as 
“at the heart of the free academic inquiry.” The Professional Model embraced by Fish 
distinguishes between academic controversy (which is good) and political controversy 
(which is bad). 
A notable distinction between Fish’s Professional Model and the Gentleman 
Scientist Model is Fish’s support of controversy: “This does not mean that you must stay 
away from highly-charged political topics; only that when you introduce then in the 
classroom, you ask your students to analyze, describe and (if appropriate) compare them 
rather than asking them to take a stand on the issues the topics raise” (Fish, 2014, 23). 
Fish wants professors to discuss controversial political issues, and he wants them to take 
controversial academic stands. But he thinks political stands must be prohibited. 
The deep-seated connections between Fish and Post and Finkin’s approach can be 
seen in the fact that Fish praised Post and Finkin's book as “right on target” with only one 
exception. Fish wrote about professors who “sneak in their partisan preferences under the 
cover of providing students with supplementary materials. That, I think, is a genuine 
concern, and one Finkin and Post do not take seriously enough” (Fish, 2014). This “risk” 
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that “intellectual inquiry will give way to partisan venting” is one that Fish gives greater 
weight to than Post and Finkin, but otherwise they share the basic values of the 
Professional Model (Fish, 2014). 
Fish’s Five Schools of Academic Freedom 
In his latest work, Fish (2014) defined “Academic Freedom Studies” and 
identified five different schools of thought about academic freedom: 
(1)—the “It’s just a job” school, where “academics are not free in any special 
sense to do anything but their jobs.” 
(2)—the “For the common good” school, in which “professional values are 
subordinated to the higher values of democracy or justice or freedom, that is, to the 
common good.” 
(3)—the “Academic exceptionalism or uncommon beings” school, where faculty 
“are not to be held accountable to the same laws and restrictions that constrain ordinary 
citizens.” 
(4)—the “Academic freedom as critique” school, in which “academic freedom is 
understood by this school as a protection for dissent and the scope of dissent must extend 
to the very distinctions and boundaries the academy presently enforces.” 
(5)—the school of academic freedom as training for revolution, which treats 
academic freedom as a tool to be used rather than a principle applied to all. 
Fish argued for the first school, declaring that “the defense of academic freedom 
flows from a description of the good academics offer—the good of disinterested inquiry” 
(Fish, 2014). This ideal of being “disinterested” was a classic part of the Professional 
Model. According to Fish, “Academic freedom, in this picture, is a subset not of morality 
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or philosophy, but of professionalism” (Fish, 2014). For Fish’s Professional Model, 
academic freedom was just a mundane work requirement: “While academic freedom is 
often celebrated in grand, indeed grandiose, terms, it is at base a guild slogan that speaks 
to the desire of the academic profession to run its own shop” (Fish, 2014). Unlike Post 
and Finkin (who represented the second school of thought in Fish’s model), Fish did not 
see academia as a grand profession at all, and regarded academic freedom as a tool for 
workers rather than serving any noble goal. 
But Fish’s analysis of the remaining three schools, which he condemned, did not 
offer much analysis of the meaning of academic freedom. Fish attacked the “academic 
exceptionalism” school, but the notion that there is something special about academic 
work was certainly part of his own approach (as well as Post and Finkin’s second school). 
Arguing about whether academics are exceptional or not does little to define the meaning 
of academic freedom itself. 
The fourth school, “academic freedom as critique,” was Fish’s attack on leftist 
critics such as Judith Butler who argued that academic freedom must include the right of 
professors to challenge the foundations of their disciplines, a focus on individual rights 
that is part of the Liberty Model. 
The fifth school, “training for revolution,” was actually a pedagogical model 
rather than a model of academic freedom. Fish argued, “The view of education that lies 
behind and informs this most expansive version of academic freedom is articulated by 
Henry Giroux. The 'responsibilities that come along with teaching,' he says, include 
fighting 'for an inclusive and radical democracy by recognizing that education in the 
broadest sense is not just about understanding ,…but also about providing the conditions 
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for assuming the responsibilities we have as citizens to expose human misery and to 
eliminate the conditions that produce it' (Against The Terror of Neoliberalism, 2008). In 
this statement the line between the teacher as a professional and the teacher as a citizen 
disappears” (Fish, 2014). Fish believed that Giroux’s pedagogical theories went beyond 
Fish’s dictated limits of academic freedom, but Giroux did not propose a theory of 
academic freedom that only protects those who share his pedagogical theories. What Fish 
called “academic freedom as revolution” is actually a theory of pedagogy as revolution, 
and a belief that this pedagogy is protected by academic freedom. 
Fish’s five theories of academic freedom were, as Fish put it, “plotted on a 
continuum that goes from right to left. The continuum is obviously a political one, but the 
politics are the politics of the academy” (Fish, 2014). 
However, Fish’s five schools of thought are not a useful analysis of academic 
freedom theories precisely because of Fish’s focus on politics. Theories of academic 
freedom do not always neatly conform to the political views of their advocates. More 
importantly, Fish’s five schools do not adequately explain what academic freedom means 
in these different approaches. 
It is notable that Fish also argued for “two views of academic freedom. In one 
freedom is a general, overriding, and ever-expanding value and the academy is just one of 
the places that house it. In the other, the freedom in question is peculiar to the academic 
profession and limited to the performance of its core duties” (Fish, 2014). This describes 
roughly the contrast between the Professional Model and the Liberty Model, which is a 
more coherent way to examine theories of academic freedom than Fish’s five schools. 
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But Fish’s approach to the Professional Model is a particularly extreme version of 
it. The theory Fish has espoused against allowing politics in academe is a deeply political 
theory; by contrast, the Liberty Model that advocates freedom for political views in 
academia is actually apolitical, because it does not judge statements based on their 
political content. 
What distinguishes Fish's version of the Professional Model from the old 
Gentleman Scientist approach is that Fish argued for a distinctly profession-based 
analysis: “it is important for the ‘It’s just a job’ school to be able to justify a firm 
distinction between academic work and politics (understood as partisan politics) without 
resorting to metaphysical doctrines of truth, objectivity, etc;”(Fish, 2014). Fish's rejection 
of a core scientific concept like “objectivity” shows how his model is truly modern 
despite some of its eccentricities. 
Fish argued, “If you know (in your disciplinary bones) that what you’re supposed 
to be doing is putting theses, including your own, to the test of rigorous documentation 
and techniques of falsification, you also and already know that you’re not supposed to 
allow your efforts to be guided or influenced by your partisan ideological desires” (Fish, 
2014). A proof by citing one’s “disciplinary bones” hardly seems to pass the test of 
rigorous documentation that Fish himself demands. But the bigger problem is that 
“partisan ideological desires” are often in the eye of the beholder. Theories of academic 
freedom are not about the ethical desires of individuals. They are all about the machinery 
of academic regulation imposed on individuals.  
Fish's proposal to prohibit the use of “methods either direct or indirect” to lead 
students toward a particular viewpoint is an example of an extraordinarily vague 
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prohibition on “political” speech. The mere choice of readings or the discussion of certain 
facts is always subject to bias that certainly must influence students. And many 
professors, including Fish, want to lead their students in subtle or not-so-subtle ways 
toward what they see as the truth.  
Whatever the philosophical debate involved in the prohibition of politics, Fish's 
approach presents a number of serious practical dangers. After all, it is hard to imagine 
who can be trusted to properly interpret when a professor is indirectly leading students 
toward a particular viewpoint. Fish himself has shown poor judgment about what should 
be a prohibited political viewpoint. In 1990, as chair of Duke University’s English 
department, Fish wrote to the provost that members of the conservative National 
Association of Scholars “should not be appointed to key university committees” because 
they were “racist, sexist, and homophobic,” and “had already decided, in terms of fixed 
political categories, what is or is not meritorious” (Wilson, 1995, 54). Fish’s misguided 
attempt to punish those he thought had allowed their political judgments to overcome 
academic judgments was an example of how easy it is for an academic administrator to 
interpret academic views he opposes as “political” and therefore deserving of 
punishment.  
Fish called his approach a “non-philosophical version of academic freedom” 
(Fish, 2014). But, of course, it is deeply philosophical, and deeply political, too, in its 
rejection of politics. What Fish proposes for academic freedom is not the absence of 
politics, but a constant awareness of it. After all, without such vigilance, politics could 
creep in almost anywhere, as Fish fears that it has. 
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Fish (2014) worried that “the boundaries of freedom will expand with the desires 
and ambitions of the academic who invokes it.” Fish was absolutely right—without 
boundaries on freedom, academic freedom could expand with the desires of any 
academic invoking it. His mistake was imagining that politics is the only important 
boundary, and that a ban on political speech was the only way to impose boundaries.  
In the attempt to ban politics from the classroom, Fish’s Professional Model ends 
up making the politically-based choices he says are illegitimate. Rather than removing 
politics from academic decision-making, Fish’s Professional Model puts politics at the 
forefront of every analysis by making it a forbidden subject. 
Fish, in his radical form of the Professional Model, rejected the idea of an 
individual right to academic freedom so intensely that he sees institutional academic 
freedom as the only proper claim to the term: “If you begin by assuming that academic 
freedom attaches to the individual professor (and student) rather than to the institution, 
the exercise of your freedom might well involve flouting the institution’s protocols in the 
name of a higher obligation; and once you reach that conclusion, you are more than half-
way to deciding that what academics are free (and obligated) to do is critique and oppose 
arrangements that impede the advancement of social progress by protecting the status 
quo” (Fish, 2014). While Fish regarded such a conclusion as a great political evil, the 
Liberty Model does indeed argue that all professors should be free to advocate their own 
particular political view, whether it is the belief that political action is good or the belief 
(as Fish holds) that political action is evil. Under the Liberty Model, academics are 
indeed free to critique and oppose arrangements that impede the advancement of social 
progress. What’s less clear is why Fish imagined that such criticism endangers academia. 
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Fundamentally, Fish regarded the Professional Model as the only possible 
understanding of academic freedom: “The professional definition of academic freedom is 
not merely a rival account of the academy. It is the academy. A capacious definition of 
academic freedom, urged in the name of social justice and human solidarity, undermines 
both academic freedom and the very idea of academic life” (Fish, 2014). 
The Liberty Model (which Fish called the “capacious definition”) was attacked by 
Fish in both its purpose and its effects. Fish imagined that the Liberty Model is urged 
only for “social justice” purposes. Although advocates of social justice naturally embrace 
a theory of academic freedom that protects what they advocate, this is not the basis of the 
Liberty Model. In fact, the Liberty Model also protects faculty who advocate against a 
leftist vision of social justice. 
The problem Fish never really confronted is the difficulty in escaping politics. 
What to one person might seem like an indisputable fact is a political prejudice to 
someone else. As Cary Nelson noted about Fish's advocacy for political disengagement in 
academia, “It is itself a political position” (Nelson, 2010, 181). The Liberty Model was 
born out of this belief that everyone has political positions, whether they recognize them 
or not. 
Defining the Liberty Model 
Former AAUP president Cary Nelson is a leading advocate of the Liberty Model. 
The core distinction of the Liberty Model from the Professional Model and the 
Gentleman Scientist Model is its defense of political speech in the classroom. Under the 
Liberty Model, political speech is no different from any other kind of speech. A key tenet 
of the Liberty Model is that political speech is not treated any differently from other 
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speech. If the political speech is relevant to the classroom, then it is fully protected like 
any other classroom speech. If the political speech is not relevant to the classroom, then it 
is still protected from arbitrary penalties. A college can punish a professor who constantly 
spouts political theories if that professor is failing to teach the class, but only if the same 
penalty applies for a professor who devotes a class to non-political distractions. The 
Liberty Model holds that the math professor who spends every moment of every class 
railing against (or in favor of) the president can be criticized, but any punishment should 
be no different than the professor who spends every moment denouncing (or praising) the 
football team. The key is that the basic failure to do one's job, not the political content or 
unpopular viewpoint being expressed, must be the basis of any punishment. Expressing 
controversial political opinions is the same as writing a letter to the editor about 
vegetables, or discussing the weather in class. The expression of these political views, 
inside the classroom or out, may be poor pedagogy, but it is essential to protect the 
freedom to express them. 
The Liberty Model also fundamentally differs from the Professional Model in 
seeing academic freedom as an idea of individual rights at its core. As Nelson put it, “If a 
faculty committee acts to compromise academic freedom or deny recognition to a 
deserving faculty member, it should be asked to reconsider and, if necessary, be 
overruled” (Nelson, 2010, 40). The Professional Model, which defines academic freedom 
by collective faculty judgments, sharply disagrees with this principle. 
The Liberty Model does not remove the faculty or its collective action from the 
picture. As Nelson noted, “Academic freedom is an empty concept, or at least an 
effectively diminished one, if the faculty does not control its enforcement through shared 
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governance” (Nelson, 2010, 32). Faculty are the central defenders of academic freedom, 
and the leading beneficiaries of the concept. In practice, such violations of individual 
faculty academic freedom by collective faculty judgments are exceedingly rare, so rare 
that it might be unwise to allow faculty judgments to be overruled. In practical terms, the 
Professional Model and the Liberty Model often share common ground in defending 
academic freedom. But the differences in principles are important to understand how 
divergent their theoretical approaches are. 
Nelson offered a sharp critique of the Gentleman Scientist Model that dominated 
the early years of the AAUP: “Since the 1915 Declaration, the AAUP has been 
historically overinvested in quiet rationality and sweet reasonableness as the only ethical 
models for professional interaction” (Nelson, 2010, 117). Imposed rationality and 
sweetness, the scientific and gentlemanly approaches, are antithetical to the Liberty 
Model. From Nelson's perspective, the Professional Model is flawed by its historical 
connection to the Gentleman Scientist Model. The danger is that the old narrow 
restrictions of the Gentleman Scientist Model on ungentlemanly behavior and unscientific 
thinking can be redefined as unprofessional behavior under the Professional Model.  
Nelson noted, “The idea that all university dialogue needs to be conducted in 
calm, dispassionate, unvaryingly respectful way in fact makes the university less useful 
as a social model, because then the university seems unrealistic and irrelevant” (Nelson, 
124). Nelson worried, “Too many campuses enforce a stifling and inflexible imposition 
of reasonableness on public events...” (Nelson, 124). 
The Liberty Model argues that what are called, in varying circumstances, 
“reasonable,” “calm,” “dispassionate,” “collegial,” “rational,” “objective,” 
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“disinterested,” “fair-minded,” are often simply code words for imposing a gentlemanly 
style on professors even when the content of the speech deserves protection. The Liberty 
Model recognizes that there is a wide range of potentially valid teaching styles. 
In practice, such violations of individual faculty academic freedom by collective 
faculty judgments are exceedingly rare, so rare that it might be unwise to allow faculty 
judgments to be overruled. In practical terms, the Professional Model and the Liberty 
Model often share common ground in defending academic freedom. But the differences 
in principles are important to understand how divergent their theoretical approaches are. 
The Uniqueness of Academic Freedom 
Finkin and Post (2009) criticized the Liberty Model because it does not explain 
what is special, and academic, about academic freedom: “In a democracy each and every 
citizen is entitled to enjoy the liberty of free and critical inquiry, and it is therefore 
unclear why scholars should receive special protections for this liberty, protections that 
other Americans do not generally possess against their private employers” (44). Finkin 
and Post (2009) offered a challenge to the Liberty Model: a theory of academic freedom 
“must explain why scholars ought to enjoy freedoms that other members of the public do 
not possess” (44). But the Liberty Model rejects the idea that a theory of academic 
freedom must grant special freedoms to scholars and deny them to others. What makes 
academic freedom “academic” is the historical traditions of higher education that built it, 
and the special benefits to universities and the rest of society from having researchers and 
teachers who are free to think and speak. But the Liberty Model refuses to build a wall of 
separation between colleges and the rest of society.  
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Under the Liberty Model, there is no reason at all why the standards of academic 
freedom could not also be applied to administrators, students, K-12 teachers, journalists, 
or even “ordinary” workers for corporations and governments. This broad application 
does not make “academic freedom” meaningless; instead, it makes the core meaning of 
academic freedom applicable to all institutions, for the simple reason that the ideas that 
are at the core of the academic world can be found in any workplace, along with the value 
of encouraging dissenters, dreamers, and contrary thinkers. Academic freedom does not 
need to be unique in order to exist. 
What makes academic freedom “academic” is its special application to academic 
institutions, not some inherent freedom that no one else should be allowed to possess. 
American colleges are the leading structures in our society run according to broadly-
embraced and institutionalized systems of freedom, but there is no logical necessity for 
them to be the only ones. Under the Liberty Model, “academic freedom” is just a peculiar 
subset of “intellectual freedom,” but that lack of exclusivity is not a logical argument 
against it. 
Indeed, the question of uniqueness is much more problematic for the Professional 
Model. Imagine a university where the president orders the firing of any administrative 
staffers who criticize a particular politician. Can the Professional Model really claim that 
a president’s firing based on political reasons does not involve academic freedom, simply 
because academic freedom only applies to faculty scholars? What about expelling 
students who express political viewpoints? Is that also unrelated to academic freedom 
because students are not scholars? 
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Advocates of the Professional Model would reject such attacks on freedom of 
expression but not want them to be called “academic freedom.” But under the Liberty 
Model, academic freedom is the freedom of the academy, and academic freedom must 
pervade all aspects of the institution. In a corporation, the employees and customers have 
no rights; in a university, all employees and customers (students) have some rights, and it 
seems logical to call these rights part of academic freedom rather than invent new terms 
to describe the special freedoms at academic institutions. 
Academic freedom often seems like an elitist concept: a special right reserved for 
the best and the brightest faculty, to give them particular protection so that they can 
bequeath to us their brilliant ideas. And there is a great deal of historical truth in that 
elitism.  
Calling the Gentleman Scientist Model or the Professional Model elitist does not, 
in itself, serve as an effective criticism. Universities themselves are a kind of elitism, 
institutions originally developed and sustained to provide Americans with ministers and 
leaders, and then later expanded to include many other fields and many more people. But 
universities remain, as they always were, the domain of an educated elite. 
The problem with the Gentleman Scientist Model lies in the particular kind of 
elitism it establishes, one that seeks to limit the scope of academic freedom as well as the 
people permitted to enjoy it. And the Professional Model shares that same commitment to 
elitism. 
The Liberty Model takes a different approach to academic freedom. Instead of 
seeing academic freedom as a kind of property belonging to an elite academic class of 
tenured professors, the Liberty Model sees academic freedom as a fundamental principle 
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of colleges, one that everyone shares in and benefits from. Instead of being the property 
of an elite class, academic freedom under the Liberty Model is a core principle of higher 
education. The tenured faculty are the key guardians of academic freedom, but not its 
owners or sole beneficiaries. 
Another advocate of the Professional Model, Louis Menand argued, "Academic 
freedom is, at a basic level, an expression of self interest: it is a freedom for academics” 
(Menand, 1996, 9). He noted that "wide freedom of inquiry" exists "only for the 
specialist” (Menand, 1996, 8). But according to the Liberty Model, the purpose of 
academic freedom is not to protect the freedom of professors to be specialists. The 
purpose of academic freedom is to create colleges where freedom flourishes. One 
absolutely critical mechanism for reaching that goal is to protect professors, but the 
protection of professors' freedom should not be regarded as the only mechanism and 
certain not as the sole goal of academic freedom. No one could properly describe a 
university as having academic freedom if students were prohibited from ever speaking 
their views publicly, even if the freedom of professors was fully protected. There is a 
good reason why we call it “academic freedom” rather than “faculty freedom.” 
Walter Metzger is another advocate for the Professional Model. According to 
Metzger, “Ever since 1915, when the concept of Lehrfreiheit [professor freedom] was 
decoupled from the concept of Lernfreiheit [student freedom], the standard professional 
answer to the question of ‘who is entitled to academic freedom?’ has been ‘every 
academic and no one but an academic.’”(Metzger, 2000, 83). Although Metzger is a 
preeminent historian of academic freedom, his vision of an unaltered singular standard 
for academic freedom since 1915 is simply inaccurate. Lehrfreiheit and Lernfreiheit were 
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always complementary concepts, but never were they regarded as a singular vision of 
academic freedom that had been divided into two halves. But the mere existence of 
Lernfreiheit suggested that academic freedom always meant more than just the liberty of 
professors. 
The danger of the Liberty Model is that once academic freedom is broadened and 
expanded, will it lose its essential meaning? The key for the Liberty Model is to 
understand academic freedom as a principle, not a process; academic freedom is a 
universal ideal rather than a property controlled by a certain group. As long as the 
principle of academic freedom is adhered to, there is no danger in expanding it to include 
everyone.  
Expanding academic freedom from its elitist origins always poses the danger that 
the concept will be abused. But the danger of misinterpretation exists in every model of 
academic freedom, and it cannot be an argument for preferring one model over another. 
Professional Norms and the Liberty Model 
Finkin and Post are right when they argue that the Liberty Model undercuts 
professional norms. Professional norms do suffer when academic freedom is an 
individual right. After all, if individual faculty are allowed to dissent from dogmas 
established by professional norms, those norms can be subject to questioning and change. 
But the essence of the Liberty Model is that professional norms always manage to survive 
well in a state of freedom, while individual rights are far more vulnerable to repression. 
There is no necessary link between academic freedom and professional norms. 
The Liberty Model does not entirely remove professional norms, of course. In any 
process of hiring, tenure, and promotion, disciplinary norms will be imposed out of 
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necessity. Judgments of academic quality must be made by every peer review committee, 
whether it is for a journal article, a job opening, or a tenure decision. And judgments of 
academic quality will always be affected by ideology. Inevitably, scholars tend to think 
(albeit with exceptions) that the academic work they agree with is superior to that which 
they disagree with. The Liberty Model does not overturn professional norms or academic 
judgment. 
The Liberty Model puts the emphasis on individual rights because that idea offers 
the strongest defense of professional norms. Without an individual right of academic 
freedom, professional norms are simply too weak to prevail. No one ever successfully 
sued a college or obtained a censure from the AAUP simply because the administration 
violated professional norms by overturning a faculty judgment. Professional norms are 
only meaningful as a buttress for individual rights, not as an alternative to them. And the 
reality is that the Professional Model alone cannot adequately protect academic freedom. 
Under the Liberty Model, academic freedom belongs to everyone, not to the small 
subset of tenured professors exercising their professional judgment. Professors represent 
the core of academic freedom, the defenders of it, but not the sole proprietors. The 
academic freedom of professors is only limited insofar as it is necessary to protect the 
academic freedom of other faculty and of students. 
Evaluation and Punishment under the Liberty Model 
Finkin and Post (2009) critiqued the Liberty Model’s individual rights by 
invoking an ideal of balance: “The traditional ideal of academic freedom, with its twin 
commitments to freedom of research and to compliance with professional norms, nicely 
balances these negative and affirmative dimensions. This balance would be lost if 
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academic freedom were reformulated as an individual right that insulates scholars from 
professional regulation” (43). If so, Finkin and Post claimed, “academic freedom would 
regard the communication of each scholar as equally protected” (43).  
However, Finkin and Post presented a caricature of the Liberty Model when they 
suggested it would demand absolute relativism in evaluating faculty. In the career of a 
faculty member under long-held AAUP guidelines, there are two different types of 
review of faculty: evaluation and punishment. The evaluation stage comes when faculty 
are hired, tenured, or promoted. In the evaluation stage, it is appropriate to give a broad 
analysis of the faculty member's quality of teaching, research, and service. Although 
faculty should never be evaluated on viewpoint, the style they use in the classroom can be 
relevant to their success and the overall quality of their work. A professor who expresses 
political views in the classroom can be evaluated if that expression affects the quality of 
their teaching, but not merely for the expression of those views. While there is a threat to 
academic freedom in the evaluation stage, it is a necessary part of upholding academic 
standards. 
In fact, the limited nature of the evaluation stage is essential to the protection of 
academic freedom. If professors are constantly working in the evaluation stage, where 
any mistake in the classroom can lead to dismissal for poor teaching, it will tend to 
silence experimental ideas and the open expression of them. 
In the punishment stage, which is how the great bulk of an academic career under 
a tenure system is spent, any professor can be punished at any time. But the standards for 
punishment are much higher than the standards used in evaluation. Punishment requires a 
violation of other's rights or a fundamental betrayal of professional standards, such as by 
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failing to teach one's classes or committing severe misconduct, such as plagiarism. But 
the Professional Model, by declaring that any minor violation of professional norms is 
punishable and is unprotected by academic freedom, leaves open the possibility of 
extremely broad violations of liberty. 
During the evaluation stage, a professor can face a penalty, including the extreme 
penalty of losing one's job, for relatively minor academic “crimes” such as mediocre 
teaching, making factual mistakes, or utilizing poor arguments in research. This is the 
nature of academic excellence, that mediocrity is punished. But because the evaluation 
stage is severely limited, and the standards are clear, the threat to academic freedom is 
minimized. The necessity of limiting the evaluation in order to protect academic freedom 
also explains why tenure is so critical to academic freedom. 
With a system of tenure, the process of evaluation is highly professionalized, 
largely under the control of faculty members who are obliged to follow professional 
standards in their decisions, which utilize a comprehensive examination of the professor's 
quality of work. Without tenure, the system of evaluation is no longer restrained. If every 
faculty members is evaluated every year on a constant basis, then real peer review is 
effectively impossible. Evaluation falls in the hands of administrators, who are rarely able 
to do any comprehensive evaluations on a regular basis, especially since they lack the 
specialized academic knowledge necessary to evaluate faculty. As a result, without a 
tenure system, faculty will only face evaluation and penalty if they do something 
controversial: criticize the administration, offend a student in the classroom, or say 
something impolitic in public. 
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The long history of academic freedom proves that controversial faculty will face 
punishment for their views if they live under a system of constant evaluation. Without a 
key moment such as tenure to concentrate attention, it is likely that a faculty member will 
never receive a systematic evaluation of the quality of their work. Instead, faculty who 
are merely adequate will be passed along every year unless they somehow rock the boat.  
Tenure, far from harming the quality of faculty, actually is likely to improve it. 
Underperforming faculty who don't attract attention are more likely to be forced out in a 
tenure system than a constant evaluation system. And excellent faculty who express 
controversial ideas are much more likely to survive in a tenure system. 
The great innovation of the tenure system is creating this separation between the 
evaluation stage and the punishment stage in the academic career. The tenure system 
protects academic freedom not by giving faculty a job for life, but by limiting the 
evaluation process to a few key moments. In doing so, peer review is both possible 
(because the intense review process is limited) and effective (because it identifies the best 
teachers and scholars, rather than waiting for a complaints and controversy to guide the 
system of firing faculty). This makes professional standards much stronger than in a 
hierarchical employment system. Equally important, the tenure process makes it much 
harder to fire controversial faculty who express unpopular ideas.  
According to Finkin and Post, the Professional Model offers the only solution to a 
paradox created by the Liberty Model: “We are thus led to a paradox. Intellectual 
standards are required to connect the exercise of academic freedom” (Finkin and Post, 
2010, 55). There is no paradox in connecting intellectual standards to the exercise of 
individual academic freedom, only practical difficulties that must exist in the 
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enforcement of any kind of liberty. There is no such thing as absolute freedom. But that 
fact cannot lead us to abandon the concept of academic freedom altogether. 
Finkin and Post argued, “it is plainly unacceptable to believe that professors 
possess 'full freedom' to violate professional norms” (Finkin and Post, 2009, 56). But 
there is a fundamental difference between having full freedom to do research and having 
full freedom to be rewarded for that research. No, there is no “full freedom” to do any 
research you want and get tenure for it. But there is, in general, the freedom to pursue that 
research without prior review, and without arbitrary punishment. There is a small 
category of research deemed so unprofessional as to merit punishment (even for tenured 
professors), such as plagiarism and other forms of academic dishonesty. But these have to 
do with the methods of research, and not its content.  
Finkin and Post argued for their Professional Model as the only possible winner in 
the battle between “individualist academic freedom” and “professionalist academic 
freedom.” However, the Liberty Model of academic freedom emphasizes individual 
rights, but it does not violate professional norms. Instead, it recognizes that individual 
rights are often how professional norms must be protected. But the individual rights 
approach also posits an idea of how one aspect of professional norms—the dominant 
theories in a discipline—must be is constantly in flux and subject to evolving theories. 
Yesterday's professional ideological norm sometimes is today's nonsense, and vice versa.  
Likewise, professional behavioral norms must also be allowed to evolve over time 
and provide a wide range of acceptable approaches. Academia has always had professors 
who offended the norms of society in their teaching, research, and extramural utterances. 
These professors often faced the worst censorship. The Gentleman Scientist Model set a 
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behavioral standard of politeness that had nothing to do with academic norms. While the 
Professional Model seems to abandon that archaic approach, it rarely clarifies exactly 
what professional norms should mean. And because the Liberty Model’s ideal of 
individualist academic freedom has become gradually established as a professional norm, 
the Professional Model cannot claim exclusive control over what professional norms are. 
The Professional Model is not the only model that considers professional norms to 
be an essential part of academic freedom. The Liberty Model requires professional norms 
because that's the foundation of academic freedom. The Liberty Model presumes that 
there are legitimate and illegitimate approaches for faculty hiring and firing, and those are 
based on professional norms. In fact, the Professional Model, despite the name, is merely 
espousing a narrower framework of professional norms. And by failing to fully protect 
academic freedom, the Professional Model falls short on one of the most important 
professional norms. 
Advocates of the Professional Model argue that professionalism is an essential 
limit on academic freedom. According to Larry Gerber, “Academic freedom, in other 
words, requires a governance system in which faculty expertise—often residing in an 
individual, but also expressed at times in a collective fashion—is the determining factor 
in institutional decisions affecting academic matters” (Gerber, 2010, 13). This is a crucial 
point: professionalism defines the mechanism for enacting academic freedom in day-to-
day academic decisions. The mistake often made is to jump from this to the assumption 
that the concept of academic freedom is limited solely to professional activities and 
therefore unprofessionalism can be punished, which is a key idea of the Professional 
Model. 
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Professionalization is a necessary part of the Liberty Model of academic freedom 
because the professional body of faculty must make the key hiring and tenure decisions 
based on professional criteria. The Liberty Model argues that faculty as professionals 
must make these decisions, but need to do so while protecting faculty freedom to speak, 
freedom to research, and freedom within the classroom. The Professional Model of 
academic freedom, by contrast, seems to allow faculty to punish those who are deemed to 
violate professional standards. Nothing in the Liberty Model rejects the professional role 
of faculty decision-making in personnel decisions. The Liberty Model, however, 
recognizes the need for different criteria in making those decisions, such as to allow 
faculty freedom to express political views within the classroom.  
Under the Gentleman Scientist Model, faculty self-regulation is the dream for 
which many sacrifices to social norms will be made. Under the Professional Model, 
faculty self-regulation is the goal of the academic community. Under the Liberty 
Model, faculty self-regulation is merely the best method for protecting academic 
freedom. The fundamental differences between these approaches lead to drastically 
varied realities produced by the models. For the Liberty Model, faculty control of the 
hiring and dismissal process is a means to the end, and academic freedom is the end. 
For the Professional Model, academic freedom is redefined within the confines of the 
faculty self-regulation.  
The Liberty Model does not free faculty from professional responsibilities. 
Faculty are still obligated to do their jobs, to respect the rights of others, and to engage in 
their work without the kind of dishonesty involved in proven cases of plagiarism and 
fraud. The difference between the Professional Model and the Liberty Model comes 
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when attempts are made to punish faculty for the crime of being “unprofessional” in 
some way, such as the firing of Ward Churchill at the University of Colorado for 
incorrectly citing scholars who disagreed with him, the firing of John Boyle at 
Northeastern Illinois University for recruiting students to minor in his program, or the 
firing of Norman Finkelstein at DePaul University for harsh criticism of other scholars in 
his research. While advocates of the Professional Model have defended some of these 
scholars for violations of due process or other reasons, only the Liberty Model provides a 
clear theoretical objection for why these firings violated academic freedom. 
In practice, the AAUP has largely adopted the Liberty Model as a statement of 
its values and the Professional Model as the guide for its daily activities, while the 
AAUP’s fundamental statements still include some language from the Gentleman 
Scientist Model. This may help explain why there is so much confusion and 
disagreement about the meaning of academic freedom, even within the AAUP. 
Most of the AAUP's documents indicate that the Liberty Model is the primary 
guide for the meaning of academic freedom, that it is an individual right of all 
academics to freedom of teaching, freedom of research, and freedom of speech.  
But the Professional Model and its focus on faculty self-regulation, remains the 
core of AAUP activity. A key point at which the Professional Model and the Liberty 
Model diverge is when an individual professor is punished by colleagues in violation of 
academic freedom. Under the Professional Model, that sentence might be regarded as 
nonsensical: when the faculty punish individual members of the guild, it is an exercise 
of true academic freedom, not a violation of it. And the AAUP has generally held it to 
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be quite clear, that it will not intervene in cases of faculty acting collectively to violate 
the academic freedom of other faculty. 
The reason for this is quite logical: in order to overturn a faculty decision that 
violates academic freedom, the AAUP would have to put its trust in the administration 
or trustees to overrule faculty decisions about academic matters. But the overwhelming 
majority of violations of academic freedom occur in precisely those circumstances. So, 
even if the faculty acting collectively might be capable of violating academic freedom 
(as the AAUP standards accept in theory), the threat of overruling faculty decisions for 
ideological reasons is so dangerous to academic freedom that the AAUP desires to stop 
it altogether, even if it might be beneficial in a few cases. 
Unlike disciplinary associations, the AAUP lacks the expertise to make an 
affirmative statement about the qualifications of a professor within a particular field. If 
there is no faculty body at an individual college making a statement that declares an 
individual well-qualified, then it is difficult to prove any violation of academic freedom. 
For that reason, AAUP reports focus overwhelmingly on due process, and rarely 
address the substance of a complaint. 
The AAUP and the Three Models 
The fact that the AAUP as an organization includes the leading advocates of the 
Liberty Model (Nelson as a deeply influential former president) and the Professional 
Model (Finkin and Post as long-standing members of Committee A on Academic 
Freedom and Tenure) reflects the complexity and contradictions of the AAUP as an 
organization. The AAUP’s practices and written policies are a strange brew of all three 
models, with the influence of each model reflected in the language and its interpretation. 
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In discussing politics in the classroom and the archaic AAUP language about it, 
Nelson wrote, “I take 'persistent' to refer to bringing outside material into the classroom 
so frequently that the ability to teach the course's advertised content is impaired. Even 
then, I regard the warning as ethical and professional advice, not the logic for a regime of 
surveillance” (Nelson, 2010, 171). Under the Liberty Model, the AAUP’s old Gentleman 
Scientist language is a statement of values rather than an enforceable policy. But this is a 
fundamental reinterpretation of the language in ways that the AAUP’s founders could 
never have imagined. The Liberty Model represents a radical shift in perspectives, not 
merely a small adjustment in interpretations. 
Understanding the historical changes in the AAUP’s approach to the theory of 
academic freedom, as well the different voices within it, is essential not merely to see the 
contradictions inherent in the AAUP as an organization, but also to comprehend the 
theoretical debate over the meaning of academic freedom. Rather than being the 
authoritative voice of a singular vision of academic freedom, the AAUP has served as an 
institution where the idea of academic freedom has been fiercely debated, and ultimately 
evolved into its current state.  
Institutional Academic Freedom 
Any discussion of academic freedom must include a mention of theories that have 
been offered to define its meaning but do not fit with these other models, including the 
Institutional Academic Freedom model, the Denial model, and the Revolutionary model. 
An approach to academic freedom that has gained influence in legal circles is 
Institutional Academic Freedom. It is notable that when the AAUP in 1915 defined its 
statement of principles, the idea of institutional academic freedom simply did not exist. 
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The 1915 Declaration of Principles clearly states that there are two kinds of academic 
freedom, the student and the faculty, and that the AAUP's concern was solely with the 
latter. The notion that the administration had a kind of “academic freedom” would have 
seemed bizarre. 
Institutional Academic Freedom, I argue, is not a core concept of any of the 
models of academic freedom, and in fact it must contradict those models. To the extent 
that violations of institutional autonomy threaten academic freedom, the danger they pose 
can be entirely contained within the three models of academic freedom in this study.  
Instead, Institutional Academic Freedom is a peculiar legal concept that co-opted 
the term “academic freedom” beginning in the 1970s. Originally mentioned by Justice 
Powell in the Bakke affirmative action case, it was intended to provide universities with 
greater discretion to act without government or court scrutiny over every decision. Over 
time, the minor legal precedent was expanded by some courts to be a substitute for actual 
academic freedom as an individual right. In Urofsky v. Gilmore (2000), a federal appeals 
court claimed that academic freedom did not apply to internet searches on public 
university computers, and that if was any academic freedom at all, only Institutional 
Academic Freedom existed. 
Institutions do not have rights; only individuals have rights. To protect the 
academic freedom of individuals, it is wise to have a certain amount of institutional 
autonomy. But creating a separate Institutional Academic Freedom right that can trump 
individual academic freedom is a way of undermining academic freedom altogether. 
Thus, it is not surprising that Institutional Academic Freedom is a concept invoked by 
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administrators and their lawyers, but not by the AAUP or many theorists of academic 
freedom. 
The Denial Model 
The fact that Gentleman Scientist Model was dominant for much of the 20th 
Century also reflects the backward state of academic freedom at the time. This 
dissertation does not explore in depth what could be called a fourth model, the Denial 
Model of academic freedom, which was the dominant belief outside of universities (and 
occasionally within them) for most of the 20th Century. The Denial Model is the view that 
academic freedom does not (or should not) exist, that universities should have no more 
freedom than any other institutions, and that professors should have no liberties different 
from any other employees of any business. Not surprisingly, there is almost no theoretical 
literature about academic freedom written by those who argue that there should be no 
such thing as academic freedom. And the Denial Model, by declaring academic freedom 
to be nonexistent, does not offer much in the way of a deeper analysis of the meaning of 
academic freedom. The primary advocates of the Denial Model of academic freedom 
were politicians (often following public opinion) attacking higher education who wanted 
to silence controversial faculty and students. 
However, the lack of analysis about the Denial Model should not lead us to 
dismiss its existence. It is precisely because of the Denial Model that the Gentleman 
Scientist Model developed the way that it did. And the Denial Model continues to exist, 
although it is rarely if ever publicly embraced. One of the greatest successes of the AAUP 
in the past century was the defeat of the Denial Model among mainstream American 
debate. The limits and meanings of academic freedom are still debated to this day, but 
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rarely if ever does anyone call for the elimination of academic freedom. The Gentleman 
Scientist, Professional, and Liberty Models all have been shaped by the goal of 
establishing a defense against the Denial Model. But the Gentleman Scientist Model, 
because it was the oldest, was most influenced by the attacks on academic freedom. 
The early advocates of academic freedom who adopted the Gentleman Scientist 
Model may have concealed their more libertarian views for practical reasons of fighting 
against the Denial Model; today, the reverse may be true: today's activists and politicians 
who believe in the Denial Model and would like to destroy academic freedom are not 
likely to openly oppose academic freedom itself. Instead, they are more likely to take the 
path of least opposition and declare themselves to be supporters of academic freedom 
who simply have a different, more restrictive interpretation of the concept. 
The differences between these various models of academic freedom are not 
merely theoretical; they have a dramatic effect on the practical reality of what academic 
freedom is. The dominant model of academic freedom becomes the guiding light for how 
colleges and universities operate.  
The Revolutionary Model 
There is also a fifth model of academic freedom that needs to be addressed: The 
Revolutionary Model. Unlike Fish’s version of the revolutionary model, which he 
condemns for allowing political discussion in the classroom, this Revolutionary Model 
refers to the theory of restricting academic freedom for those who hold right-wing views 
deemed contrary to the promotion of social justice. 
The Liberty Model of academic freedom was not the only concept challenging the 
Gentleman Scientist approach in the 1960s. The Revolutionary Model of academic 
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freedom was in some ways the flip side of the Gentleman Scientist. It demanded 
conformity to certain political theories as a condition of enjoying liberty. Herbert 
Marcuse’s famous 1965 tract on “Repressive Tolerance” was perhaps the best theoretical 
expression of this Revolutionary Model. According to Marcuse, the idea of liberal 
toleration embodied by the Liberty Model was simply a foolish concept that kept the 
ruling class in power. Marcuse wrote, “The tolerance which enlarged the range and 
content of freedom was always partisan--intolerant toward the protagonists of the 
repressive status quo” (Marcuse, 1965). 
Marcuse emphasized “the distinction between right and wrong limitations on 
tolerance, between progressive and regressive indoctrination, revolutionary and 
reactionary violence.” In Marcuse’s view, repression was justified when used by 
progressive forces, even though it was wrong when used by the establishment. Therefore, 
Marcuse believed in liberatory repression as the flip side of repressive tolerance. 
Marcuse's critique of tolerance was not without merit. The kind of tolerance advocated by 
the Gentleman Scientist Model was, indeed, always partisan. There were always limits to 
this tolerance, and there was always bias against dissenters from the establishment. The 
Gentleman Scientist Model protected only those who followed its standards. But 
Marcuse’s critique of the establishment’s Gentleman Scientist Model was shared by the 
Liberty Model, which offered a principled alternative to repression of any kind. 
The key problem with Marcuse's approach, and the reason why the Revolutionary 
Model fails to be a genuine model of academic freedom, is that Marcuse openly 
embraced a system without principles, one that aspired only to have political 
consequences that he favored. Marcuse took all the flaws of the Gentleman Scientist 
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Model in practice and flipped them upside-down. He accepted only the hypocrisies, 
without the principles. No question about whether a violation of academic freedom 
occurred could be answered by looking at the circumstances, only by examining the 
ideology of the alleged victim. 
Second thoughts did not lessen Marcuse’s radicalism. In his 1968 postscript, 
Marcuse concluded by urging progressives to be “militantly intolerant and disobedient to 
the rules of behavior which tolerate destruction and suppression.” The Repressive 
Tolerance approach to academic freedom embraced banning ROTC from campus (and 
for its most extreme adherents, bombing ROTC buildings), trying to stop military 
research on campus, and attempting to force the shutdown of universities until their 
demands were met. 
Marcuse's theory of Repressive Tolerance, I argue, is not a real model of 
academic freedom, but a special variation of the Liberty Model aimed at avoiding 
universal principles. Marcuse argued for the kind of full freedom to discuss politics that 
the Liberty Model endorses. However, he wanted to limit that Liberty Model freedom to 
those on the left who agree with his ideological predispositions. To those who disagree 
with him, Marcuse endorsed the Denial Model and supported full-fledged repression. 
What Marcuse espoused seems to be simple hypocrisy: one theory of academic 
freedom for himself, and a very different theory of academic freedom for those who have 
a different ideology. This hypocrisy is hardly new, nor is it limited to thinkers on the left. 
But Marcuse was unusual for his willingness to be so open about his views.  
Marcuse reflected the problem of a theorist caught up in the real world. Marcuse 
imagined radical figures like himself on the left fighting against an overwhelming enemy 
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that sought to suppress their liberty. The ideal of a principled theory to Marcuse was 
nothing but a naïve response to repression, one that would lead to certain defeat. To fight 
against repression, he argued, you must utilize the tools of repression against those who 
control you. 
To support what is fundamentally an unprincipled approach to academic freedom, 
Marcuse developed a theory that posits the academy (and the left) as a small outpost of 
freedom in a kind of revolution against a society full of conservative institutions. 
Marcuse's theory holds that academic freedom should be different for those who hold 
power in the larger society. 
Marcuse and his followers may be unique in their theoretical justification of 
hypocritical academic freedom, but they are far from alone. Indeed, the Gentleman 
Scientist Model was also fundamentally a hypocritical approach to academic freedom, 
one that supported full freedom for scholars who held conventional viewpoints and 
punished those who espoused controversial ideas that were unpopular with the public.  
The history of academic freedom in America is primarily a story of hypocrisy. 
The long parade of abuses of academic freedom to be found in American history were 
largely committed by faculty, administrators, trustees, and others who believed sincerely 
in a kind of academic freedom that protected themselves and their values, but did not 
extend to a disfavored class.  
What makes Marcuse unusual is the rigor and clarity of his hypocrisy, not its 
existence. Many people have believed in repressive tolerance toward opposing 
viewpoints, but few of them ever were willing to acknowledge and define this hypocrisy 
as Marcuse did. 
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Analyzing Academic Freedom 
Other attempts at defining theories of academic freedom have taken different 
approaches. Shiell (2006) argues that there are three conceptions of academic freedom, 
the civil libertarian conception, the legal moralistic conception, and the egalitarian 
conception. According to Shiell (2006), the civil libertarian conception is a strong 
defense of free speech on campus adopted by the AAUP, the ACLU, FIRE, and other 
advocacy groups; the legal moralistic conception sees academic freedom as “a narrow 
rather than a broad category” and one limited to professional work; and the egalitarian 
conception argues that the cause of educational equality warrants restrictions on 
academia such as hate speech codes. 
Shiell’s civil libertarian conception is close to the Liberty Model, and the “legal 
moralistic” conception is similar to the definition of the Professional Model. However, 
Shiell’s approach to analyzing theories of academic freedom falls short on several fronts. 
It treats the AAUP as purely a civil libertarian organization, ignoring both its historic 
roots and its contemporary divisions between “civil libertarian” and “legal moralistic” 
approaches. Shiell’s definition of a third “egalitarian” conception ignores the fact that 
“hate speech codes” were a debate focused on student free speech, and less on academic 
freedom as a core theory. Both the Liberty Model and the Professional Model recognize a 
university’s obligation to stop harassment and the limits of academic freedom when the 
legitimate rights of others are infringed. The egalitarian approach can be a way of 
interpreting the Liberty Model or the Professional Model to restrict hate speech, but it 
does not represent a fundamentally different approach to academic freedom.  
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This study’s approach of utilizing the Gentleman Scientist Model, the 
Professional Model, and the Liberty Model is a useful way of analyzing different theories 
of academic freedom, because it recognizes the historic changes and conflicts over 
academic freedom, it analyzes well-defined distinctions about academic freedom, and it 
can incorporate most theoretical approaches to academic freedom within these broad 
categories. 
Summary 
The fear of the denial model of academic freedom has motivated many of the 
theoretical limits on the concepts. Finkin and Post (2009) called academic freedom “this 
fragile autonomy” (155), emphasizing the need for limits and compromise to keep the 
idea alive against all its enemies. Under the Professional Model, academic freedom is 
fragile and must be protected with narrow interpretations at every turn or the public could 
be turned against liberty for scholars. Under the Liberty Model, academic freedom is also 
fragile, which is why it must be strengthened by broad, principled interpretations at every 
turn. Of course, academic freedom is always under attack. But does narrowing it lead to a 
stronger concept of academic freedom, or a weaker one? That is at the core of the debate 
between the Professional Model and the Liberty Model, and one that may never be 
settled. 
Perhaps the greatest triumph of the AAUP was to make academic freedom a 
desirable term invoked with admiration by nearly everyone. This public relations 
campaign for academic freedom was so successful that it created its own problems: when 
academic freedom became an ideal espoused nominally by everyone, opponents of 
academic freedom would simply try to re-define the term to suit their needs. 
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As Ellen Schrecker noted, “What makes the history of academic freedom so 
confusing, however, is that public relations considerations require concealing that 
pressure” from outside (Schrecker, 2010, 41). As a result, Schrecker pointed out, 
“politically motivated dismissals, therefore, came to be clothed in academic garb” 
(Schrecker, 2010, 41). This concealment takes two forms: first, violations of academic 
freedom are never admitted to be such. Throughout the long history of American higher 
education, there has never been a recorded case where an institution openly admitted that 
it was violating academic freedom, and doing so because academic freedom is terrible 
idea. Instead, everyone violating academic freedom will praise the idea of academic 
freedom and always deny that it is relevant in that particular case. 
The second form of concealment is the use of academic language to justify a 
violation of academic freedom. If a professor is fired for their political views, a college 
will typically do much more than deny any academic freedom violation. The institution 
will try to create a justification for the firing that meets the wording of professional 
standards. 
The difficulty of this approach to the theory of academic freedom can be found in 
the reality of campus censorship. The history of academic freedom in America is 
primarily the repression of scholars for their non-scholarly opinions about politics. 
Whether it was punishment for political affiliations or an offensive letter to the editor, 
most of the high-profile attacks on academic freedom had little to do with any 
scholarship. In the rare cases where a professor's scholarship was under attack, that 
scholarly expertise was often questioned as insufficiently scholarly. 
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This is one of the vulnerabilities of the Professional Model, and the Gentleman 
Scientist Model that preceded it. If professional qualifications can only be understood by 
experts, then it is difficult to create any remedies for violations of academic freedom. A 
judge or jury who lacks the capacity to adjudicate a professor's qualifications cannot 
effectively question an administration's claims to be following professional norms. 
This problem might be solved in theory if faculty experts were given the solitary 
power to make decisions on hiring, tenure, and promotion of their peers. But there is no 
college in reality with an administration willing to give up all power in these realms.  
This dissertation explores the meaning of academic freedom over the past century 
in American colleges, and it is clear that professional norms almost never motivated the 
purging of faculty. Instead, professors were fired for predictable reasons: they engaged 
publicly in controversial extramural speech. These controversial statements might be 
redefined as violations of “professional norms” in order to justify an attack on academic 
freedom, but it was rarely the case that professional standards were the key motivation to 
remove a faculty member. 
Finkin and Post (2009) often invoked the term “akademische freiheit” for their 
analysis of academic freedom. While it is appealing to have a direct German term for 
academic freedom, the reality is that the phrase seems not to have been in much use a 
century ago. Finkin and Post do not quote scholars employing the term. The early 
American advocates of academic freedom, such as the AAUP, almost always used the far 
more common term “lehrfreiheit.” The broader American idea of academic freedom 
simply didn't have a direct German counterpart. Finkin and Post used “akademische 
freiheit” as a way to escape some of the more disturbing limits on academic freedom 
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imposed by the old Gentleman Scientist Model invoked with “lehrfreiheit.” Creating a 
new term allowed them to imagine some ideal freed from historical reality. And utilizing 
a foreign term, now as in the past, provides a useful mechanism for claiming some 
imagined place where academic freedom was strongly defended in perfect harmony with 
a theoretical ideal. In reality, the Professional Model found in the German idea of 
academic freedom was very weak, whether one calls it “lehrfreiheit” or “akademische 
freiheit.”  
Finkin and Post (2009) identified “a striking new turn in the American saga of 
academic freedom” (5). According to Finkin and Post (2009), “Whereas in the early 
twentieth century debate turned on the question whether academic freedom should exist, 
contemporary controversies assume the desirability of academic freedom and attempt to 
spell out its implications” (5). In reality, there appears to be no dramatic shift. There have 
always been external forces denouncing academic freedom, and there have always been 
internal enemies of academic freedom who denied that they were infringing upon 
academic freedom. The key difference in the past century is that critics who openly 
denounce academic freedom are much rarer today. But this only makes it even more 
crucial to properly understand and explain the meaning and history of these competing 
approaches to academic freedom. 
 67 
 
CHAPTER III 
ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE EARLY COLLEGES 
 
Censorship in higher education is as old as the colleges themselves. In the 
colonial college and during most of the 19th century, academic freedom did not exist at 
all, as a phrase or as a concept. The faculty were considered employees whose job was to 
inculcate students in the traditions of the West. Expression of original or controversial 
ideas was frowned upon, whether inside or outside the classroom. The most common 
teaching mode was the recitation, where the teacher would order a student to stand and 
recite the given truth. 
The earliest American colleges were created to educate clergy. In 1636, the 
Massachusetts Bay colony established Harvard, the first college in America, "dreading to 
leave an illiterate Ministry to the Churches, when our present Ministers shall lie in the 
Dust” (Hofstadter & Metzger, 1955, 83). These religious origins included the imposition 
of orthodoxy. 
The first Statutes of Harvard (1646) set forth sharp restrictions on the freedom of 
students (and by implication, faculty as well). According to the Statutes, “Every one shall 
consider the main End of his life and studies, to know God and Jesus Christ which is 
Eternal life.” The Statutes made the Bible virtually the sole basis of learning: “Every one 
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shall so exercise himself in reading the Scriptures twice a day that they be ready to give 
an account of their proficiency therein, both in theoretical observations of Language and 
Logic, and in practical and spiritual truths as their tutor shall require…..” Harvard’s 1646 
Statutes imposed severe regulation of student behavior: “They shall eschew all 
profanation of God’s holy name, attributes, word, ordinances, and times of worship…” 
Even the speaking of English was largely banned: “The Scholars shall never use their 
Mother tongue except that in public exercise of oratory or such like…” 
Harvard’s 1646 Statutes also marked the first incarnation of in loco parentis: 
“They shall honor as their parents, Magistrates, Elders….by being silent in their 
presence.” Harvard’s staff not only had the responsibility to monitor students like a 
father, they also were entitled to the same Biblical authority over students that a father 
had over children. 
Samuel Eliot Morison argued that the founding statutes of Harvard were “most 
remarkable” because unlike European universities there was no “religious test or oath” 
for teachers or students (Morison, 1936, 339). However, this omission did not appear to 
reflect a newfound religious tolerance in America, but the economic necessity of 
recruiting students from across a religiously diverse nation. 
Religious dissent quickly reared its ugly head, and that head was figuratively cut 
off. Harvard president Henry Dunster was forced to resign in 1654 after he sparked some 
controversy by failing to have his fourth child baptized. Because Dunster shocked people 
by speaking against "corupcions stealing into the Church" due to infant baptism,
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Dunster's replacement, Charles Chauncey, was hired on the condition that he stay silent 
about his belief in baptism by total immersion rather than sprinkling (Hofstadter & 
Metzger, 1955, 89). The General Court of the colony declared that "it greatly concerns 
the welfare of this country that the youth thereof be education, not only in good literature, 
but sound doctrine." They recommended removing any teachers who "have manifested 
themselves unsound in the fayth, or scandelous in theire lives, and not giving due 
satisfaction according to the rules of Christ” (Hofstadter & Metzger, 1955, 88-89). 
In 1707, lawyer John Leverett became Harvard's president despite the complaints 
of Cotton Mather about the dangerous of a secular leader: "To make a lawyer, and one 
who never affected the study of Divinity, a praesident for a College of Divines, will be a 
very preposterous thing, a thing without precedent” (Hofstadter & Metzger, 1955, 105). 
Leverett emphasized "the liberal tradition of Harvard University," which in turn led to the 
first witchhunt in American higher education in 1723, after Cotton Mather warned that 
students were privately reading "plays, novels, empty and vicious pieces of poetry, and 
Ovid's Epistles, which have a vile tendency to corrupt good manners." Mather also 
complained that tutors were assigned theology books "that have rank poison in them” 
(Hofstadter & Metzger, 1955, 108). 
A Board of Overseers' Committee of Visitation blamed the misconduct of 
students on the fact that they "have read promiscuously, according to their inclinations, 
authors of different denominations in religion." Their report concluded, "there has been a 
practice of several immoralities; particularly stealing, lying, swearing, idleness, picking 
of locks, and too frequent use of strong drink; which immoralities, it is feared, still 
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continue in the College, notwithstanding the faithful endeavors of the rulers of the House 
to suppress them” (Hofstadter & Metzger, 1955, 108). 
Not even money could purchase religious liberty at Harvard. After Thomas Hollis 
gave generously to Harvard in 1719 and 1720 to establish a divinity professorship with 
the condition that no candidate "should be refused on account of his belief and practice of 
adult baptism," the Overseers nevertheless interrogated the first candidate, Edward 
Wigglesworth, to determine if he held orthodox views on "the divine right of infant 
baptism" among other doctrines (Hofstadter & Metzger, 1955, 109).  
In 1735, Harvard's Overseers fired Louis Langloiserie as a French teacher when it 
became known that he held unsound doctrines and excessive "enthusiasm." The 
Overseers declared that they could "Examine into the principles of all those that are 
Employed in the instruction of the Students of the College upon any Just Suspicion of 
their holding dangerous tenents altho no Express Charge be Layed in against them” 
(Hofstadter & Metzger, 1955, 157). 
Wigglesworth’s son underwent a similar examination to be seated in his father’s 
chair in 1765, although the Board of Overseers twice voted down a proposal to examine 
John Winthrop, who held the Hollis Professorship of Mathematics and Natural 
Philosophy, on his religious principles (Hofstadter & Metzger, 1955, 156). 
Harvard was not alone in its repression of religious dissent. In 1722, Yale fired 
Rector Timothy Johnson for becoming an Episcopalian, and began examining all future 
rectors and tutors for faith (Hofstadter & Metzger, 1955, 158). In 1744, two students at 
Yale were expelled for attending Separatist church services with their parents, and failing 
to confess to their "crime" in the college hall. President Thomas Clap issued a pamphlet 
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defending the expulsion on the grounds that "it would be a Contradiction in the Civil 
Government to Support a College to Educate Students to trample upon their own laws” 
(Hofstadter & Metzger, 1955, 169). That same year, Samuel Cook was forced to resign 
under threat of an examination of his religious principles (Hofstadter & Metzger, 1955, 
171). 
The pressure for orthodoxy from community leaders was strong, especially 
because America’s early private colleges received funding from the state. In 1742, 
Jonathan Edwards made a warning about the excessive liberalism of American colleges, a 
fear that would be repeated for centuries to follow: "It seems to me a reproach to the land, 
that ever it should be so with our colleges, that, instead of being places of the greatest 
advantages for true piety, one cannot send a child thither without great danger of his 
being infected as to his morals” (Hofstadter & Metzger, 1955, 161).  
However, the religious diversity of the colonies made orthodoxy in college 
difficult to maintain, since students were sought from various sects throughout colonial 
America. The movement toward religious tolerance in colonial government was also a 
trend that grew in the American colleges as well. 
By the mid-18th Century, the idea that American colleges would represent 
religious orthodoxy was fading. The 1746 charter for the College of New Jersey 
(Princeton) required that trustees could not exclude "any Person of any religious 
Denomination whatsoever from free and Equal Liberty and Advantage of Education” 
(Hofstadter & Metzger, 1955, 142). 
But witchhunts still occurred, especially if unorthodox views of faculty were 
made public. In 1756, the University of Pennsylvania investigated Provost Smith after 
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newspapers attacked him for being irreligious and un-Pennsylvanian. However, the four 
members of the senior class testified that "in the whole Course of his Lectures on Ethics, 
Government and Commerce, he never advanced any other Principles than what were 
warranted by our standard Authors, Grotius, Puffendorf, Locke, and Hutcheson” 
(Hofstadter & Metzger, 1955, 202). In fact, the next year Provost Smith was jailed under 
a libel charge for publishing an article written by Judge William Moore which criticized 
the Quaker faction of the Pennsylvania Assembly. However, the trustees gave Smith 
permission to continue teaching "at the usual Hours in the Place of his present 
confinement," and a dozen students assembled in his jail cell for instruction (Hofstadter 
& Metzger, 1955, 205). It is difficult to imagine any 21st Century trustees who would 
support a professor held in prison or allow courses to meet in a jail cell. 
In 1778, Ezra Stiles became President of Yale, with the promise from the 
Corporation that they would repeal the 1753 religious restrictions (Hofstadter & Metzger, 
1955, 177). It was not the rights of faculty, but the rights of students, which sparked the 
development of academic freedom. Hofstadter noted, "freedom of thought as a 
consciously formulated goal appeared first as religious freedom for students” (Hofstadter 
& Metzger, 1955, 152). Religious orthodoxy was bad for business in a young country of 
diverse sects. In a 1802 appeal for money, Princeton officials noted, "No pupil with us 
has ever been questioned on sentiments, nor received any censure or disapprobation for 
making known his opinions either in speech or writing” (Hofstadter & Metzger, 1955, 
152).  
But this same reasoning did not apply to freedom of thought for faculty. Young 
teachers were cheap and easy to find; academic freedom for teachers wasn’t 
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economically necessary, as it was to attract students. As Hofstadter noted, "Men often 
spoke of liberty of conscience but never applied it to the teaching function” (Hofstadter & 
Metzger, 1955, 111). 
To the contrary, the leaders who ran America’s early colleges maintained a tight 
hold over teaching, fearing that instructors might promote science above religion. In 
1788, Harvard officials resolved that the Hollis Professor of Mathematics and Natural 
Philosophy "be directed, while he is delivering his Philosophical and Astronomical 
lectures, to make sure incidental reflections upon the Being, Perfections and Providence 
of God, as may arise from the subjects, and may tend seriously to impress the minds of 
youth” (Hofstadter & Metzger, 1955, 199). For Harvard, ordering a science professor to 
praise religion was more than simply a way to promote belief; it was also a warning that 
deviations from orthodoxy would be punished. However, as religious liberty for students 
became more widely accepted, similar liberties for faculty would be demanded, and the 
first steps toward academic freedom has begun. 
Campus Revolts 
Attracting students in a religiously diverse country was not only the reason why 
American colleges developed religious freedom. The spirit of the American Revolution 
also had a strong influence on American higher education. 
The revolts by American colonists were matched by student revolts against 
oppression on campus. In 1766 was the first recorded student rebellion, a riot at Harvard 
over the low quality of butter (Yamane, 2001, 11). It came shortly after the colonists 
successfully stopped the 1765 Stamp Act by threatening to tar and feather any tax 
collectors. 
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For faculty during the American Revolution, students posed the greatest threat. 
W.H. Cowley noted, “Harvard students drove out of Cambridge the tutor who directed 
British troops to Lexington” (Cowley, unpublished “Notes on Universities,” quoted in 
Lipset, 1976, 127). At Harvard, the Revolutionary War was followed by a seven-year 
rebellion beginning in 1790 against Harvard’s exams (Lipset, 1976, 128). Harvard 
experienced numerous student rebellions in the new nation. In 1818, four students were 
expelled for throwing dishes during a food riot (Lipset, 1976, 128). In 1823, more than 
half of the senior class was expelled right before graduation. In 1834, President Quincy 
was hanged in effigy because he brought in police to punish rioters. Students who wrote a 
circular defending the rebellion were deprived of their degrees (Morison, 1986, 185, 
252). 
Harvard was not the only college with student rebellions. At Princeton in 1806, 
half of the students were expelled after a riot (Bowes, 1964). At the University of 
Virginia in 1836, students rioted and formed a militia opposing the “tyrannical 
movements of the faculty” to remove all arms from campus (who apparently had good 
reason to worry, since in 1840 a professor was shot to death by a student) (Handlin and 
Handlin, 1970, 40-1). 
Freedom and Slavery on Campus 
While religion was the key free expression debate of the early American college, 
slavery became the most public question of academic freedom in the 19th Century. 
Thomas Jefferson declared that in a world with a thousand religions, "free inquiry 
must be indulged, and how can we wish others to indulge it while we refuse it ourselves” 
(Jefferson, 1787). But even Jefferson did not live up to these ideals in the University of 
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Virginia. Jefferson wrote Madison in 1826, "In the selection of our law professor we 
must be rigorously attentive to his political principles” (Hofstadter & Metzger, 1955, 
241). Jefferson predicted, "If we are true and vigilant in our trust, within a dozen or 
twenty years a majority of our own legislature will be from one school, and many 
disciples will have carried its doctrines home with them to their several states and will 
have leavened the whole mass” (Hofstadter & Metzger, 1955, 241).  
Nor did Jefferson's university did not stand up for academic freedom when it 
came to slavery. In 1832, a member of the University of Virginia's student Jefferson 
Society publicly declared his support for the emancipation of slaves, which led the 
faculty to declare, "there should be no oration on any distracting question of state or 
national policy nor on any point of theological dispute” (Hunter, 213). 
In 1856, after professor Benjamin Sherwood Hedrick at the University of North 
Carolina favored the Republican Party, the North Carolina Standard called the party 
"incompatible with our honor and safety as a people,” and faculty repudiated his views. 
After being burned in effigy by students, Hedrick was fired after refusing to resign or 
change his anti-slavery views (Hofstadter & Metzger, 1955, 258). 
The repression of anti-slavery sentiments was so powerful throughout the South 
that few professors would ever dare to espouse abolitionist views. Along the North/South 
border, however, the disputes about slavery that would lead to the Civil War sometimes 
could not be suppressed by colleges. In 1833, the Board of Trustees of Lane Theological 
Seminary in Cincinnati banned an antislavery society formed by students and some of the 
faculty, declaring that "education must be completed before the young are fitted to 
engage in the collisions of active life." A group of students, a professor, and a trustees 
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were dismissed for their views (Hofstadter & Metzger, 1955, 282). The faculty of 
abolitionist Berea College in Kentucky were forced to flee north after founder John 
Gregg Fee was reported to have endorsed John Brown's actions (Hofstadter & Metzger, 
1955, 254). 
But many colleges in the North also censored abolitionists. In 1833, three Western 
Reserve College professors in Ohio who advocated immediate abolition and racial 
equality were fired by trustees who sought gradual abolition and the removal of ex-slaves 
to Liberia (Goodheart, 1982, 421). 
In 1835, Amherst College suppressed an anti-slavery society which included one-
third of its students (Hofstadter & Metzger, 1955, 259-61). Carl Follen, a professor of 
German at Harvard, was “separated from his office” in 1836 for opposing slavery and 
President Quincy (Rockwell, 1950, 229). When Ralph Waldo Emerson came to speak at 
colleges, he was frequently denied the use of campus buildings (Roszak, 1968, 6). 
The abolitionist movement in the North, however, was not immune from 
suppressing dissent. President Joseph Smith of Franklin College was fired for not being 
an abolitionist, and Judge Edward Greely Loring was dismissed from Harvard Law 
School because he had enforced the fugitive slave law (Hofstadter & Metzger, 1955, 
260). President Nathan Lord of Dartmouth was forced out of his job for believing in the 
divinity of slavery. Lord complained about that the trustees' censure, saying that it was 
wrong for them "to impose any religious, ethical or political test upon any member of 
their own body or any member of the College Faculty, beyond what is recognized by the 
Charter of the Institution or express Statutes or stipulations conformed to that instrument” 
(Hofstadter & Metzger, 1955, 260). 
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The long-term impact of the abolitionist movement and the Civil War on 
academic freedom is more difficult to measure. The Civil War led to teacher loyalty oaths 
in states such as California (1863), Nevada (1866) and West Virginia (1867) (Fosse, 
1951, 17). 
Even when slavery was condemned, racism prevailed. In the 19th century and 
much of the 20th century, discrimination went unchallenged at American colleges. In 
1845, Brown University refused to admit a black student because “southern patronage 
would be withdrawn” (Weinberg, 1977, 263). In 1850, when Harvard Medical School 
admitted three blacks on the condition that they emigrate to Africa after graduation, white 
students successfully demanded their dismissal out of opposition to racial integration and 
the fear that it would harm the value of their diplomas (the students also, with even fewer 
dissenters, condemned the possibility that a woman might be admitted) (Watson, 1998, 
50).  
Religious liberty in universities grew because of the economic necessity of 
recruiting students from across the country who came from diverse Christian 
backgrounds. But that same economic necessity caused many colleges, even in the North, 
to ban black students due to the need to recruit Southerners. Because of that economic 
influence, racism in higher education continued unabated after the Civil War concluded.  
God and Man on the 19th Century Campus 
Despite the Civil War, religion remained a key point of controversy. But by the 
mid-19th Century, the principle of private religious freedom for faculty was beginning to 
be accepted, even if in practice religious liberty was often infringed. Wolcott Gibbs, a 
Unitarian, was not hired by Columbia's Episcopalian Board of Trustees in 1853 as a 
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physical science professor because of his religious views, even though the Columbia 
charter outlawed religious tests (Hofstadter & Metzger, 1955, 270-1). 
In 1877, Cornell refused to reappoint Felix Adler because his lectures favored 
rationalistic views and in one case he suggested that some doctrines of Christianity could 
be discovered in other religions. Vice-President Russel admitted to Adler, "True wisdom, 
it seems to me, forbids my bringing on a contest where victory would not be of greatest 
importance, but where defeat would be lasting injury” (Hofstadter & Metzger, 1955, 
340). 
In many cases, it was the faculty who imposed religious orthodoxy. In the 1850s, 
the faculty at Yale expelled a student for leading twenty students to be "free thinkers” 
(Oren, 1985, 96). Yale rules until the 1860s declared: "If any student shall profess or 
endeavor to propagate a disbelief in the divine authority of the Holy Scriptures, and shall 
persist therein after admonition, he shall no longer be a member of the College” (Lucas, 
1994, 129). 
Discrimination against minority religious views was also common. Seymour 
Martin Lipset writes, "Few, if any, schools would hire Jews and Catholics, not to speak of 
overt atheists, until well into the nineteenth century” (Lipset, 1993, 73). In America, 
religious liberty was often a concept reserved for Protestants. 
The Fight Over Evolution 
It was the rise of science which challenged the religious orthodoxy. The value of 
scientific knowledge was becoming increasingly apparent to the American economy. 
However, the question of evolution sparked widespread repression as religious authorities 
rejected Darwin’s theory because it seemed to contradict the Biblical story of Genesis. 
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In 1878, Alexander Winchell was dismissed by Vanderbilt University for writing 
a pro-evolution tract on the origin of man before Adam. Winchell reports that Bishop 
Holland McTyeire, president of the trustees, told him: "We are having considerable 
annoyance from the criticisms which are passed by our people on some of your positions 
in matters of opinion, and it is likely to increase” (Hofstadter & Metzger, 1955, 331). 
In 1879, Yale president Noah Porter ordered William Graham Sumner (whom he 
had hired despite opposition from the religious orthodoxy) to stop using Herbert 
Spencer's Study of Sociology as a textbook. Porter believed that Spencer's attacks on 
theistic views and "the cool and yet sarcastic effrontery with which he assumes that 
material elements and laws are the only forces and laws which any scientific man can 
recognize, seem to me to condemn the book as a textbook for a miscellaneous class in an 
undergraduate course” (Hofstadter & Metzger, 1955, 336). In 1884, James Woodrow was 
forced to resign as a professor of natural science at a Presbyterian seminary in Columbia, 
South Carolina because he advocated the theory of evolution (Warren, 1914, 693). 
However, by the early 20th Century, the scientific consensus behind the theory of 
evolution was so strong that campus bans became much rarer. John Dewey observed in 
1902, “The biological sciences are clearly in a transitional state. The conception of 
evolution is a test case. It is safe to say that no university worthy of the name would put 
any limitation upon instruction in this theory, or upon its use as an agency of research and 
classification” (Dewey, 1902, 4). It was in American high schools that the controversy 
over evolutionary science raged, most famously in the Scopes trial.  
Evolution may have been the key dividing issue that began to sharply separate 
academic freedom for professors and academic freedom for schoolteachers. Whereas in 
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the late 19th Century, academic freedom was seen as a concept applying to all teachers 
(albeit not fully embraced), by the end of the 20th Century, academic freedom for 
schoolteachers would be almost forgotten. In part, this reflected the success of the 
Scientific Model of academic freedom. Because few schoolteachers held the Ph.D. or 
engaged in scientific research, they could not claim scientific expertise as a defense for 
academic freedom. The Scientific Model of academic freedom strengthened the claims of 
professors to autonomy, but it divided the profession of teaching and set higher education 
as a separate occupation entitled to its own unique privileges. 
Academic Freedom and the Research University 
Metzger argued for four reasons to explain the rise of academic freedom after the 
Civil War: 1) ”the post-war university granted its teachers the time to engage in outside 
activities”; 2) colleges “brought in the professional scholar”; 3) academics “gave up the 
quiet retreat of moral philosophy and the sanctuary of classical economics for the faculty 
study of social problems and the evaluation of social policy”; and 4) “the rise of the 
philosophy of pragmatism, which sanctioned the participation of men of thought in 
worldly problems and affairs” (Metzger, 1961, 130). 
While these factors were important, there were two general developments near the 
end of the 19th Century that created the climate which made academic freedom 
necessary. The first was the rise of the research university. In the age of the college, 
freedom was of minimal importance for faculty. Their job was not to think of new ideas, 
but to transmit the old ones to another generation of ministers and aristocrats. Freedom 
was not only expendable, but downright dangerous to a system in which the preservation 
and glorification of classical knowledge was supreme. As new colleges were established 
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in America and competition for students grew, elite institutions needed a way to 
differentiate themselves from their peers. The quality of the faculty took on a new 
importance, and publication of research was the most obvious way to display faculty 
expertise to students. The growing research universities valued scholarly activity and 
encouraged it among the faculty (Thelin, 2011). 
The second development that followed was the creation of professional standards 
and departmental affiliations. When faculty were ordered to teach a traditional curriculum 
of ancient ideas, and hiring and firing were solely in the hands of the president and board 
of trustees, the idea of academic freedom held little influence. But as universities 
expanded and divided into more specialized fields, the faculty themselves became the 
most qualified judges of a candidate's suitability. The universities were moving away 
from the hierarchical control of faculty in the older English system toward the 
decentralized German model. 
With the growth of the American university near the end of the 19th century, 
research became the new guiding idea. Professors now were supposed to discover new 
knowledge, not just repeat the old thoughts as sacred writ. To research new ideas, 
professors often became the source of controversial ideas. And the ideology of scientific 
research spread to the study of human problems, which would lead to the biggest 
academic freedom debates of the 20th century. 
Lehrfreiheit Comes to America 
The American research university was a hybrid of the German University and the 
English College. And the guiding concept of academic freedom was likewise a hybrid of 
the reigning concepts in these two institutions, the scientific model and the gentleman 
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model. It is too simplistic to merely associate the scientific model with Germany and the 
gentleman model with England; each nation’s universities incorporated both models in 
the concept of academic freedom.  
Designed to imitate the German university where research was emphasized, the 
American university adopted the two German principles of Lehrfreiheit and Lernfreiheit. 
According to Metzger, Lehrfreiheit meant "the university professor was free to examine 
bodies of evidence and to report his findings in lecture or published form--that he enjoyed 
freedom of teaching and freedom of inquiry” (Metzger, 1961, 112-3). Lernfreiheit meant 
that students "were free to roam from place to place, sampling academic wares; that 
wherever they lighted, they were free to determine the choice and sequence of courses, 
and were responsible to no one for regular attendance; that they were exempted from all 
tests save the final examination; that they lived in private quarters and controlled their 
private lives” (Metzger, 1961, 112). This freedom for professors was necessary in order 
to provide opportunities for specialization and development of new ideas which drove the 
research university.  
However, the American universities never fully accepted these German 
principles. Students never received the full freedoms implied by Lernfreiheit, although in 
many universities the traditional fixed curriculum was dramatically weakened. And 
although some verbal support was given to the idea of academic freedom, in practice it 
was greatly limited and not institutionalized until after the formation of the AAUP in 
1915. 
In the early years of the universities, the old ethic of the college age prevailed, 
where instructors, even with tenure, had no protections of academic freedom. 
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Administrators had almost unlimited authority to dismiss professors, usually those who 
were deemed too radical in their public statements. This was true even at the most 
prestigious universities. 
But Lehrfreiheit had a much more dramatic effect on American universities. 
Richard Ely observed in 1938, “The development of science also depends very largely on 
an atmosphere of freedom of thought and expression, upon what the Germans call 
Lehrfreiheit und Lernfreiheit—freedom to think and freedom to express one’s thoughts to 
one’s fellows. When I first went to Germany I seemed to breathe a new and exhilarating 
atmosphere of freedom. There was a free and large spirit on the part of the professors to 
which I had not been accustomed” (Lucas, 1994, 124). 
Connolly (2000) argues that the 1915 AAUP Declaration citing Lehrfreiheit and 
Lernfreiheit was a “reference to a tradition of academic freedom, something we certainly 
did not have in the United States….” However, academic freedom was not unknown in 
America, nor had it reached some idealized stage in Germany. Instead, the German 
concept of academic freedom was espoused (and often exaggerated) in the United States 
because scholars (often with only limited experience of how it worked in Germany) saw 
it as a way to push for improvements in America. 
Boyer (2002) noted how the University of Chicago in 1904 celebrated its 15th 
anniversary by honoring the German research university and giving five honorary 
doctorates to German scholars. Boyer argued, “what some American academics had 
already begun to understand by the concept of Lehrfreiheit was in fact a more full blown 
‘academic freedom,’ a more ambitious and robust notion that included the freedom 
enjoyed by scholars to speak on issues beyond one’s narrow field of scholarship and, 
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even more significantly, beyond the wall’s of one’s home university” (Boyer, 2002). 
American professors used an idealized picture of Lehrfreiheit to push for a much broader 
concept of academic freedom than ever existed in German universities. 
Germany was far from being a paradise of academic liberty; in fact, the concept 
of academic freedom in Germany developed in response to repression. In September 
1819, the German Diet ratified the Carlsbad Decrees, creating truth commissions for each 
university “to observe very carefully the spirit with which the professors and tutors are 
guided in their public and private lectures.” Professors would be removed if “in 
overstepping the bounds of their duty, in abusing their legitimate influence over the 
minds of youth, by the propagation of pernicious dogma, hostile to order and public 
tranquility, or in sapping the foundation of existing establishments, they have shown 
themselves incapable of executing the important functions entrusted to them” (Fosse, 
1951, 15) No writing was allowed in a newspaper or periodical without advance consent. 
It was this kind of repression in Germany—far worse than in America, where the 
restrictions on academic freedom came largely from trustees and administrators, not 
legislators—that sparked the drive for Lehrfreiheit and Lernfreiheit to become dominant 
in the 19th Century. And in Germany, Lehrfreiheit and Lernfreiheit were strictly limited 
concepts. Lernfreiheit never meant that students would be free to express themselves, 
inside or outside the classroom. Lehrfreiheit applied only to senior scholars at the elite 
universities, not every professor, and it was sharply limited to classroom speech and 
scientific research, not political debates. 
In America, as in Germany, academic freedom was not derived from an abstract 
analysis of the ideal university, but from actual experience with restrictions on liberty. 
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Americans derived a unique interpretation of academic freedom, but the German 
conception of Lehrfreiheit deeply influenced how the Scientific Model of academic 
freedom was developed and embraced. 
Economics and the Fight over Academic Freedom 
The concept of academic freedom in America was primarily developed during the 
first two decades of the 20th Century, and the understanding of it was shaped by the most 
prominent controversies at leading universities during the last years of the 19th Century. 
The cases of Edward Bemis at the University of Chicago, Edward Ross at Stanford 
University, and Richard Ely at the University of Wisconsin all helped to provoke 
awareness of the threat to academic freedom and the need for academia to create an 
organization, the American Association of University Professors, that could defend it. 
It is no coincidence that these three cases all dealt with economics, and all 
involved left-leaning professors critiquing policies of the wealthiest class. By the end of 
the 19th Century, businessmen replaced the clergy as the primary conservative influence 
upon American colleges at the elite level. The growth of the industrial economy had 
created a new class of millionaires under pressure to prove their social worth. Colleges 
turned to businessmen not only as donors but also as managers, filling Boards of Trustees 
with wealthy men. Not surprisingly, the primary intellectual conflicts at colleges were no 
longer about religion, but economics. 
It is also no coincidence that the first American organization which made 
academic freedom one of its core principles was an association of economists. In 1885, 
the American Economic Association was formed, and declared that one of its four 
purposes was, “The encouragement of perfect freedom in all economic discussion” (Ely, 
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1938, 136). Ely declared, “The American Economic Association took a stand at its 
organization for entire freedom of discussion. We were thoroughly devoted to the idea of 
the German university--Lehrfreiheit und Lernfreiheit; and we have not hesitated to enter 
the lists vigorously in favor of freedom when we have considered it endangered” (Ely, 
1938, 146). Ely noted, “we did feel at first that it required a struggle to find a place in our 
academic life for free expression of our views” (Ely, 1938, 146). 
But economists were fighting against a widespread belief that academic freedom 
could not include the right to dissent from the views of one’s employer. In the 1880s, 
Henry Carter Adams was fired from Cornell for giving a pro-labor speech that offended 
an important donor (Hofstadter & Metzger, 1955, 419).  
In 1892, George Steele, president of Lawrence University, was fired for his views 
on free trade (Will, 1901). At Brown University, the Board of Trustees told President 
E.B. Andrews to cease discussing his support of free silver because "these views were so 
contrary to the views generally held by the friends of the University that the University 
had already lost gifts and legacies which would otherwise have come or have been 
assured to it, and that without change it would in the future fail to receive the pecuniary 
support which is requisite." Although a public outcry pressured the Board to back down, 
Andrews was forced to resign a year later (Will, 1901). The case revealed that many 
newspapers rejected the concept of academic freedom. The New York Express proclaimed 
in 1897, "The trustees have the unquestionable right to suppress teaching which they 
believe to be false as well as injurious to the college” (Will, 1901, 251). The Philadelphia 
Commonwealth added in 1897, "The trustees had indeed a right to expect him to shape 
his teachings in economics to meet their views” (Will, 1901, 251). 
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When Northwestern President Henry Rogers resigned in 1900, one trustee noted 
that the board "took the ground that as head of the University he should not voice 
opinions that were antagonistic to the board of managers" and that the people "giving 
large endowments to its funds are nearly all opposed to the political views expressed 
from time to time by Mr. Rogers” (Will, 1901, 256). James Henry Raymond, a 
Northwestern trustee, noted: "A professor is not a mere parrot to repeat and fairly explain 
to his students the diametrically opposite premises, arguments, and conclusions of the 
writers and teachers of the ages upon any given subject. He must of necessity be an 
advocate, but his advocacy must be in harmony with the conclusions of the powers that 
be, with the animus and main purposes of the institutions, and the teachings of his 
collaborers” (Will, 1901, 252-3). Raymond’s view may have been shared by many 
trustees, but academics rejected it. Raymond argued that professors must be advocates of 
“the powers that be.” Against this notion of academic servility, professors sought to use 
the ideas of objectivity and neutrality, holding that academia could offer the public a 
balanced arbiter in the world of ideas, someone who would not stand with the powers that 
be, but also would not blindly oppose them. The Gentleman Scientist Model was meant 
to protect academia from the dangers posed by pro-business trustees, administrators, and 
politicians who felt that faculty should be mere employees of the college, speaking in 
total harmony with its aims. 
In the early years of the universities, the old ethic of the college age prevailed, 
where instructors, even with tenure, had no protections for academic freedom. 
Administrators had almost unlimited authority to dismiss professors, usually those who 
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were deemed too radical in their public statements. This was true even at the most 
prestigious universities. 
The University of Chicago's first president, William Rainey Harper, was typical in 
the controls he placed on students and faculty to prevent them from expressing any 
radical ideas. Harper, who himself had been accused of religiously unorthodox views, 
vetoed a plan by some students to form an unacceptably liberal religious association. 
Though John D. Rockefeller, who provided the millions of dollars which created the 
University of Chicago, usually stayed out of university affairs, he kept a closer watch on 
religion. In 1892, an address by actor Joseph Jefferson after chapel services caused 
conservative Baptists to complain to Rockefeller, who in turn raised his concerns with 
Harper. Harper apologized for appearing "to be endorsing the theatre in general," and 
wrote that "the whole event must be regarded as a mistake” (Olasky, 2000, 142). Harper 
also praised Rockefeller's "deep personal interest in the religious condition of the 
University” (Marsden, 1994, 244). Harper also wrote to Rockefeller in 1900 to make sure 
that J. Franklin Jameson was acceptable to him before allowing his hiring (Karier, 1975, 
43). 
The Bemis Affair 
One of the most famous academic freedom cases of the late 19th Century involved 
University of Chicago economist Edward Bemis. In some ways, the Bemis case was 
important precisely because University of Chicago officials denied any bad motives and 
expressed their strong devotion to academic freedom. The Bemis case exposed the fact 
that the threat to academic freedom existed at even the most prestigious universities, and 
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that university authorities could easily conceal their true motives behind a professed 
allegiance to the emerging concept of academic freedom (Barber, 1993). 
Economics at the University of Chicago had a conservative flavor from the start, 
long before the “Chicago School” ever became infamous. Milton Friedman wrote, “The 
Chicago Department of Economics has been a leading center of graduate economics ever 
since the founding of the university in 1890. James Laurence Laughlin, the first chairman 
of the department, who was recruited by Harper from Cornell, set a pattern that has been 
maintained ever since. Himself a hard-money man of rigidly conservative views, he 
demonstrated an extraordinary degree of tolerance in staffing and guiding the 
department” (Friedman and Friedman, 1998, 191). Yet Laughlin’s “extraordinary degree 
of tolerance” included rejecting almost all liberal-minded scholars, and helping to fire a 
left-leaning economist in one of the most famous cases in the history of academic 
freedom. 
Considering the future fame of the conservative Chicago School of Economics, it 
may be shocking to learn that Laughlin's appointment was mainly chance. In fact, the 
University of Chicago came remarkably close to hiring Richard Ely, a leftist economist at 
Johns Hopkins. Chicago's founding president, William Rainey Harper, wanted Ely, who 
wrote Harper that he would help Chicago economics "to make its influence felt on 
political life and to elevate practical politics” (Barber, 1993, 248). 
In the late 19th century, liberal economists were the leaders in the field producing 
the cutting edge results. But they had an economic dispute: Harper and Ely couldn't agree 
on a salary: Ely wanted $5,000 a year, and Harper offered only $4,000. Ely wrote to 
Harper on March 20, 1891, "you must raise your prices somewhat in order to get the man 
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who will make the University the success which we desire” (Barber, 1993, 247). For the 
want of $1,000, the entire history of the Chicago School--along with the future of 
economic thought and American policies--might have been radically different. And the 
firing of Edward Bemis became possible. 
The opposite of Ely, Laughlin was one of the most conservative economists in the 
country. He adhered to the gold standard. For more than two decades until his retirement 
in 1916, Laughlin held dictatorial power over appointments in economics, and he did not 
suffer gently those he regarded as fools. However, Laughlin was also called “Uncle 
Larry” by his students, and he insisted on bringing Thorstein Veblen with him from 
Cornell to Chicago, even though Veblen’s progressive views did not conform to 
Laughlin’s ideology (Barber, 1993, 256). 
Laughlin did have strict limits to his tolerance, and Harper worried that the 
University of Chicago might fall in stature if did not include the cutting edge of research. 
At the first faculty meeting in 1892, Harper declared: "The question before us is how to 
become one in spirit, not necessarily in opinions” (Levine, 2007, 67). Harper wanted to 
hire Edward Bemis, a leading young proponent of the left-leaning “new institutionalist” 
view of economics. 
Laughlin strongly opposed Bemis, declaring that “I do not believe he is competent 
to treat a difficult economic problem.” Bemis wrote to Harper in 1892 that it would be 
"most embarrassing and hazardous for myself or indeed any man of the new economic 
movement" to serve under Laughlin. Bemis noted that he saw Harper "did not intend to 
have any one school of economics dominate in U'v's'ty, but would have all sides 
represented on an equal footing." Bemis even proposed a "double department" to allow 
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this diversity when Laughlin would not; however, Harper instead gave Bemis an 
associate professorship in the extension division, which carried tenure. But Bemis 
demanded to spend one quarter each year teaching in the University itself. Laughlin 
wrote to Harper that Bemis “seriously impairs the morale of his department,” and because 
of the dispute with Laughlin, Bemis was assigned to sociology (Boyer, 2002, 3). 
Harper would soon regret his efforts to hire Bemis. In January 1894, he asked 
Bemis to look for another position, due to Laughlin’s continued lobbying to get rid of 
him (Boyer, 2002, 3). Bemis wouldn’t leave, and he refused to keep quiet. In the summer 
of 1894, Bemis publicly attacked the railroad companies during the Pullman strike, 
creating an embarrassing controversy for the University. The Chicago Times reported on 
July 16, 1894 that Bemis declared, “If the railroads would expect their men to be law 
abiding they must set the example,” and he accused railroads of “open violations of the 
Interstate Commerce law” (Boyer, 2002, 3). 
Today, such a statement would hardly be newsworthy (particularly because it was 
true), let alone justify the firing of a professor. But Harper was angered, and wrote to 
Bemis: “Your speech at the First Presbyterian Church has caused me a great deal of 
annoyance. It is hardly safe for me to venture into any of the Chicago clubs. I am 
pounced upon from all sides. I propose that during the remainder of your connection with 
the University you exercise great care in public utterances about questions that are 
agitating the minds of the people” (Boyer, 2002, 3). The gentlemanly model decreed that 
a professor’s remarks should not make it uncomfortable for a president to enter an 
exclusive club. 
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Laughlin was also outraged by Bemis because Laughlin wanted the railroad 
companies to donate money to the economics department for a center to study railway 
economics. Laughlin wrote to Harper later that summer, accusing Bemis of being 
“wholly one-sided on the railway question” and warning that Bemis' insults against the 
head of the Chicago & Northwestern Railway threatened a potential donor: “in 
antagonizing Pres. Hughitt he is making very difficult the establishment of a great 
railway interest in the University” (Boyer, 2002, 3). Although Laughlin invoked the 
objectivity of the scientific model in his letter, he scarcely seemed to care that he was 
one-sided on the railway question, too, albeit in support of the railroads.  
Harper noted privately, "It is all very well to sympathize with the working man, 
but we get our money from those on the other side, and we can't afford to offend them." 
Trustee Fred W. Peck declared, "The trustees should see to it that in teaching...no 
unsound financial doctrines nor anything of a dangerous character be taught” (Will, 1901, 
254). 
Bemis was hardly militant in his response to Harper, claiming that he urged trade 
unions not to strike and "tried to calm the troubled water while making use of the 
opportunity to urge upon employers a conciliatory Christ-like attitude." However, it was 
too late for Bemis: Harper and sociology chair Albion Small asked him to resign in 
December 1894 (Boyer, 2002, 3). 
Bemis initially followed the gentlemanly model by keeping his dismissal out of 
the news. But in 1895, Bemis went public and denounced Harper (Boyer, 2002, 3). Bemis 
joined up with Richard Ely to launch a national attack on Harper that sometimes strayed 
from the truth. Ely, for example, falsely claimed that he had rejected Harper’s offer to be 
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a professor “because the institution was supported in part by a monopolist.” Bemis and 
Ely even placed a false anonymous letter in the New York World which asserted that 
Harper denied offering Ely the post, prompting Ely to write to Harper, hoping to 
embarrass him into publicly stating the truth (Boyer, 2002, 3). 
Yet Harper and his supporters were equally deceptive in their replies. Harper 
denied any violation of academic freedom, claiming Bemis was "incompetent," a 
common excuse for removing troublesome faculty (Boyer, 2002, 3). "This outcry about 
violation of academic freedom is a mechanically manufactured alarm," declared Small. 
"The American professor whose digestion is good and who has escaped brain-fag has all 
the freedom that he wants. He knows that he could not have more without resorting to 
license that would place him among social quacks” (Small, 1899, 471). However, Small 
had worried early on about Bemis' political views, asking him in a March 31, 1892 note 
to make his classes "only incidently and secondarily controversial” (Boyer, 2002, 3). 
The controversy forced Harper to publicly announce his devotion to academic 
freedom in June 1895: “Any statement to the effect that the University has in any way 
restricted the liberty of its professors in the declaration of their opinions, or in the 
performance of their duties as free citizens, I declare to be absolutely false.” But Harper 
also noted, “Care however should be taken not to confound personal privilege with 
official duty, not to mistake popular pleading for scientific thought” (Boyer, 2002, 4). In 
Harper’s view, a scientist was entitled to academic freedom, but someone who sought to 
influence the general public, rather than fellow scholars, was not entitled to protection. 
This was the embodiment of the Gentleman Scientist Model. 
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Small not only denied the fact that Bemis had been fired for his political views, 
but also wrote an essay on academic freedom discounting any threat to intellectual 
freedom at any leading university. Small wrote in 1899, "With reference to alleged cases 
of interference with academic freedom, of which only hearsay reports have reached me, I 
have yet to learn of the first instance in which the evidence presented seems to justify the 
rumor” (Small, 1899, 463). Small denied "that an authenticated case has ever come to my 
knowledge in connection with the non-State institutions” (Small, 1899, 463). Small’s 
state of denial reflected his personal involvement in the Bemis case. To admit that 
academic freedom was endangered would require confessing his own failure to protect 
Bemis. Instead, Small made the bizarre claim that no professor at a private university had 
ever been denied academic freedom. 
But Small’s view of the state of academic freedom also reflected the severe limits 
he placed on the concept. According to Small, "Absolute freedom is a speculative 
abstraction which has no counterpart in reality. No man is free. We are simply free within 
the limits set by our responsibilities” (Small, 1899, 464). Small saw “responsibility” in 
very broad terms: “The professor is responsible again to his students. His business is to 
develop in them first and foremost intellectual integrity and morality. Knowledge is 
secondary. Right intellectual conduct is primary” (Small, 1899, 465). For Small, the 
search for knowledge was no defense. Professors had the responsibility to conceal the 
truth if it might damage their tender students. Small’s notion that “right intellectual 
conduct” mattered more than knowledge reflected the old view that higher education 
primarily taught morality, not truth. This was the gentlemanly half of the Gentleman 
Scientist, the belief that moral goodness was the first duty of a professor. Of course, this 
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“right intellectual conduct” did not include being an agitator like Bemis. As Small noted 
about any professor: "Whatever his other deficiencies, he should be above suspicion of 
intellectual irresponsibility” (Small, 1899, 465). 
To allow full academic freedom would, in Small’s view, ruin the profession. 
Because Small embraced such a broad sense of misconduct by professors, it is little 
wonder that he never saw academic freedom endangered at any university, or in his own 
conduct. 
Small even defended the wealthy businessman who provided both the funding for 
universities and dominated boards of trustees. He argued that "American rich men are not 
the enemies of humanity" because of "their loyal support of institutions whose ideals and 
traditions are distinctly different from those of pure business” (Small, 1899, 471). Small 
contended in another apparent reference to Bemis, "If there is any board of trustees in this 
country that muzzles a professor of economics or sociology in the interest of wealth, I do 
not know the institution which it controls. From my personal knowledge of conditions of 
instruction in those subjects, I should at once suspect that a professor who demands more 
liberty than he enjoys probably wants a sort of liberty to which he has no right” (Small, 
1899, 471). Small also invoked the scientific model of academic freedom, but only in 
order to denounce what he called “partialism posing as science" (Small, 1899, 471), or 
the effort to extend academic freedom to ideas which had not been scientifically proven. 
Thus, Small concluded, "This outcry about violation of academic freedom is a 
mechanically manufactured alarm” (Small, 1899, 471). Small opposed a broader view of 
academic freedom because he saw it as a threat to the scientific status of the profession. If 
professors had the academic freedom to speak, the entire profession would be reduced to 
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the level of “social quacks.” Therefore, to protect the sanctity of academia, the broad 
concept of academic freedom had to be rejected. 
Small’s fundamental error was assuming that the only people who ever suffered 
infringements of academic freedom would be the “social quacks” who deserved 
repression—a mistake that Small perhaps felt was justified by his experience with the 
troublesome Bemis case. Nor did Small consider how restriction of the extremes would 
tend to silence even those with more moderate views, and increase the potential to punish 
many more perspectives. 
As Small’s viewpoint indicated, there was no consensus about the meaning of 
academic freedom in America at the end of the 19th Century. Although the term 
“academic freedom” itself had been well established within academia as a noble concept 
(hence the intense efforts by Small and Harper to deny any misconduct in the Bemis case, 
despite the fact that their personal letters indicated otherwise), there was no operational 
definition or enforcement mechanism.  
Economic Orthodoxy in the American University 
Edward Bemis was not the only victim of economic orthodoxy at the University 
of Chicago. In 1894, Docent I.A. Hourwich attended a Populist Party convention and was 
given the choice of resigning or stopping his political activities. He resigned. The 
trustees’ minutes merely record Hourwich resignation, but the explanation leaked out to 
sympathetic media. The suburban Elgin News reported on November 8, 1895: "Chicago 
University seems to be singularly unfortunate in its professors of political economy. 
Following the lead of the old school writers of free trade, they not only teach their 
heresies but go a step further and champion the pernicious doctrines of socialism and 
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populism. Prof. Bemis was 'resigned' for that cause, and now Dr. Isaac Hourwich is 
debarred from teaching because he is an 'avowed socialist, an infidel, and a sympathizer 
with the people's party.' The last count is not so bad, because every man has a right to his 
political convictions, but no self-respecting institution should retain for an hour among its 
lecturers one who holds such dangerous opinions as Dr. Hourwich. While the prompt 
action of President Harper saved the university from serious harm, he should be warned 
against nominating men to professorships till their fitness is fully ascertained” (Metzger, 
1961, 149). 
Harper continued to rein in faculty who strayed too far from the mainstream. 
Harper wrote to John D. Rockefeller in 1900 to make sure that J. Franklin Jameson was 
acceptable to him before allowing his hiring (Novick, 1988, 64). 
In his President's Report of 1900, Harper noted: "A professor is guilty of an abuse 
of his privilege who promulgates as truth ideas or opinions which have not been tested 
scientifically by his colleagues in the same department of research or investigation” 
(Boyer, 2002, 4). Harper’s scientific model of academic freedom, following closely the 
attitude of Small, held that a faculty who strayed from his colleagues with controversial 
views was not entitled to the protections given to scientists. However, Harper also 
believed in the gentlemanly model, holding that faculty must exercise “common sense” 
by refraining from being partisans or speaking outside their given area of expertise. 
Harper declared, "There is not an institution of learning in the country in which 
freedom of teaching is more absolutely untrammeled than in the University of Chicago" 
and said, "freedom of expression must be given to members of a university faculty, even 
tho it be abused, for the abuse of it is not so great an evil as the restriction of such 
 98 
 
liberty." However, Harper was better at expressing the tenets of academic freedom than 
following them. 
In 1903, Harper warned Jerome Raymond, associate professor of sociology, that 
some of his Extension lectures stirred up strife. In 1906, Veblen was pressured into 
resigning by Harper because of his extramarital activities (as C. Wright Mills politely put 
it, "Girls, we are told, liked Veblen, and he did not really object"). Dean Marion Talbot 
argued that same year that students who gave newspapers information about the 
prevalence of gambling on campus should be summarily expelled, even if the information 
was true. 
However, Harper was still committed in theory to the idea of diversity, despite the 
trouble it caused him. Even as Bemis was leaving, Harper hired Edmund James to teach 
political science in the extension division. In 1901, when James held lectures on “modern 
social and economic problems” and included guest speakers such as Edward Ross—the 
economist fired by Stanford University for his left-leaning views—Laughlin erupted in 
anger at someone stepping on his turf. Laughlin wrote to Harper, reminding him of the 
problems with Bemis and warning, “we are laying up difficulties for ourselves in the 
future.” 
The University of Chicago was not unique in the restraints it placed on faculty; 
Edward Bemis would be fired again for his economic views in 1899, this time from the 
Kansas State Agricultural College (Will, 1901, 255). The limits on academic freedom 
were expressed by James Henry Raymond, a trustee at Northwestern, who declared that 
social scientists should in all things "promptly and gracefully submit to the final 
determination of the trustees” (Will, 1901, 252). Raymond added that a professor's 
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"advocacy must be in harmony with the conclusions of the powers that be, with the 
animus and main purposes of the institutions, and the teachings of his co-laborers” (Will, 
1901, 253). Most leaders of leading universities agreed wholeheartedly with Raymond's 
views. James Allen Smith was dismissed from Marietta College in 1897 for his anti-
monopoly teaching, along with a number of liberal teachers (Will, 1901, 255). Even 
President Schurman of Cornell University, who spoke out strongly for scientific freedom, 
supported the dismissal of a professor in favor of free silver (Will, 1901, 253).  
The Case of Edward Ross 
Perhaps the most famous case regarding academic freedom involved Edward Ross 
at Stanford. As Joan Wallach Scott puts it, “In 1901 Edward Ross, a liberal economist at 
Stanford University, was fired at the insistence of Jane Stanford, who found repugnant 
his views on economic reform and his criticism of the economic policies of her husband, 
Stanford University founder Leland Stanford” (Scott, 2002). Jane Stanford wrote to 
President David Starr Jordan, “Professor Ross cannot be trusted, and he should go” 
(Hofstadter and Metzger, 1955, 439). 
President Jordan proclaimed, “No one has the right to speak for the University in 
any matter of opinion, but each man as a private citizen is perfectly free to take any stand 
in politics he may choose.” (Elliott, 1937, 336). Ross was accused of using his position in 
1896 to support William Jennings Bryan’s political campaign and his stand for free 
silver, even though 50 Stanford professors supported McKinley publicly in 1896 without 
censure (Metzger, 1961, 167). 
But the key reason why Jane Stanford ordered the firing of Ross was his 
opposition to the importation of Chinese laborers to build the railroads, in which the 
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Stanford family had a strong financial interest. However, William Tierney has argued that 
the Ross case is much more complex. Ross’ opposition to immigration was put in 
blatantly racist terms. Ross declared in 1900, “The Oriental can elbow the American to 
one side in the common occupations because he has fewer wants. To let this go on, to let 
the American be driven by coolie competition, to check the American birth-rate in order 
that the Japanese birthrate shall not be checked . . . is to reverse the current of progress, to 
commit race suicide. … We are resolutely determined that California, this latest and 
loveliest seat of the Aryan race, shall not become, if we can help it, the theater of such a 
stern, wolfish struggle for existence as prevails throughout the Orient” (Tierney, 2004). 
After reading Ross’ speech, Jane Stanford wrote to President Jordan. “I am 
grieved to the depths of my heart” and expressed her fear that anti-Chinese prejudice 
would lead to a reign of terror. Stanford declared, “The teaching of violence is 
inconsistent with the Founding Grant” (Tierney, 2004). Jane Stanford defended the 
Chinese against racism, including an effort in 1891 by Stanford students to ban Chinese 
workers from Stanford’s cafeterias. But her maternalistic concern for Chinese people did 
not apparently extend to the conditions of those workers who suffered tremendous 
exploitation and loss of life helping to make her family more wealthy. 
Jordan tried to persuade Stanford to change her mind, but he ultimately obeyed 
his orders and dismissed Ross. Fifteen economists, including some of the most 
conservative in America, endorsed the report of an American Economic Association 
committee criticizing Stanford’s action (Will, 1901, 256). When Stanford professor 
George Howard declared, "I do not worship Saint Market Street; I do not reverence Holy 
Standard Oil; nor do I doff my hat to the celestial Six Companies," he was forced by 
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order of Jane Stanford to apologize or resign, and chose the latter option (Will, 1901, 
256). Seven Stanford professors resigned to protest the firings. Perhaps the most 
significant result of the Ross controversy was its impact on the thought of philosopher 
Arthur Lovejoy, who left Stanford University and moved on to Johns Hopkins 
University, where he became the most powerful influence in creating the AAUP and 
influencing its early approach to academic freedom (Scott, 2002). 
The racism of Edward Ross should make us realize how widespread bigotry was 
in academia. However, many classic cases of academic freedom have involved faculty 
expressing vile beliefs. The firing of Ross reflected the insecurity of academics, and 
inspired enormous concern on college campuses. The fact that Ross’ views should have 
been condemned along with his dismissal doesn’t change the fundamental issue of 
academic freedom at stake in his case. 
Defending Academic Freedom in Wisconsin 
Not all early cases about academic freedom were horror stories. Richard Ely, the 
director of the University of Wisconsin School of Economics, Politics, and History, was 
tried by a committee on the Regents for supporting "strikes and boycotts, justifying and 
encouraging the one while practicing the other” (Metzger, 1961, 152). Ely was 
denounced by Regent Oliver Wells, who was elected Wisconsin’s state superintendent of 
education in 1892. Wells declared that Ely “supports strikes and boycotts, as evidenced 
by his entertaining at home and advising an out-of-state union organizer fomenting labor 
unrest in Madison and by his withdrawing a contract when the printer refused to unionize 
his workplace. His books, intentionally written for the masses and widely marketed by 
the University, trick the general population into accepting his revolutionary views 
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through his pious cant and ostentatious sympathy for all who were in distress” (Wells, 
1894). 
At the July 31, 1894 Regents meeting, a committee of three people was appointed 
to investigate Ely. Wells, who was elected Wisconsin’s state superintendent of education 
in 1892, declared that Ely's books provided a "moral justification of attack upon life and 
property" and were "utopian, impracticable or pernicious” (Metzger, 152). It was true that 
Ely was a radical compared to other 19th Century faculty; he was the first academic 
economist to speak to a national labor union when he addressed the American Federation 
of Labor in 1887. But Ely defended himself by declaring, “I am neither a socialist nor an 
anarchist, and although I favor labor unions, I have a limited faith in them” (Shiell, 
2005b). Ely’s numerous friends and former students jumped to his defense, and Wells’ 
accusations proved to be shaky at best under scrutiny. 
Ely was eventually exonerated and the Regents’ committee made a strong 
declaration of academic freedom: “we could not for a moment think of recommending 
the dismissal or even the criticism of a teacher even if some of his opinions should, in 
some quarters, be regarded as visionary. Such a course would be equivalent to saying no 
professor should teach anything which is not accepted by everyone as true. This would 
cut our curriculum down to very small proportions. We cannot for a moment believe that 
knowledge has reached its final goal, or that the present condition of society is perfect. 
We must therefore welcome from our teachers such discussions as shall suggest the 
means and prepare the way by which knowledge may be extended, present evils be 
removed and others prevented. We feel that we would be unworthy of the position we 
hold if we did not believe in progress in all departments of knowledge. In all lines of 
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academic investigation it is of utmost importance that the investigator should be 
absolutely free to follow the indications of truth wherever they may lead. Whatever may 
be the limitations which trammel inquiry elsewhere we believe the great state University 
of Wisconsin should ever encourage the continual and fearless sifting and winnowing by 
which alone the truth can be found” (Herfurth, 1998). 
The committee’s defense of academic freedom was one of the strongest ever 
made, and it was extraordinary for the 19th Century. But as Goldstein noted, "it could 
hardly escape the attention of other teachers that the alleged holding of 'radical' opinions 
could lead to problems and that Ely himself denied the charges against him and said that 
had they been true they would 'unquestionably unfit me to occupy a responsible position 
as an instructor of youth in a great University.'"(Goldstein, 2001). It is noteworthy that 
Ely never invoked academic freedom to express radical ideas; instead, he denied the 
charges made against him, and declared that if they were true, he would deserve being 
fired. Ely’s approach put him well within the mainstream of the gentleman model of 
academic freedom, since he denied any rights of free expression for professors. 
The University of Wisconsin’s strong stand for academic freedom did not end all 
future controversies. In November 1909, after historian Frederic Jackson Turner left 
Madison for Harvard, President Van Hise reached a compromise with the Regents to stop 
interference. However, that deal quickly fell apart. In January 1910, the Regents 
unanimously censured sociology professor Edward Ross, who had come to Wisconsin to 
be with Ely, his former professor, and benefit from the tradition of academic freedom at 
Madison. Ross was censured because he defended the right of anarchist Emma Goldman 
to speak in Madison, for escorting her around campus, for giving her a tour of the 
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campus, and for inviting Parker Sercombe (who happened to be an advocate of free love) 
to speak to his class about educational theories (Shiell, 2005a; Downs, 2005, 191). 
President Van Hise did not defend these actions, but instead sought to minimize 
them: “In the first place it would be an injustice; for the mistakes which professor Ross 
has made are no sufficiently grave to have more weight than years of service as a teacher 
highly appreciated by his students, including many of the higher grade; second, the 
removal of a professor on the grounds considered would damage the University most 
seriously in the eyes of the academic world. The effects of such a drastic action as the 
removal of a professor holding a continuing appointment for so inadequate a cause would 
not be overcome for years” (Shiell, 2005a). Political activists in the Class of 1910 
decided to cast the Regents’ 1894 statement in bronze and presented it to the Regents 
(who refused to allow it to be hung, and stored it in the basement of Bascom Hall). But 
the Regents backed down from any further action. 
The Class of 1910’s tablet would prove to be remarkably difficult to avoid. 
Alumni lobbied to the Regents to display it on campus. Finally, in 1915, the Regents 
(which had shifted from conservative to progressive control) agreed to a compromise, 
putting it up in Bascom Hall if the members of the Class of 1910 withdrew their claims 
that the Regents were violating academic freedom (Shiell, 2005a). 
Van Hise proclaimed in 1915, “There are no ‘sacred cows’ at Wisconsin. There is 
no such thing as ‘standardized’ teaching in any subject. Professors and instructors present 
faithfully the various sides of each problem. Their duty is to train the students to 
independent thinking. They are in no sense propagandists for any class or interest” 
(Shiell, 2005a). Van Hise’s actions toward academic freedom displayed more 
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ambivalence than his ringing words. In 1912, he gave a commencement address 
defending the academic freedom of philosopher Max Otto, who had been attacked for 
criticizing belief in God in his class, “Man and Nature” (Shiell, 2005a). But in 1914, Van 
Hise asked the faculty to refrain from discussing the growing conflict in Europe, whether 
inside or out of class, until he backed down after a Regent expressed concern that this 
threatened academic freedom (Shiell, 2005a). 
The Culture of Academic Conformity 
Conformity was a common value at the turn of the century. President Draper of 
the University of Illinois, who feared that students who went to Europe would come back 
with "un-American ideas, and perhaps loose habits," also advised students: "Do not stand 
aloof;...above all, do not get to be a freak. Keep in step with the procession. It is a pretty 
good crowd and it is generally moving in the right direction” (Veysey, 1965, 78, 428). 
Faculty were also quite conservative. William Dodd wrote that the faculty at the 
University of Chicago hated President Woodrow Wilson so much that the faculty club 
"took his picture down from a conspicuous place in the main room and put it behind the 
door upstairs” (Novick, 1988, 130).  
Although economics was the primary threat to academic freedom in the early 20th 
century, religion remained a concern. Druly College dismissed a professor for donating a 
book on theosophy to the library (Hofstadter & Metzger, 1955, 466). 
Racism was also prevalent on campus. In 1903, John Bassett, a professor at 
Trinity College (later named Duke University), wrote a moderate article stating that not 
all blacks were intellectually inferior, Raleigh News and Observer publisher Josephus 
Daniels noted that the University of Chicago was not "the only institution which harbors 
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freaks who rush into absurd statements and dangerous doctrines--statements which, if 
true, damn the State of North Carolina, and doctrines which, if carried out, would destroy 
the civilization of the South” (Hofstadter & Metzger, 1955, 447). Bassett resigned in 
1903 after the pressure increased and a boycott of the college was threatened. However, 
President Kilgo and the entire faculty signed a petition for Bassett, threatening to resign if 
his resignation was accepted. The trustees voted 18-7 to keep Bassett, although they 
opposed his views, because they were "unwilling to lend ourselves to any tendency to 
destroy or limit academic liberty” (Hofstadter & Metzger, 1955, 448). The trustees noted, 
"We cannot lend countenance to the degrading notion that professors in American 
Colleges have not an equal liberty of thought and speech with all other Americans” 
(Hofstadter & Metzger, 1955, 449). But while white professors could have freedom at 
some Southern colleges, black professors (and students) were excluded. Academic 
freedom never extended to racial equality. 
Politics and the Rise of the Public University 
The widespread creation of public universities in the wake of the Morrill Acts of 
1862 and 1890 created a new threat to academic freedom: the political attack. Professors 
at private universities were accustomed to the threats posed by administrators and 
trustees. But the 1817 Dartmouth College decision insulated private universities from 
direct political influence. However, the same could not be said of public colleges 
(Hofstadter & Metzger, 1955). 
In 1887, Democrats led the successful effort to remove three Republican 
prohibitionist professors at the State University of Iowa (Hofstadter & Metzger, 1955, 
429). In 1893, the Regents of West Virginia University dismissed the president and all 
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the faculty (Hofstadter & Metzger, 1955, 429). At Kansas State Agricultural College, a 
1896 victory by Democrats and Populists led to a takeover of the presidency and 
economics department. In 1899, when Republicans returned to power, president Thomas 
Elmer Will, Edward Bemis, and Frank Parsons were all dismissed (Hofstadter & 
Metzger, 1955, 424-5). 
In 1915, a year after IWW folk-song composer Joe Hill was tried for murder and 
executed, a professor at the University of Utah who had been active in his defense was 
fired (Goldstein, 2001, 97). That same year, 17 professors resigned from the University 
of Utah to protest the dismissal of four professors by President Kingsbury. Kingsbury 
declared that he was firing Dr. A. A. Knowlton because "Dr. Knowlton has worked 
against the administration of the University" and "spoken very disrespectfully of the 
Chairman of the Board of Regents." Professor George C. Wise was fired for having 
"spoken in a depreciatory way about the University before his classes" and "spoken in a 
very uncomplimentary way about the administration," which had banned a political 
meeting of a student club (AAUP 1915a). 
Charles W. Snow was dismissed as an instructor by Kingsbury because of a 1914 
commencement address by Milton Sevy, which Snow had looked over and advised on 
revisions. Sevy's address attacked "ultra-conservatism" and urged the University to take a 
role of leadership toward a "vigorous, progressive policy." Unfortunately, Governor Spry 
was in attendance and did not appreciate these progressive comments. Spry wrote a letter 
to the Board of Regents urging that "those who are responsible in the University for the 
unwarranted, untrue ideas regarding the attitude the state has taken toward educational 
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matters and institutions, be curbed in their utterances or relieved of their positions. They 
are a menace to the educational interests of the state” (AAUP, 1915a). 
The interference of a governor in public universities was not unusual at this time. 
In 1915, James Brewster was denied reappointment to the University of Colorado Law 
School despite "eminent satisfaction" with his teaching after the school was reorganized. 
In 1914, after Brewster had appeared as counsel for the Miners' Union and testified 
before the Commission on Industrial Relations, Governor E.M. Ammons called President 
Farrand to demand his dismissal (AAUP, 1916c). 
These incidents, particularly the wholesale dismissal of faculty due to shifts in 
political control, greatly alarmed the advocates of academic freedom. There is no 
evidence that faculty at public colleges faced greater restrictions than those at private 
colleges (indeed, in the most famous cases it was Stanford and Chicago that fired faculty, 
while the University of Wisconsin regents defended academic freedom). But the elitist 
Gentleman Scientist Model had much more confidence in the abilities of trustees at top 
private universities, and feared the prejudices of the masses much more. The Gentleman 
Scientist Model defined academia in profoundly anti-democratic terms, creating an elite 
that could defend itself against attempts at outside control. 
Academic Freedom and the Fear of the Masses 
Harvard President Charles Eliot was prescient in 1907 when he called academic 
freedom “a difficult subject, not as yet very well understood in this country, but likely to 
be of increasing interest and importance throughout the coming century” (Eliot, 1907, 1). 
In his 1869 inaugural address, Eliot declared that Harvard “demands of all its 
teachers that they be grave, reverent and high-minded; but it leaves them, like the pupils, 
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free” (Hofstadter and Metzger, 1955, 394). Despite these gentlemanly restrictions on 
faculty, Eliot was the first major American academic leader to propose freedom as a key 
value of the American university. 
By 1907, Eliot saw the danger to academic freedom as coming not from a few 
rich men, but “the pressure in a democracy of a concentrated multitudinous public 
opinion” (Eliot, 1907, 1). In some areas, “a teacher holding unpopular opinions could, 
until very recently, hardly escape the alternative of silence of banishment” (Eliot, 1907, 
2). 
According to Eliot, “Professors of economics are not even supposed to be free in 
some American communities which have held for generations with great unanimity the 
doctrine of protection” (Eliot, 1907, 2). But Eliot’s idea of the dangerous democracy, 
striking down free trade and other ideas, was at odds with most of the prominent cases 
involving academic freedom, in which professors who opposed corporate interests 
suffered the most, not those who opposed protectionism.  
Although legislators in some states infringed academic freedom at public 
universities, for the most part this reflected the powerful control of wealthy interests over 
politicians, not the will of the majority. It is noteworthy that the most dubious claim of 
the 1915 AAUP Declaration was its assertion that in public universities subject to 
legislative interference, “the menace to academic freedom may consist in the repression 
of opinions that in the particular political situation are deemed ultra-conservative rather 
than ultra-radical” (AAUP, 1915a). 
The 1915 Declaration pointed to the “most serious difficulty of the problem; 
namely, the dangers connected with the existence in a democracy of an overwhelming 
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and concentrated public opinion” (AAUP, 1915a). This “danger of despotism” was seen 
as the greatest threat to academic freedom. 
It was precisely this misapprehension about what endangered academic freedom 
that reinforced the Gentleman Scientist Model. If the primary threat was perceived to be 
public opinion, then an elitist model aimed at insulating academics from the people was 
embraced as the strongest protection. 
Eliot was not alone in viewing the university as a conservative force necessary to 
suppress the errors of the masses. The AAUP’s 1915 Declaration stated that a university 
is “likely always to exercise a certain form of conservative influence” because one of its 
roles was “to check the more hasty and unconsidered impulses of popular feeling.” 
Indeed, the AAUP argued in its 1915 Declaration that academic freedom was 
essential precisely in order to add credibility to its conservative influence: “For the public 
may respect, and be influenced by, the counsels of prudence and of moderation which are 
given by men of science, if it believes those counsels to be the disinterested expression of 
the scientific temper and of unbiased inquiry.” The mass public, on the other hand, “is 
little likely to respect or heed them if it has reason to believe that they are the expression 
of the interests, or the timidities, of the limited portion of the community which is in a 
position to endow institutions of learning, or is most likely to be represented upon their 
boards of trustees” (AAUP, 1915a). 
The AAUP was making a direct appeal to conservative trustees, arguing that 
academic freedom would protect the integrity of a university that was essential in order to 
persuade the ignorant and dangerous public. But this was more than just a cynical 
argument; the leaders of the AAUP were not leftist radicals. They sincerely believed in 
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the threat posed by the public, and they saw the Gentleman Scientist as the best model for 
protecting academic freedom from the masses. 
By misjudging the primary danger to academic freedom, the AAUP adopted a 
Gentleman Scientist Model that was unable to fully confront the political debates that 
dominated the question of academic freedom throughout the 20th Century. 
Even Eliot, whose views about academic freedom were the most advanced of his 
generation (in the sense of resembling 21st Century ideas of free expression), failed to 
understand that democracy was not the primary threat to academic freedom. 
Although Eliot may have been misguided about the main threat to academic 
freedom, he made a key contribution to academic freedom by recognizing that tenure was 
essential to it. Eliot noted, “So long as school committees insist on annual elections of all 
teachers, and boards of trustees of colleges and universities claim the right to dismiss at 
pleasure all the officers of the institutions in their charge, there will be no security for the 
teachers’ proper freedom” (Eliot, 1907, 2). According to Eliot, “A long tenure of office 
for teachers is well-nigh indispensable, if a just academic freedom is to be secured for 
them” (Eliot, 1907, 2). 
Eliot defined tenure as a concept that should apply to all teachers, not just to 
universities: “Teachers in every grade of public instruction from the lowest to the highest, 
when once their capacity and character have been demonstrated, should hold their offices 
without express limitation of time, and should be subject to removal only for inadequate 
performance of duty or for misconduct publicly proved” (Eliot, 1907, 2). Eliot was also 
rare among his peers in raising the academic freedom of students as a concern: “A faculty 
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is much more likely to limit unduly the academic freedom of students than of teachers” 
(Eliot, 1907, 3). 
Eliot was the most prominent advocate of student academic freedom: According 
to Metzger, “before the nineties, academic freedom had alluded primarily to student 
freedoms, particularly the freedom to elect courses” (Metzger, 1961, 223). But after the 
turn of the century, “only one of the important documents of academic freedom linked 
Lernfreiheit with Lehrfreiheit”—Charles Eliot’s 1907 address (Metzger, 1961, 223). 
Eliot declared in that speech, “When he reaches his college, normally at eighteen 
or nineteen years of age, he ought to find at once a great enlargement of his freedom of 
choice among studies. This is for the student the first element in a just academic 
freedom” (Eliot, 1907, 7). Much of Eliot’s idea of student academic freedom followed the 
principle of lernfreiheit that he had already sought to implement at Harvard. This 
included “choice among teachers” (Eliot, 1907, 7). According to Eliot, “the student ought 
to find himself free to determine the method of his daily life with no more restrictions 
than the habits and customs of civilized society necessarily impose” (Eliot, 1907, 9). But 
Eliot’s idea of student academic freedom also went far beyond the German concept. 
According to Eliot, “The college student may reasonably expect to find himself free from 
attempts to impose opinions on him”—whether by teachers, peers, or mass meetings 
(Eliot, 1907, 8). This was something that the German model of universities (where 
students rarely expressed their views) never addressed. 
Eliot still had a somewhat paternalistic view of students, even urging a ban on 
pledging a fraternity early in the first year of college and doing so in the name of 
academic freedom: “To be forced to accept an unknown group of permanent associates 
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within three weeks of entering college is an unfortunate limitation of academic freedom” 
(Eliot, 1907, 9). 
The student, Eliot proclaimed, “has also a right to be free from all inducements to 
cant, hypocrisy, or conformity,” noting that “voluntary attendance at all religious 
exercises is a valuable element in academic freedom” (Eliot, 1907, 8). Eliot even urged 
financial aid “on merit only, without regard to any opinions or practices of his” (Eliot, 
1907, 8). 
Charles Eliot’s concern for student academic freedom was unusual for his time, 
and did not reflect the primary emphasis on the scholar as the source and purpose of 
academic freedom. However, Eliot had an underlying motive for his view of academic 
freedom that did not correspond to the civil liberties view of academic freedom. Eliot 
believed that it was essential to alter the structure of the university, and student choice in 
the curriculum was the mechanism for freeing it from its fixed old ways. Once students 
began to choose courses in more modern scientific fields, colleges would be able to hire 
scholars who did new research. Other student liberties, such as the abolition of mandatory 
chapel, were similarly aimed at removing the stranglehold of old ideas over academia. 
Thus, Eliot’s perspective never really conflicted with scientific models of academic 
freedom, but represented a deeper understanding of the political barriers to creating a 
genuinely scientific university. 
Because Eliot saw academic freedom as essential to teaching at all levels, and 
applied it even to students, he did not endorse the scientific model which saw academic 
freedom as applying only to a certified elite of experts. But Eliot was deeply committed 
to the gentlemanly model: “academic freedom for teachers is properly subject to certain 
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limitations which may best be described as those of courtesy and honor. They resemble 
the limitations which the manners of a gentleman or a lady impose on personal freedom 
in social intercourse” (Eliot, 1907, 6). 
Eliot told the story of a Harvard professor who approached him about the 
controversial economic view he presented in a textbook: “I was obliged to tell him that 
the president and fellows would prefer to have that doctrine omitted from the book, 
unless, indeed, he were willing to omit from the title page his own official title as a 
Harvard professor. The result was that the troublesome chapter was omitted….The 
incident taught me that the best defense of an institution against abuses of academic 
freedom was to be found in the sense of duty and honor which obtains among its officers” 
(Eliot, 1907, 7). In Eliot’s view, self-censorship was the most desirable outcome; the true 
Gentleman professor would, of course, prefer to silence a controversial chapter rather 
than remove his noble affiliation with Harvard University. And the true Gentleman would 
clear his writing with his president rather than potentially embarrass his institution. 
Eliot’s gentle form of repression was an example of how pervasive such censorship was 
at the turn of the century. The fact that Eliot would actually celebrate his successful 
suppression of controversial economic views in an essay about “academic freedom” 
reflected how pervasive the Gentleman Scientist Model was. 
But the gentleman model had a much darker side to it. Imagine what might 
happen to the professor who published controversial ideas, who publicly offended donors 
and trustees, who even dared to oppose the administration. The professor who was not a 
gentleman would quickly find himself out the door, even if (as Edward Bemis 
discovered) the true reasons for his dismissal were never disclosed. 
 115 
 
The Gentleman Scientist Model functioned because leading universities were still, 
at the turn of the century, small clubs where the virtue of the individual professor could 
be monitored closely. Eliot’s story seems unusual from the perspective of the 21st 
Century, when most university presidents are far too busy raising money to read anything 
written by their professors, and virtually no professor would imagine a moral obligation 
to get permission from the president before publishing controversial ideas. As higher 
education expanded far beyond what any of the AAUP’s founders could have imagined, 
the Gentleman Scientist Model increasingly became an anachronism that sharply 
restricted academic freedom rather than a system for defending it. However, it did not 
take several decades for the flaws of the Gentleman Scientist Model at protecting 
academic freedom to become apparent. 
The Idea of Academic Freedom in the Early 20th Century 
In one of the earliest articles about the term “academic freedom,” published in 
1885, Andrew West warned: "freedom in studies, freedom in conduct....these two are 
one” (West, 1885, 443). And West did not regard freedom as a good thing: "if this easy-
going dealing with faith and morals is the spirit of the new departure, it is certainly the 
most dangerous element in the whole movement” (West, 1885, 444). Evoking the 
conservative attitude of the 1828 Yale Report, West wrote: "What our youth most need is 
discipline of character, deeply inwrought with their studies” (West, 1885, 444). To West, 
"Discipline in diligence, attentiveness, candor, ready obedience to law, determination to 
achieve honorable success, patience, perseverance, courage, assured control over 
appetites and passions, and unselfish devotion to pending duty are the ruling powers. 
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These are both preconditions and products of genuine education” (West, 1885, 443). 
West was describing the virtues of a gentleman. 
Johns Hopkins founder Daniel Gilman defended academic freedom in 1885. "It is 
the universities which edit, interpret, translate and reiterate the acquisitions of former 
generations, both of literature and science. Their revelation of error is sometimes 
welcomed but it is generally opposed; nevertheless the process goes on, indifferent to 
plaudits or reproaches” (Lucas, 1994, 172-3). Gilman’s optimism about the inevitability 
of scientific progress (and opposition to it) reflected a 19th Century attitude. But the rise 
of the industrial economy created popular and political support for science, and much 
greater controversies over politics and economics as the ideology of science spread to 
what would be called the “social sciences.” For the 20th Century, it would not be 
literature or science that sparked the worst violations of academic freedom, but this odd 
middle ground of new “sciences” which challenged the wealthy donors who financed the 
new research universities sprouting around the country. 
By the turn of the century, the idea of academic freedom bore little resemblance 
to today’s vision of it. William Hyde, who served as president of Bowdoin College for 32 
years, declared in 1901 at the Boston University commencement: "The incompetent man 
should be dismissed at the first opportunity. Academic freedom demands it” (Hyde, 1901, 
12). 
Hyde observed that "this question of academic freedom did not arise so long as 
the colleges were content to teach Latin, Greek, mathematics, and a little science and 
philosophy, for the simple reason that nobody cared much, one way or the other, what 
was taught about these things” (Hyde, 1901, 1). According to Hyde, "Interference with 
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liberty comes only when the subjects taught are those for which the people care” (Hyde, 
1901, 1). However, Hyde’s claim that professors in the early American college did not 
face repression was simply wrong. What went on in the classroom did not cause public 
disputes over academic freedom because the teaching either went unnoticed by 
authorities or was dealt with behind the scenes. It was rarely teaching of any kind that 
caused controversy throughout the history of higher education; instead, it was the fear 
that a publicly revealed remark or allegiance might indicate how a professor taught in the 
classroom, or a simple belief that anyone who believed in such ideas should not be 
employed by a college. 
The Gentleman Model decreed that politeness was considered essential for a 
professor, and trumped academic freedom. Hyde argued, "a professor is under obligation 
to respect the constituency of the college. A professor has no right, deliberately and 
intentionally, to offend the friends and supporters of the institution which he is employed 
to serve” (Hyde, 1901, 13). Hyde rejected the idea that a professor could be an “agitator” 
unless “he should first hand in his resignation” (Hyde, 1901, 13). 
Like others who espoused the ideal of the Gentleman Scientist, Hyde saw the 
ideal as a necessary compromise to protect professors from political persecution. In this 
implicit “don’t ask, don’t tell” deal about politics, the inevitable result was a model of the 
university which avoided any discussion of contemporary political issues. Hyde noted, 
"Membership in a political party and frank avowal of one's views on political and social 
questions are perfectly consistent with the position of a professor. Neither president nor 
trustee nor donor has the slightest right to inquire into a professor's views for the 
purposes of discipline or removal, nor to prevent the reasonable and moderate expression 
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of such views” (Hyde, 1901, 14). But, Hyde wrote, the college’s president and trustees 
have "both the right and duty" to warn "a professor that the immoderate and aggressive 
and vituperative reiteration of views which are repugnant to a large portion of the 
constituency of an institution, are inconsistent with his largest usefulness as a professor; 
and if he persists in such utterances, to notify him to choose between the career of an 
agitator and a professor” (Hyde, 1901, 14). 
This “ivory tower” approach, the separation of agitating and professing, was 
meant to protect the university from the pressures of external politics, but it also 
prevented members of the university from fully participating in politics. Hyde’s approach 
(which probably represented a common campus view) allowed radical views to become 
targets for attack, since only ideas outside the mainstream (and expressed in an 
“immoderate” way) would be targets for punishment. In this vision of the Gentleman 
Scientist, radical professors gave up the right to academic freedom (and to their jobs) by 
violating the standards of polite society, which expected them not to offend the 
“constituency” of a university. 
Arthur Hadley wrote in the 1903 Atlantic Monthly about the threat to academic 
freedom, which he regarded as a relatively small problem: “Once or twice every year the 
public hears of differences of opinion between teachers in our collegiate institutions and 
those who hold the appointing power” (Hadley, 1903, 152). 
Hadley saw the “cardinal fault” of early science: “it failed to provide for 
progress” (Hadley, 1903, 153). The idea of progress was essential not only for science, 
but also for academic freedom. Unless new knowledge (and criticism of old knowledge) 
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was necessary, there would be no reason to give professors the freedom to express their 
own views. 
Hadley’s ideas reflected the early split between liberty of research and liberty of 
teaching, and he urged severe limits upon the teacher: “We have not learned to separate 
the rights of the discoverer from the duties of the teacher, or to secure the advantages of 
freedom without the dangers” (Hadley, 1903, 160). Hadley believed that the teacher has 
“a contractual relation with authorities, public or private, who pay him for his teaching 
and conceive that they have the right to say what he shall teach” (Hadley, 1903, 160). 
Hadley argued that tying together academic freedom for both the researcher and the 
teacher would bring down scientific research. Since it was natural for colleges to demand 
limits upon the teacher, it would be better to accept these limitations and instead try to 
assure freedom of thought for academics: “Deny liberty of thought and you deny liberty 
of teaching as a matter of course. But it does not follow, because you approve of liberty 
of thought, that you thereby sanction a corresponding liberty of teaching, even among 
teachers of the highest grade” (Hadley, 1903, 157). 
Warren’s 1914 essay on academic freedom expressed the opposite fear, that 
freedom of teaching in the German sense was being denied in America: “The German 
scholar has higher ideals. In German universities academic freedom of teaching 
(akademische Lehrfreiheit) has long been a cardinal tenet. The professor of highest rank 
(the Ordinarius) is free to offer any course whatsoever within the confines of his own 
branch. This untrammeled freedom of teaching has led to a somewhat mistaken 
conception in our own country of the real meaning of academic freedom. It is often 
imagined that it implies liberty on the part of a professor to advance any theory in 
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classroom without restraint” (Warren, 1914, 691). By contrast, in America, “Freedom of 
teaching does not mean that an instructor may offer any course which he deems wise 
without securing the consent of his colleagues” (Warren, 1914, 691). 
This split between teacher and researcher has been influential in guiding the idea 
of academic freedom; the AAUP’s 1915 Declaration even included a warning about 
indoctrinating students too immature to handle the truth. But for the most part, the 
advocates of academic freedom by the 20th Century had unified research and teaching as 
two sides of the same coin of scientific investigation. To report scientific truth to one’s 
colleagues or one’s students was a duty of the professor. 
In 1914, Howard Crosby Warren described several examples of academic 
freedom being violated. In 1911, Warren noted, “Professor Banks was dismissed from the 
University of Florida, following the publication of an article in The Independent, in 
which he stated his conviction that teachers and others in positions of influence made a 
grievous mistake in the generation prior to the Civil War in not paving the way for a 
gradual removal of slavery without the loss of so many lives and the consequent pension 
burden.” (Warren, 1914, 693). 
Warren reported “a very exceptional instance” in 1913 when President Bowman 
at the State University of Iowa offered to resign after “the Board had dismissed a member 
of the Faculty without consulting the president, and without giving the accused member a 
hearing.” (Warren, 1914, 694). 
In 1913, Dr. J. L. Lewinsohn, a law professor at the University of North Dakota, 
“resigned under pressure, the authorities having disapproved of his active participation in 
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the political campaign. He claims to have been censured by the dean for attending a 
conference of leaders of the Progressive party” (Warren, 1914, 694). 
In 1914, Professor A.E. Morse was “practically forced to resign for political 
reasons” as chair of political science at Marietta College. The faculty were told, “it is the 
sacred duty of the trustees to administer the affairs of the institution according to their 
own judgment and the dictates of their own conscience” (Warren, 1914, 694). Two other 
department chairs, friends of Morse, were given the choice of resigning or being 
dismissed (Warren, 1914, 694). 
In 1914, a psychology department head at a state university “was dismissed on 
indefinite charges, his petition for a faculty committee of inquiry being denied.” (Warren, 
1914, 693). At a state normal school, an assistant professor of psychology was “dismissed 
without warning after a brief hearing before the board” (Warren, 1914, 693). 
Warren concluded, “At present the biologists appear to have won the right to 
teach the truth as they understand it” (Warren, 1914, 693). According to Warren, 
“Interference with freedom of inquiry and instruction in recent years has been largely 
confined to the departments of philosophy, psychology, and economics, particularly the 
last.” (Warren, 1914, 693). 
Nicholas Murray Butler and Academic Freedom at Columbia 
In 1914, Columbia president Nicholas Murray Butler espoused the gentlemanly 
model in sharp terms: “Academic freedom has been won at a great cost and it has 
produced noble results, but is open to grave abuse. The limitations upon a university 
teacher are those imposed by common morality, common sense, common loyalty, and a 
decent respect for the opinions of mankind. A teacher or investigator who offends against 
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common morality has destroyed his academic usefulness, whatever may be his 
intellectual attainments” (Butler, 1914, 291). According to Butler, “Most abuses of 
academic freedom are due simply to bad manners and to lack of ordinary tact and 
judgment” (Butler, 1914, 292).  
Butler enforced this gentlemanly model. Joel Elias Spingarn, a full professor at 
Columbia, was fired in 1911 because he opposed President Butler's "corporate efficiency" 
and defied the conventional views of English professors (Klingenstein, 1991, 106). 
Butler asserted that “questions of academic freedom are frequently involved with 
other issues” citing the case of an inadequate teacher where “it would only be possible to 
remove him from office or make other change in his status if he happened to be a 
Republican or a Democrat. If he were a Progressive and had supported the proposals for 
the recall of the judges and the recall of judicial decisions, both the newspapers and the 
general public would assume, assert and reiterate that such a teacher had been punished 
because of his political opinions” (Butler, 1914, 292). Butler’s dubious claim that left-
wing professors were protected from dismissal precisely because they belonged to an 
unpopular political party must have astonished those teachers who lost their jobs for 
being a Progressive. 
Butler’s view of faculty was this: “They enjoy academic freedom, but they enjoy 
it like gentlemen” (Butler, 1914, 294). Academic freedom, Butler declared, is “confused 
and confounded with many other issues, and one of those issues is the capacity or 
incapacity of a given scholar to behave like a gentleman” (Butler, 1914, 293). According 
to Butler, “A gentleman understands that it is neither necessary nor expedient to teach to 
the young everything which the experience and reflection of an older man may have 
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taught him to believe….He knows how to use the rich gift of freedom without divesting 
himself of a high sense of responsibility for that use” (Butler, 1914, 294). 
These early formulations of academic freedom by university presidents often cited 
the gentlemanly requirement that was considered fundamental to the concept. Perhaps the 
scientific model of academic freedom was really thought of as an alternative to the 
gentleman model. The goal was to use scientific method and scientific consensus to allow 
for the expression of ideas that might be controversial among the uneducated masses.  
By 1915, academic freedom was not widely embraced in America; it was often 
perceived as the special pleading of professors. In 1915, the New York Times 
editorialized, "Academic freedom, that is, the inalienable right of every college instructor 
to make a fool of himself and of his college by...intemperate, sensational prattle about 
every subject under heaven, to his classes and to the public, and still keep on the payroll 
or be reft therefrom only by elaborate process, is cried to all the winds by the organized 
dons” (Hofstadter & Metzger, 1955, 482). Whether it was newspapers, politicians, or 
college presidents, faculty faced a hostile audience as they tried to persuade people of the 
value and necessity of academic freedom. The rest of the 20th Century would be marked 
by a concerted effort of faculty to make academic freedom a reality, and not merely a 
theory. 
Dewey and Academic Freedom 
One key to understanding the meaning of academic freedom in the early 20th 
Century is to examine the thoughts of John Dewey, who would go on to be the most 
prominent founder of the AAUP and its first president. Dewey’s vision of academic 
freedom in 1901 made “a distinction between the university proper and those teaching 
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bodies, called by whatever name, whose primary business is to inculcate a fixed set of 
ideas and facts” (Dewey, 1902, 1). Dewey believed, “An ecclesiastical, political, or even 
economic corporation holding certain tenets certainly has a right to support an institution 
to maintain and propagate its creed” (Dewey, 1902, 1). Dewey did not, in 1901, see 
academic freedom as a universal concept essential to the idea of higher education. 
Instead, he regarded it as an idea that applied only to a certain elite in the top universities, 
where the ideals of pursuing knowledge made academic freedom necessary. As Dewey 
put it, the university requires “accepting obligations to a larger world of scholarship and 
of society” (Dewey, 1902, 2). 
Dewey declared: "The university function is the truth-function” (Dewey, 1902, 3). 
And Dewey saw no difference between discovering truth and transmitting it. But Dewey 
also believed that an opinion expressed by a professor “is almost certain to be regarded as 
an official judgment. It thus commits and possibly compromises the institution to which 
the instructor belongs” (Dewey, 1902, 6). Here was the weakness of the Gentleman 
Scientist Model embraced by Dewey: so long as the opinions expressed by professors 
were taken as the official view of a university, the university would be justified in 
restricting the freedom to speak. 
Dewey saw science as the way out of the problem of academic freedom. 
According to Dewey, “Upon the whole, it is practically impossible for any serious 
question regarding academic freedom to arise in the sphere of mathematics, astronomy, 
physics, or chemistry. Each of these subjects now has its definite established technique, 
and its own sphere within which it is supreme” (Dewey, 1902, 4). If every field could 
achieve similar scientific validity, Dewey imagined, there would be no problem. Dewey 
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worried, “Wherever scientific method is only partially attained the danger of undue 
dogmatism and of partisanship is very great. It is possible to consecrate ideas born of 
sheer partisanship with the halo of scientifically established belief. It is possible to state 
what is currently recognized to be scientific truth in such a way as to violate the most 
sacred beliefs of a large number of our fellow-men” (Dewey, 1902, 7).  
Dewey viewed academic freedom from a scientific perspective. Dewey admitted 
that “some of the studies taught in the university are inherently in a much more scientific 
condition than others” (Dewey, 1902, 3). But he saw the study of economic activity as 
demanding more academic freedom, not less. Dewey observed, “Political economy, 
sociology, historical interpretation, psychology in its various possible applications, deal 
face to face with problems of life, not with problems of technical theory. Hence the right 
and duty of academic freedom are even greater here than elsewhere” (Dewey, 1902, 5). 
Dewey also endorsed the gentlemanly ideal of the professor: “We may insist that 
a man needs tact as well as scholarship” (Dewey, 1902, 8). According to Dewey, “Lack 
of reverence for the things that mean much to humanity, joined with a craving for public 
notoriety, may induce a man to pose as a martyr to truth when in reality he is a victim of 
his own lack of mental and moral poise” (Dewey, 1902, 8). Here Dewey quoted 
University of Chicago president William Rainey Harper’s December 1900 convocation: 
“A professor is guilty of an abuse of privilege who promulgates as truth ideas or opinions 
which have not been tested scientifically by his colleagues in the same department of 
research or investigation” (Dewey, 1902, 8). 
Harper identified four other exceptions to a professor’s academic freedom: “who 
takes advantage of a classroom exercise to propagate the partisan view of one or another 
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of the political parties”; “who in any way seeks to influence his pupils or the public by 
sensational methods”; who “undertakes to speak authoritatively on subjects which have 
no relation to the department in which he was appointed to give instruction” or even a 
specialist in a department who tries to discuss anything “with which he has had little or 
no experience” (Dewey, 1902, 8-9). 
Harper did declare, “freedom of expression must be given to members of a 
university faculty, even tho it is abused, for the abuse of it is not so great an evil as the 
restriction of such liberty” (Dewey, 1902, 9). But although academic freedom is 
technically given to such members, no one could expect faculty to stand up for their 
rights if they violated the scientific ideal. 
In Dewey’s scientific ideal, academic freedom is very simple, and he worries that 
“the presence of these personal elements detracts very much from the simplicity and 
significance of an issue regarding academic freedom” (Dewey, 1902, 9). The desire of 
Dewey to simplify academic freedom and avoid complicated cases caused him to have an 
almost naïve view of its status. Dewey declared that he would “dissent most thoroly from 
the opinion sometimes expressed that there is a growing danger threatening academic 
freedom. The exact contrary is, in my judgment, the case as regards academic freedom in 
the popular sense, that is to say of dictatorial interference by moneyed benefactors with 
special individual utterances” (Dewey, 1902, 9). Ironically, Dewey would express a 
similar opinion more than a decade later at the start of the AAUP,  
Dewey claimed in 1901, “The man with money hardly dare directly interfere with 
freedom of inquiry, even if he wished to; and no respectable university administration 
would have the courage, even if it were willing, to defy the combined condemnation of 
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other universities and of the general public” (Dewey, 1902, 10). But by 1915, Dewey 
realized that the general public often cared little for (or actually opposed) academic 
freedom, and that universities were unwilling to criticize their peers. Thus, it became 
necessary for professors to be the source of “condemnation” in such cases. 
Dewey wrote in 1901, “There has never been a time in the history of the world 
when the community so recognized its need of expert guidance as to-day” (Dewey, 1902, 
13). As he would do in 1915, Dewey saw the AAUP ultimately as a means to help society 
benefit from the expert advice of professors, not purely as a defense of academic 
freedom. 
Dewey saw the scholarly association as a model: “No fact is more significant than 
the growing inclination on the part of scientific associations to assume a right and duty to 
inquire into what affects the welfare of its own line of inquiry, however and wherever it 
takes place. This is the growth of the corporate scientific consciousness; the sense of the 
solidarity of truth” (Dewey, 1902, 14). In 1901, Dewey even predicted the future of the 
AAUP he would later help to create, writing that he could “foresee a time when the 
consciousness of being a member of an organized society of truth-seekers will solidify 
and re-enforce otherwise scattered and casual efforts” (Dewey, 1902, 14).  
This was Dewey’s scientific model of academic freedom, in which the scientific 
experts would themselves defend academic freedom through their scientific societies. 
Only the scientific experts could truly judge who within their field was entitled to the 
protections of academic freedom. 
Dewey confidently declared that through individual initiative and “the sense of 
membership in the wider university,” academics “will assuredly amply triumph over all 
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dangers attacking academic freedom” (Dewey, 1902, 14). It was an optimism that would 
be repeated by Dewey in 1915 at the creation of the AAUP. 
Mecklin and the Rise of the AAUP 
In 1905, John Mecklin was named as professor of moral and mental philosophy at 
Lafayette College, a Presbyterian institution. President Ethelbert Warfield was offended 
by Mecklin’s teaching of evolutionary theories in his classes, and wrote to him, “I shall 
be glad to give you every opportunity to explain your opinions and your teachings, but I 
ask that you do so explain them or retire from the chair which you occupy” (Tiede, 2014). 
After twice being summoned before a committee of the governing board, and expecting 
that he would be dismissed, Mecklin decided to resign in 1913 (Tiede, 2014). Angry 
students at Lafayette responded by disrupting Warfield’s chapel speeches and 
commencement (Tiede, 2014). 
The American Psychological Association and the American Philosophical 
Association joined together in 1913 in order to investigate the Mecklin case and issued a 
report of the joint committee. By unanimous vote, the committee declared: “We believe it 
to be the right of the general body of professors of philosophy and psychology to know 
definitely the conditions of the tenure of any professorship in their subject” and “to 
understand unequivocally what measure of freedom of teaching is guaranteed in any 
college, and to be informed as to the essential details of any case in which credal 
restrictions, other than those to which the college officially stands committed, are 
publicly declared by responsible persons to have been imposed” (Warren, 1914, 696). 
Mecklin was not the only professor whose dismissal inspired a collective response 
from scholarly associations. In 1913, Willard Fisher, professor of economics and social 
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science at Wesleyan College, was asked to resign from Wesleyan University because of 
some offhand remarks he made about church-going and Sunday observance at a lecture 
(Warren, 1914, 694). At their 1913 meeting, the American Political Science Association 
(APSA) appointed a committee of three “to examine and report upon the present situation 
in American educational institutions as to liberty of thought, freedom of speech, and 
security of tenure for teachers of political science” (Warren, 1914, 696). Similar 
committees were also established by the American Economics Association (AEA) and 
the American Sociological Association (ASA), and all three joined together to investigate 
the dismissal of Fisher. 
Creating the AAUP 
The movement to create a “National Association of College Professors” was first 
broached in response to the Mecklin case in a spring 1913 letter by senior faculty from 
Johns Hopkins, and a preliminary meeting was held on Nov. 17, 1913 in Baltimore, 
attended by 18 delegates from Clark, Columbia, Harvard, Johns Hopkins, Princeton, 
Wisconsin, and Yale. John Dewey was appointed as chair of a committee to send 
invitations to join the organization to full professors “whose names appeared on the lists 
of distinguished specialists prepared for the committee” (AAUP, 1916b, 18). 
Recognizing that individual scholarly groups lacked the power to address violations of 
academic freedom, the group decided that a national association of faculty was necessary. 
The December 1913 meetings of the AEA, APSA, and ASA for a joint committee 
on academic freedom spurred the development of the AAUP’s emphasis on academic 
freedom. After a preliminary report of this joint committee was presented in December 
1914, the AAUP held its first meeting in January 1 and 2, 1915 with over 250 professors 
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meeting at the Chemists’ Club in New York City, and decided to take up the problem of 
academic freedom by passing a motion to “bring about a merging in a new committee of 
the committees already created by the economic, political science and sociological 
associations to deal with the subject of academic freedom, the joint committee to be 
authorized to investigate the subject in behalf of this Association” (AAUP 1916b, 16). 
This committee, known as Committee A, would quickly become the central focus 
of the new organization. Committee A reported a year later, “The committee of fifteen 
had scarcely been constituted when a number of cases of alleged infringement of 
academic freedom were brought to its attention” (AAUP, 1915a). 
With 11 cases suddenly on its hands, Committee A was unable to put together 
enough investigating committees; it sent three cases to “appropriate special societies”: 
Dartmouth College, to the American Philosophical Association; Tulane, to the American 
Physiological Society; and the University of Oklahoma, to the American Chemical 
Society. The December 1915 Bulletin announced that the AAUP would meet in 
Washington, DC on Dec. 31, 1915 in order to coordinate with “three societies concerned 
with the social sciences” because the academic freedom report “is the chief feature of this 
year’s program.” 
At the 1915 meeting, the AAUP began by concentrating on academic freedom. 
The AAUP’s early emphasis on academic freedom bothered some members. John 
Dewey, elected as head of the group, announced: “I have heard rumors of some criticism 
on this point” (Dewey, 1915, 11). Dewey tried to comfort these members by saying, 
“none of the officers of the Association, least of all those who have been overwhelmed by 
the duties incident to these investigations, regard this year’s work as typical or even as 
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wholly normal” (Dewey, 1915, 11). But Dewey argued that the AAUP had an obligation 
to address these problems: “The investigations of particular cases were literally thrust 
upon us. To have failed to meet the demands would have been cowardly; it would have 
tended to destroy all confidence in the Association as anything more than a talking body” 
(Dewey, 1915, 12). 
The AAUP’s formation in 1915 and its first statement of principles marked the 
most important step in the history of academic freedom. Metzger called it “an academic 
freedom rationale that did not become crystallized in this country until 1915” (Metzger, 
2000, 73). However, the AAUP’s founders had no clear idea that this would happen. The 
AAUP’s defense of academic freedom in America was more of an accident than a 
conscious plan of the organization. 
The goal of the AAUP was not academic freedom, but a much broader concept of 
professionalization for university faculty. The original call for a meeting to create the 
AAUP declared, “The scientific and specialized interests of members of American 
university faculties are well cared for by various learned societies. No organization exists, 
however, which at once represents the common interests of the teaching staffs and deals 
with the general problems of university policy” (Wigmore, 1916, 11). 
Academic freedom was considered one privilege of professors, important but 
certainly not the special focus of the AAUP. Most of the founders of the AAUP regarded 
academic freedom as a rare issue they would hardly have to address, especially when 
other concerns (such as low salaries) were a worry for everyone in academia. 
Dewey emphasized that academic freedom was essential for the AAUP’s mission: 
“the enhanced security and dignity of the scholar’s calling throughout our country” 
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(Dewey, 1915, 12). Academic freedom was important primarily because its absence 
might undermine the status of professors. Without academic freedom, the prestige 
attached to professors would disappear since their words could not be trusted as an 
independent scholarly judgment. Without that prestige and freedom, fewer bright men 
would be lured into the field. Academic freedom merged with tenure because both were 
needed for job security, in order to make the low-paid field of teaching appealing to well-
educated men. 
Dewey concluded his first president’s address with his characteristic optimism 
about the future of academic freedom: “We met one year ago with mingled hopes and 
fears. We meet today with a record of things accomplished and a definite program of 
things yet to be undertaken—with fears allayed and hopes confirmed” (Dewey, 1915, 
13). 
The AAUP’s 1915 Declaration of Principles 
The AAUP’s 1915 Declaration of Principles was the most influential definition of 
academic freedom in America. The 1915 Declaration would form the ideological 
foundation of the AAUP’s doctrines, and would shape the later statements made by the 
AAUP. The 1915 Declaration began by noting, “The term ‘academic freedom’ has 
traditionally had two applications -- to the freedom of the teacher and to that of the 
student, Lehrfreiheit and Lernfreiheit. It need scarcely be pointed out that the freedom 
which is the subject of this report is that of the teacher” (AAUP, 1915a). 
The 1915 Declaration was one of the earliest and most influential expressions of 
the triumverate purposes of the university: “To promote inquiry and advance the sum of 
human knowledge. To provide general instruction to the students. To develop experts for 
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various branches of the public service.” This rendition of research, teaching, and service 
has become the standard measure of scholarly achievement in academia; however, the 
third component has become the most altered portion, since today “service” now 
typically refers to serving on committees within the college rather than the original 
purpose of “public service.” Ironically, the protection for extramural utterances has 
dramatically increased even while the AAUP’s original justification for those utterances 
(to serve the public with expert opinion) is rarely mentioned by the organization 
anymore. 
Corresponding to these three functions of the university, the AAUP identified 
three kinds of academic freedom: “Academic freedom in this sense comprises three 
elements: freedom of inquiry and research; freedom of teaching within the university or 
college; and freedom of extra-mural utterance and action. The first of these is almost 
everywhere so safeguarded that the dangers of its infringement are slight. It may 
therefore be disregarded in this report” (AAUP, 1915a). 
Instead of research (which had rarely been seriously threatened), the AAUP 
focused on teaching and extramural utterances: “The second and third phases of academic 
freedom are closely related, and are often distinguished. The third, however, has an 
importance of its own, since of late it has perhaps more frequently been the occasion of 
difficulties” (AAUP, 1915a). However, the key flaw of the 1915 Declaration, and one 
that would haunt the AAUP for more than a half-century until it resolved the issue in the 
1960s, was the failure to confront the question of extramural utterances and stand up in 
defense of them. The AAUP Declaration noted, “we shall consider the matter primarily 
with reference to freedom of teaching within the university, and shall assume that what is 
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said thereon is also applicable to the freedom of speech of university teachers outside 
their institutions” (AAUP, 1915a). 
By refusing to distinguish between freedom of teaching and freedom of 
extramural utterances, the AAUP neglected the key threat to academic freedom. And the 
ideology of the Gentleman Scientist decreed that a professor should engage in the same 
polite behavior outside the classroom as inside of it. 
Part of the Gentleman Scientist Model was the rejection of business values. The 
AAUP statement opposed the idea of higher education as an “ordinary business venture,” 
instead emphasizing its “social function.” The AAUP also denounced what it called the 
“proprietary school or college designed for the propagation of specific doctrines 
prescribed by those who have furnished its endowment” (AAUP, 1915a). 
The primary focus of the AAUP in the 1915 Declaration was not academic 
freedom itself, but the elevation of their profession: “If education is the cornerstone of the 
structure of society and if progress in scientific knowledge is essential to civilization, few 
things can be more important than to enhance the dignity of the scholar's profession, with 
a view of attracting into its ranks men of the highest ability, of sound learning, and of 
strong and independent character” (AAUP, 1915a). Academic freedom was needed to 
draw the best “men” into academia. 
The AAUP also began its crusade for tenure, where it would be even more 
successful than in its quest for academic freedom. Tenure was needed for the profession 
because “men of high gifts and character should be drawn into it by the assurance of an 
honorable and secure position.” Tenure was an extension of the Gentleman Scientist 
Model—not only did it protect the freedom to be a scientist, but it was founded upon the 
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concept of honor, and the belief that among gentlemen a professor should not be treated 
like a disposable employee. The AAUP called for permanent tenure after 10 years of 
service (AAUP, 1915a). 
The 1915 Declaration also reinforced the Gentleman Scientist Model: “To the 
degree that professional scholars, in the formation and promulgation of their opinions, 
are, or by the character of their tenure appear to be, subject to any motive other than their 
own scientific conscience and a desire for the respect of their fellow-experts, to that 
degree the university teaching profession is corrupted” (AAUP, 1915a). Although this 
was aimed at freeing professors from the perception that the business interests which 
financed universities might control the faculty, it reflected the view that only “scientific” 
ideas were protected. 
Noting that “the modern university is becoming more and more the home of 
scientific research,” the AAUP’s 1915 Declaration argued for the necessity of academic 
freedom in the service of expanding scientific knowledge: “the first condition of progress 
is complete and unlimited freedom to pursue inquiry and publish its results. Such 
freedom is the breath in the nostrils of all scientific activity” (AAUP, 1915a). Nor did the 
AAUP limit “science” to today’s narrower conception of natural science. The AAUP 
specifically included “social science” and even “philosophy and religion” as part of this 
scientific model. 
For teachers, the AAUP worried about students’ “confidence in his intellectual 
integrity,” and the fear that “this confidence will be impaired if there is suspicion on the 
part of the student that the teacher is not expressing himself fully or frankly, or that 
college and university teachers in general are a repressed and intimidated class who dare 
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not speak with that candor and courage which youth always demands in those whom it is 
to esteem” (AAUP, 1915a). 
The AAUP sought the independence of other professionals, such as doctors and 
lawyers, even though college teachers were hired by institutions rather than commonly 
working independently. According to the 1915 Declaration, “once appointed, the scholar 
has professional functions to perform in which appointing authorities have neither 
competency nor moral right to intervene” (AAUP, 1915a). To justify this independent 
status despite being an employee, the AAUP appealed to the public service function of a 
professor: “The responsibility of the university teacher is primarily to the public itself, 
and to the judgment of his own profession; and while, with respect to certain external 
conditions of his vocation, he accepts a responsibility to the authorities of the institution 
in which he serves, in the essentials of his professional activity his duty is to the wider 
public to which the institution itself is morally amenable” (AAUP, 1915a). 
Following this model of serving the public, the AAUP proclaimed the need for 
freedom to inform the public: “It is obvious that here again the scholar must be absolutely 
free not only to pursue his investigations but to declare the results of his researches, no 
matter where they may lead him or to what extent they may come into conflict with 
accepted opinion. To be of use to the legislator or the administrator, he must enjoy their 
complete confidence in the disinterestedness of his conclusions” (AAUP, 1915a). Once 
again, the AAUP followed the Gentleman Scientist Model by justifying academic 
freedom solely on the grounds of “disinterestedness.” Without academic freedom, the 
AAUP feared control of professors by “inexpert and possibly not wholly disinterested 
persons outside of their ranks” which would undermine their credibility. However, this 
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justification carried with it the argument for restricting extramural utterances which 
might threaten the perceived expertise and disinterestedness of academics. If powerful 
people believed that faculty were not acting in a “disinterested” critique providing an 
“expert” opinion, could they revoke academic freedom? 
The AAUP argued, “The attempted infringements of academic freedom at present 
are probably not only of less frequency than, but of a different character from, those to be 
found in former times” (AAUP, 1915a). Instead of religious disputes, the AAUP noted, 
“In more recent times the danger zone has been shifted to the political and social 
sciences--in some of our smaller institutions” (AAUP, 1915a). This last comment 
reflected the elitism of the AAUP, that it was unwilling to admit that the controversy over 
political comments by professors had affected some of the largest and most prestigious 
universities in the country. By treating academic freedom as a problem only of “smaller 
institutions,” the AAUP failed to see how pervasive the threat to academic freedom was.  
The AAUP saw the danger of class conflict of interest: “In the political, social, 
and economic field almost every question, no matter how large and general it at first 
appears, is more or less affected with private or class interests; and, as the governing 
body of a university is naturally made up of men who through their standing and ability 
are personally interested in great private enterprises, the points of possible conflict are 
numberless” (AAUP, 1915a). 
However, the AAUP was careful to try to position itself as politically neutral by 
claiming that “in our state universities the danger may be the reverse” and “the menace to 
academic freedom may consist in the repression of opinions that in the particular political 
situation are deemed ultra-conservative rather than ultra-radical” (AAUP, 1915a).  
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The AAUP specifically warned against the idea that professors should reflect 
public opinion: “in a democracy there is political freedom, but there is likely to be a 
tyranny of public opinion. An inviolable refuge from such tyranny should be found in the 
university. It should be an intellectual experiment station, where new ideas may 
germinate and where their fruit, though still distasteful to the community as a whole, may 
be allowed to ripen until finally, perchance, it may become part of the accepted 
intellectual food of the nation or of the world. Not less is it a distinctive duty of the 
university to be the conservator of all genuine elements of value in the past thought and 
life of mankind which are not in the fashion of the moment” (AAUP, 1915a). 
The section of the 1915 Declaration most often quoted today expresses the model 
of the Gentleman Scientist: “Since there are no rights without corresponding duties, the 
considerations heretofore set down with respect to the freedom of the academic teacher 
entail certain correlative obligations. The claim to freedom of teaching is made in the 
interest of integrity and of the progress of scientific inquiry; it is, therefore, only those 
who carry on their work in the temper of the scientific inquirer who may justly assert this 
claim. The liberty of the scholar within the university to set forth his conclusions, be they 
what they may, is conditioned by their being conclusions gained by a scholar's method 
and held in a scholar's spirit; that is to say, they must be the fruits of competent and 
patient and sincere inquiry, and they should be set forth with dignity, courtesy, and 
temperateness of language” (AAUP, 1915a). By seeming to limit academic freedom to 
those who have “the temper of the scientific inquirer” and a gentleman’s “temperateness 
of language,” the AAUP left a substantial opening for restrictions on faculty. 
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A similar gentlemanly restraint was put upon teaching: “The university teacher, in 
giving instructions upon controversial matters, while he is under no obligation to hide his 
own opinion under a mountain of equivocal verbiage, should, if he is fit in dealing with 
such subjects, set forth justly, without suppression or innuendo, the divergent opinions of 
other investigators; he should cause his students to become familiar with the best 
published expressions of the great historic types of doctrine upon the questions at issue; 
and he should, above all, remember that his business is not to provide his students with 
ready-made conclusions, but to train them to think for themselves, and to provide them 
access to those materials which they need if they are to think intelligently” (AAUP, 
1915a). 
However, the AAUP strictly prohibited outside interference in accusations that 
faculty violated these standards, declaring it “inadmissible that the power of determining 
when departures from the requirements of the scientific spirit and method have occurred, 
should be vested in bodies not composed of members of the academic profession” 
(AAUP, 1915a). 
The AAUP noted that this power had rarely been exercised by faculty, but it was 
essential: “If this profession should prove itself unwilling to purge its ranks of the 
incompetent and the unworthy, or to prevent the freedom which it claims in the name of 
science from being used as a shelter for inefficiency, for superficiality, or for uncritical 
and intemperate partisanship, it is certain that the task will be performed by 
others…”(AAUP, 1915a). While the AAUP was condemning a system where 
administrators and trustees dismissed faculty at will, it created an expectation that the 
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profession would itself purge incompetent professors, an expectation that was never 
realized. 
Even the teaching of scientific truths held one exception that reflected the 
Gentlemanly Model (and its corollary concept, in loco parentis). The 1915 Declaration 
identified “one case in which the academic teacher is under an obligation to observe 
certain special restraints--namely, the instruction of immature students. In many of our 
American colleges, and especially in the first two years of the course, the student's 
character is not yet fully formed, his mind is still relatively immature. In these 
circumstances it may reasonably be expected that the instructor will present scientific 
truth with discretion” (AAUP, 1915a). This view—placing gentlemanly discretion above 
scientific truth—marked one of the few points of internal contradiction for the Gentleman 
Scientist Model, and in such cases the gentlemanly approach prevailed.  
The suspicion of the public was reflected in the desire for secrecy in academia. 
The AAUP’s 1915 Declaration even declared, “Discussions in the classroom ought not to 
be supposed to be utterances for the public at large. They are often designed to provoke 
opposition or arouse debate. It has, unfortunately, sometimes happened in this country 
that sensational newspapers have quoted and garbled such remarks. As a matter of 
common law, it is clear that the utterances of an academic instructor are privileged, and 
may not be published, in whole or part, without his authorization” (AAUP, 1915a). The 
AAUP hoped to limit the threat of its concessions by declaring classroom speech off 
limits to public discussion. 
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The AAUP and Professional Standards 
Academic freedom was far from the singular focus of the AAUP. The initial 
statement of ideals for the AAUP included numerous goals, of which only one was “the 
impartial determination of the facts in cases in which serious violations of academic 
freedom are alleged” (AAUP, 1915a). 
From the very beginning, most of the ideas about shared governance and tenure 
embodied in today’s university were sought by the AAUP. In 1916, the AAUP proposed 
what was called the “Bryn Mawr plan,” which called for faculty representatives to the 
Board of Directors, a faculty committee to make recommendations on re-appointments 
and termination of appointments, and rules to safeguard “the tenure of office of full 
professors after a certain number of years of service” (AAUP, 1916a, 5). Although the 
concept of faculty representatives on the Board of Trustees was resisted, the rest of the 
Bryn Mawr plan became the foundation of shared governance and tenure, which the 
AAUP pushed throughout academia. It was the model of the Gentleman Scientist as the 
embodiment of academia which reinforced these values. After all, if professors were the 
leaders of academic values, and not mere employees, then they had to hold decision-
making influence in any rational system. 
The AAUP’s founders saw themselves as a genteel club of scholars who followed 
and strengthened professional ideals. The AAUP planned to be “all-inclusive” but 
initially required a “ten-years’ apprenticeship” before admission in order to raise its 
stature (Wigmore, 1916, 9). The “apprenticeship” reflected the scientific ideal of 
academic freedom. It was not granted to all individuals. It was granted only to those who 
had been skilled enough to learn the ideas of their profession, so that they could discuss 
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those ideas. The expectation was that the untenured professor was still a mere apprentice, 
and apprentices were not entitled to academic freedom since that required scientific 
expertise. Initially, new members were required also to be nominated by a current 
member and approved by 2/3rds of the Committee on Admissions, much like an 
exclusive club.  
However, the financial drain caused by so many academic freedom investigations 
prompted rapid changes. In 1920, the AAUP reduced the service requirement to three 
years, hoping to increase its membership (AAUP, 1920a). Eventually the AAUP dropped 
the burdensome club requirements and allowed any faculty members to join at will. But 
the influence of gentlemanly ideals remained strong within the AAUP and its idea of 
academic freedom. 
At the very start, the AAUP defined the Gentleman Scientist as its goal. President 
J.H. Wigmore’s 1915 address to the AAUP began: “The influence of this Association, to 
rise to its fullest measure, must consist in its ability to express the best professional 
opinion on matters within its sphere. That professional opinion, to be representative, must 
have been well sifted and formulated by discussion, continued through ample time and in 
all quarters of the college world” (Wigmore, 1916, 8). Wigmore’s vision was decisively 
anti-individualist. His ideal was the “professional opinion” that expressed the consensus 
of academic thought. 
Most of the AAUP’s early academic freedom cases, although they technically 
defended individual professors, were primarily aimed at the protecting the mainstream 
viewpoints of the profession. The goal was not to let idiosyncratic views be expressed, 
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but to defend professors who simply recited the commonly-held views of their 
profession. 
Wigmore emphasized this message of unity. “The truth is that we are a single 
profession—the most responsible branch of that profession which Fichte forever exalted 
with his inspired essay on ‘The Nature of the Scholar.’”(Wigmore, 1916, 8). According 
to Wigmore, “hitherto, we have lived a separate life, each in his own particular acre of 
the field, be it history, psychology, geology, or the rest, and never united as a body of 
university teachers” (Wigmore, 1916, 8). The AAUP’s goal was to unify the profession 
under an ideology of science. 
Fighting the Union Label 
In order to raise their professional status, the AAUP fought against the idea that it 
was creating a union. AAUP president John Wigmore declared in 1916, “I wish to 
repudiate the notion that this Association is an occupational union, which seeks to defend 
its members by a ‘We Don’t Patronize’ list, or by any other form of coercion. Its only 
means of influence is publicity, and thereby an appeal to the common sense of justice” 
(Wigmore, 1916, 14). 
The idea that the AAUP was a union particularly offended the ideal of the 
Gentleman Scientist. Unions were the product of the working class; the AAUP leaders 
would never lower themselves to such a level. Even those who approved of unions for the 
workers believed that such a notion would be disastrous for the AAUP. 
Despite Wigmore’s opposition to the idea of a “We Don’t Patronize” list, the 
AAUP eventually developed its Censure List in the 1930s as it realized that ongoing 
publicity against an offending institution was impossible, and some permanent list was 
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needed to warn members as well as to provide an incentive for reform. Of course, the 
AAUP never used “We Don’t Patronize” to describe its censure list, preferring instead to 
treat it as publicity to shame the institutions that violated academic freedom. 
Warren noted in 1914 about the proposed AAUP, “It will not be a grievance 
society or a trade union of the economic type. The men composing the committee are too 
well balanced to accept any such programme. Their ideals are too high, their interests too 
scholarly” (Warren, 1914, 697). Warren claimed, “they have had constantly in mind the 
pattern of the medical and bar associations” and will “elevate the standards of the 
teaching profession, by promoting self-respect, initiative, and responsibility” (Warren, 
1914, 697). 
AAUP President Frank Thilly proclaimed in his 1917 address, “We began our 
existence with a comparatively small membership; no violent efforts were made to 
persuade our colleagues to join us; and some of them held back, fearing that our 
profession might emphasize unduly its own individual rights and interests and sink, as 
they themselves put it, to the level of a trade-union” (Thilly, 1917a, 7). Thilly reported on 
the danger of the union label. An AAUP member noted that a newspaper wrote how 
professors at an informal AAUP meeting belonged to a “semi-secret organization of 
university professors.” Thilly responded, “The matter of academic freedom and tenure 
was, of course, forced upon us soon after our organization, and the only right thing to do 
was to meet the issue. It is, nevertheless, unfortunate that we should have become 
identified in the public mind with a movement whose immediate concern is with the 
fortunes of the professors. It goes all right in a jocular way to be spoken of a labor union, 
but an impression of this kind could do great damage to us if it become more than a joke” 
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(Thilly 1917b, 4). Thilly spoke about the AAUP efforts to defend academia: “There is no 
trade-unionism in this, no selfish insistence on personal rights and interests; we should be 
faithless to our trust as the custodians of academic scholarship if we refused to accept our 
share of the burden in the work of reform” (Thilly, 1917c, 17). 
Other leaders of the AAUP worried about unions. J. M. Coulter proclaimed, “The 
Association has been characterized as a sort of labor union seeking to protect itself from 
the tyranny of its employers; also as a self-appointed judicial body trying cases which do 
not concern it. Such characterizations have arisen in consequence of certain of our 
activities, which belong to the category of what the public press regards as ‘news’” 
(Coulter, 1918, 3). The AAUP needed to espouse a Scientific Model of academic 
freedom in order to oppose the notion that the AAUP was a self-interested union. If the 
AAUP could assert that it was defending a neutral, scientific model of academic freedom, 
it would be able to escape the attacks on the AAUP as a union. 
Arthur Lovejoy warned in his 1919 AAUP presidential address against what he 
called “Professorial Trade-Unionism” that was happening with college faculty joining the 
American Federation of Teachers. Lovejoy argued that unions “like to be futile” and 
“would diminish the usefulness and hamper the freedom of our profession…” However, 
Lovejoy was not generally anti-union, and proclaimed, “If I were a worker at a manual 
trade I should assuredly be a member of the union of my trade” (Lovejoy, 1919, 23). Nor 
did Lovejoy endorse “the silly snobbishness in the feeling that it would somehow be 
incongruous or unseemly for members of our learned profession to adhere to an 
organization composed chiefly of manual workers” (Lovejoy, 1919, 23). 
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Instead, Lovejoy felt that “all members of college or university faculties should be 
united in a single representative body” (Lovejoy, 1919, 23). Of course, the AAUP was 
intended to be that body which could provide a “very extensive consensus of professional 
opinion” (Lovejoy, 1919, 24). The AFT threatened not only the future of the AAUP, but 
also its Gentleman Scientist ideology. But by resisting the AFT rather than cooperating 
with them, the AAUP helped extend the growing split between K-12 and college 
educators. 
In 1920, 15 members of the AAUP’s University of Missouri chapter objected to 
their president’s attack on college teacher unions and the AFT. Noting that some colleges 
are part of the public school system, and disadvantages of not being involved, the faculty 
proclaimed, “It is hard to see, however, wherein the actual relations between American 
colleges and the public schools warrant any such rigid distinctions. To us, it seems quite 
fitting that there should be an association including both…” They added, “If the history 
of the American Association of University Professors proves that collective action is 
needed among college teachers, there is no reason on the face of things why a college 
teacher may not think that collective action on a larger scale is worth while” (AAUP 
Bulletin, April 1920, 15). Lovejoy, however, refused to reply publicly to the attack, and 
only communicated with the Missouri members. 
Lovejoy’s prejudice against academic unions reflected a variation on the 
Gentleman Scientist Model. A primary original ideal for the AAUP was not merely to 
defend professors, but to also provide a way for faculty to express their expert views on 
current controversies. The goal was for a group of gentlemen to get together and agree 
about what the true scholarly position should be. As a representative force for the entire 
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professoriate, the AAUP would prevent retaliation that might occur if one professor 
expressed an opinion. Unfortunately for Lovejoy and the other AAUP leaders, this aim 
for the organization proved to be unworkable. The AAUP never developed an adequate 
mechanism to determine a scholarly consensus on any issue, nor did it wish to undermine 
its strength by taking controversial stands on policy issues. 
However, protecting the ability of individual professors to speak out provided 
another justification for academic freedom, according to Lovejoy: “The general public is 
little likely to heed ostensibly ‘expert’ opinions and arguments which it knows—or has 
plausible grounds for believing—to have been bought and paid for, or to have been 
delivered under any kind of duress. It is for this reason that the maintenance of ‘academic 
freedom’ must be a perennial and essential part of the business of this Association” 
(Lovejoy, 1919, 19). Lovejoy firmly rejected the idea of “those who pay the piper are 
entitled to call the tune….by its very essence, a university is an institution in which 
opinions are not for sale and doctrines are not served to order” (Lovejoy, 1919, 19).  
Lovejoy’s assertion that faculty were not “employees of establishments conducted 
for the private profit of individuals” also indicated why the AAUP rejected unionism 
(Lovejoy, 1919, 25). To define the AAUP as a union would imply that professors were 
mere employees who had to negotiate their liberty; by contrast, the AAUP leaders saw 
the faculty as Gentlemen Scientists who were entitled by their position to academic 
freedom. A union would undermine the idea of academic freedom for any professors who 
were not unionized. 
Lovejoy also believed that the economic fight between corporations and unions 
would continue to pose the greatest threat to academic freedom, and “the professional 
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investigator of social problems ought to avoid entangling permanent alliances with any of 
the purely economic groups which are now struggling with one another…”(Lovejoy, 
1919, 26). If faculty were members of a union, Lovejoy feared, the public would no 
longer accept their pronouncements on disputes involving labor as objective and neutral. 
The AAUP’s Idea of Academic Freedom 
The AAUP’s concept of academic freedom, framed by the 1915 Declaration of 
Principles, reflected and codified the idea of academic freedom being widely expressed 
by scholars. But the AAUP’s statement also moved academic freedom forward in new 
directions, embracing not only the idea of intellectual freedom but the structures (such as 
tenure and formal policies) necessary to protect it. The Gentleman Scientist Model, 
intertwined throughout the 1915 Declaration of Principles, was part of the AAUP’s 
attempt to gain public approval of its optimistic vision of academic freedom. However, 
the reality of academic freedom on American campuses was much different than the 
model espoused by the AAUP. The AAUP would struggle in its early years, and for 
decades to come, to reconcile its Gentleman Scientist ideal with the repression that was 
common on college campuses.
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CHAPTER IV 
ACADEMIC FREEDOM FROM 1915-1940 
 
With the formation of the AAUP, the idea of academic freedom had gained a 
strong place in higher education. For the first time, professors had a single organization 
working nationwide and across all disciplines to defend academic freedom. But would 
the nascent AAUP be powerful enough to stand up against the forces of campus 
repression? The AAUP would soon face an enormous test, and it would fail badly. The 
AAUP was founded during the largest global war that the world had ever seen. Although 
in 1915 the United States maintained a neutral stand, that would soon change. By 1917, 
America had entered the Great War, and the suppression of academic freedom quickly 
reached extraordinary levels that would never be seen again on college campuses. The 
AAUP, seemingly designed to deal with political disputes about economics, could not 
withstand the cries for patriotic unity during war. The idea of the Gentleman Scientist 
was easily converted into the Warrior Scientist serving the military cause, and the pacifist 
and the skeptic about war no longer could find a secure position at American colleges 
(Gruber, 1975). 
Scott Nearing, From Economics to War 
One of the most famous cases where academic freedom was violated concerned a 
leftist economist named Scott Nearing. The attacks on Nearing because of his political 
 150 
 
beliefs began long before he was fired. While a lecturer at the Wharton School of 
Business at the University of Pennsylvania, Nearing was denied a promotion despite the 
recommendations of the faculty and the Academic Council. Dean Robert Young warned 
him, "Mr. Nearing, if I were in your place I would do a little less speaking about child 
labor” (Saltmarsh, 1991, 84). 
Nearing's firing in 1915 was explicitly due to his political views. Trustee George 
Pepper said he supported free speech only if "free speech means the right to proclaim 
views not discordant with the ethical sense of the community” (Saltmarsh, 1991, 97). 
Pepper noted that it was "generally recognized that Doctor Nearing not only antagonized 
industrial orthodoxy, but orthodoxy in other fields, social and religious” (Saltmarsh, 
1991, 99). Another trustee said that Nearing was a problem because "he advocated the 
ruthless redistribution of property” (Saltmarsh, 1991, 97). One trustee noted that Nearing 
was accused of "economic heterodoxy” (Saltmarsh, 1991, 99). Ralph Easley, head of the 
National Civic Federation, assured a trustee that "there will be no trouble to prove that 
Nearing is a socialist and a man whose utterances are of such a character as to make him 
unworthy of being connected with an institution like the University of Pennsylvania” 
(Saltmarsh, 1991, 101). 
When the Wharton school fired Nearing, it was protested by the AAUP, the 
Wharton faculty, and 1,500 students who signed a petition (Saltmarsh, 1991, 102). But 
many people, including the New York Times, supported the decision: "Men who through 
toil and ability have got together enough money to endow universities or professors' 
chairs do not generally have it in mind that their money should be spent for the 
dissemination of the dogmas of Socialism or in the teaching of ingenuous youths how to 
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live without work. Yet when Trustees conscientiously endeavor to carry out the purposes 
of the founder by taking proper measures to prevent misuse of the endowment, we always 
hear a loud howl about academic freedom. We see no reason why the upholders of 
academic freedom in this sense should not establish a university of their own. Let them 
provide the funds, erect the buildings, lay out the campus, and then make a requisition on 
the padded cells of Bedlam for their teaching staff. Nobody would interfere with the full 
freedom of professors; they could teach Socialism and shiftlessness until Doomsday 
without restraint” (Novick, 1988, 64-65). Obviously, the early attempts to establish the 
principle of academic freedom met with strong resistance. 
World War I and the War on Academic Freedom 
After Scott Nearing's firing from the University of Pennsylvania, he received an 
offer from Toledo University (now the University of Toledo) to teach. Upon reaching 
Toledo, Nearing was greeted warmly by the local newspaper: "Dr. Nearing can express 
whatever views he has, suggest any progressive reform he believes in, and there will be 
no reactionary, medieval brained trustees attempting to muffle him” (Saltmarsh, 1991, 
109). 
But Nearing didn't keep his mouth shut, and didn't limit his criticism to child 
labor. As war seemed imminent, Nearing spoke out in opposition to US intervention. 
Within a year and a half, the local newspaper had changed its position, concluding that 
"As long as Nearing stays at the University, the School will be under fire." According to 
the paper, "free speech is not involved" but rather "the peace and the future of T.U. and 
the community at stake” (Saltmarsh, 1991, 120). Although Nearing offered to resign, the 
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trustees rejected this by a 5-4 vote, but a week later they voted 4-3 not to renew Nearing's 
contract in 1917 (Saltmarsh, 1991, 121-2). 
Nearing lost his job, his publisher, and became persona non grata for many years 
on college campuses even after the war ended. In 1920, when Nearing spoke at Clark 
University, the president Wallace Atwood found the lecture "disgusting" and stopped it 
after five minutes (Saltmarsh, 1991, 170). As H.L. Mencken noted about Nearing, "He 
was thrown out because his efforts to get at the truth disturbed the security and 
equanimity of the rich ignoranti who happened to control the university....In three words, 
he was thrown out because he was not safe and sane and orthodox." Mencken added, "I 
should be a great deal more comfortable in those convictions and instincts if I were 
convinced that the learned professors were really in full and absolute possession of 
academic freedom--if I could imagine them taking the other tack now and then without 
damnation to their jobs, their lectures dates, their book sales and their hides” (Jacoby, 
1987, 209).  
Even the organization of the AAUP to protect academic freedom did not provide 
faculty with the liberty to speak. This became clear only a few years later, when 
opponents of World War I found themselves widely persecuted with no one to defend 
them. The suppression of anti-war professors was accepted by academics because it did 
not threaten the basic university institutions. The repression was made on political, not 
academic grounds; furthermore, the repression was made for political reasons (supporting 
the war) which most faculty favored. In addition, the lines between supporting the war 
and opposing it were clear enough to prevent the danger of a slippery slope which might 
threaten academic institutions. Yet this is precisely what happened when the exception to 
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academic freedom was regarded as legitimate. Not only "disloyal" professors, but anyone 
who expressed any skepticism about the worthiness of the war or who had any German 
connections was subject to suppression. 
The New Republic reported more than 20 cases of professors fired because of 
their refusal to support the war, and there were undoubtably many more that went 
unreported. A few teachers even faced legal penalties. Carl Haessler, a philosophy 
professor at the University of Wisconsin, was imprisoned for his opposition to the war 
(Smith, 1990, 127). Academia, including the newly-formed AAUP, refused to support 
academic freedom during a time of war. 
The AAUP’s Wartime Report on Academic Freedom 
During World War I, the AAUP embraced the most repressive measures ever 
supported by the organization. Never before, and never again, would the AAUP call for 
the suppression of peaceful dissent. In part, the AAUP’s position reflected the stance of 
an organization eager for public approval and unwilling to sacrifice its limited credibility 
for the abstract principle of academic freedom during wartime. But the AAUP’s support 
for repression also reflected the strong support for the war itself among its leaders. 
John Dewey believed in academic freedom, but he also believed in this war to end 
all wars. Dewey convinced the New Republic’s editors to ban his former student 
Randolph Bourne from their magazine because Bourne disagreed with Dewey about the 
war (Mulcahy, 1996, 147). Even the victims of past repression supported severe wartime 
limits on academic freedom; Richard Ely wrote to a friend, "We cannot take the same 
position in time of war as we take in time of peace....A man who gives utterance to 
opinions which hinder us in this awful struggle deserves to be fired” (Gruber, 1975, 256). 
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Lovejoy condemned conscientious objectors as “an unpleasantly parasitic part in the 
history of human progress” (Whitfield, 1974, 69). He urged purging pacifists from 
academia, “whether or not they have already come within the reach of the law” 
(Whitfield, 1974, 70). Lovejoy declared that "such a war as this, in which the entire world 
is involved and the future character of human life and relations upon this planet is at 
issue, alters many things and suspends some of the rules of less critical and perilous 
times” (Gruber, 1975, 170). Lovejoy argued that colleges had to choose between being an 
"accomplice" in the "defeat and the dishonor of the republic," and refusing to "give 
countenance and aid" to such persons (Gruber, 1975, 170-1). Lovejoy was the chair of the 
AAUP’s Committee on Academic Freedom in Wartime, and the report it produced in 
1918 reflected his views. 
Practically no one spoke up in defense of the right to dissent, and even the AAUP, 
which had three years earlier made the first defense of academic freedom, declared in 
1918 that the war "gives rise to new problems concerning the rights and obligations of 
free speech." The AAUP quickly backed off from its new commitment to academic 
freedom when America went to war. At times, the AAUP Report on Academic Freedom 
in Wartime decried special penalties aimed at faculty, but did not espouse any special 
freedoms for them: “university teachers should be subject to the inhibitions which, 
because of the exigencies of war, the government may enjoin upon all citizens alike, and 
to those inhibitions alone” (AAUP, 1918, 34). It noted six cases in four months of 
professors dismissed for “disloyalty” and declared a “presumption against supplementary 
disciplinary action by colleges” (AAUP, 1918, 29, 36). 
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Yet the Report also endorsed precisely this kind of action, and proclaimed that 
professors should “be required by their institutions to refrain from propaganda designed, 
or unmistakably tending, to cause other to resist or evade the compulsory service law or 
the regulations of the military authorities; and those who refuse to conform to this 
requirement may be, and should be, dismissed, even before any action has been taken 
against them by the law-officers of the state.” (AAUP, 1918, 37). The AAUP decreed that 
all professors must “refrain from public discussion of the war” and privately act “to avoid 
all hostile or offensive expressions concerning the United States or its government” 
(AAUP, 1918, 41). The AAUP had never proclaimed that a topic could not be discussed 
in public and that professors could not, even in private, criticize the government. 
However, Lovejoy and the other pro-war members of the Committee were 
concerned about the far reach of repression on college campuses during World War I. 
The Report noted that a woman’s college announced, “no pro-German, pacifist or neutral 
sentiment will be tolerated by the college” and ordered that the dismissal of anyone 
whose “unqualified loyalty” to the government and support for the war was “subject to 
any reasonable doubt” (AAUP, 1918, 42). The Report added that “a distinguished man of 
science” was dismissed from an important university for “seditious or treasonable acts” 
for writing a letter to Congress opposing conscription without public support. The AAUP 
committee called it “a grave abuse of the power of dismissal” (AAUP, 1918, 45). 
The AAUP’s special report declared four wartime exceptions to academic 
freedom: 1) "conviction of disobedience to any statute or lawful executive order relating 
to the war"; 2) "propaganda designed, or unmistakably tending, to cause others to resist 
or evade the compulsory service law or the regulations of the military authorities"; 3) 
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actions "to dissuade others to resist others from rendering voluntary assistance to the 
efforts of the Government"; 4) and, for Germans, violation of a requirement "to refrain 
from public discussion of the war; and in their private intercourse with neighbors, 
colleagues and students, to avoid all hostile or offensive expressions concerning the 
United States or its government” (AAUP, 1918, 37-41). These four "exceptions" covered 
practically all of the controversial issues which led to censorship; not only was any 
criticism of the draft or military regulations unprotected, but Germans were vulnerable to 
any accusation about a private conversation concerning America. Never before, and 
never since, had the AAUP proclaimed that a topic could not be discussed in public and 
that professors could not, even in private, criticize the government. 
The AAUP did not seek to toe a delicate line between fierce loyalty and 
protection of dissent. To the contrary, the Report called those opposed to war “enemies of 
the state” and guilty of “treachery” (AAUP, 1918, 35). According to the AAUP’s Report, 
“the attitude of citizens who resist the law of military service is both ethically 
indefensible, and, if it is widely prevalent, gravely dangerous to the public in time of war; 
and in such a time the public safety is the supreme law” (AAUP, 1918, 35). 
The Nation magazine criticized the AAUP report as “a serious disappointment” 
arguing that “By rejecting this principle, the committee, for the period of the war, hands 
over the keys of the castle to the enemy…” and “jeopards the very conception of a 
university” (“The Professors in Battle Array,” 1918). The Nation argued, “surely the 
university, as the home of freedom, should not go out of its way to impose on its 
members, in addition to these, other restrictions that are not laid on other members of the 
community” (“The Professors in Battle Array,” 1918). 
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As the Nation put it, “The fundamental error in the committee’s position, as we 
see it, lies in the apparent assumption that a state of war fundamentally changes the work 
of a university and the method of accomplishing it” (“The Professors in Battle Array,” 
1918). The Nation concluded, “we have here another melancholy instance in which 
judgment on a great question of freedom has been warped by passionate devotion to that 
cause, and that the more sober reflection of quieter times, when it is too late, will lead to 
another answer.” (“The Professors in Battle Array,” 1918). While the AAUP never again 
endorsed such restrictions on academic freedom, it also never repudiated what it did 
during World War I, and none of the AAUP’s leader apparently ever expressed regret for 
the 1918 Report. 
Lovejoy wrote an angry rejoinder to the Nation, far longer than the original 
editorial. Lovejoy argued that the AAUP report was “primarily” a rejection of “petty 
persecution” at some colleges (Lovejoy, 1918). But Lovejoy’s complaint had little basis 
in fact. While the AAUP report was mildly critical of some institutions, it did not name 
any of them (and the AAUP never investigated or censured any college for their actions 
during World War I). 
Lovejoy also justified significant restrictions on academic freedom. Lovejoy 
offered the hypothetical examples of a professor who would “be permitted to employ his 
leisure in inciting other citizens to resist the draft laws; or to go about urging farmers, by 
adroit appeals to self-interest and class prejudice, to reduce the production of cereals” 
(Lovejoy, 1918). These were, to Lovejoy, self-evident examples of cases where a 
professor should be dismissed even if he were not prosecuted. 
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Lovejoy argued that the AAUP had always sharply limited academic freedom, 
allowing the firing of a professor “for grave moral delinquencies, or for violations of 
professional ethics, or for gross and habitual discourtesy” (Lovejoy, 1918). Lovejoy 
declared that the AAUP had never adopted the Nation’s position, which he dismissed as 
“complete academic anarchism” (Lovejoy, 1918). As Lovejoy put it, “The committee, in 
short, has sought to face realities” (Lovejoy, 1918). 
Lovejoy also made a startling declaration that academic freedom did not apply to 
communists: “The American college, if it maintained the kind of neutrality, with respect 
to the present struggle, which the Nation regards as essential to academic freedom, 
would, in fact, be not merely tolerating but facilitating the efforts of those who would 
repeat in America the achievement of the Lenines and the Trotzskys in Russia” (Lovejoy, 
1918). This statement was particularly shocking because World War I was not fought 
over communism, and it indicated that Lovejoy’s sharp restrictions on academic freedom 
were not limited to wartime but to any perceived threat to the nation. 
Metzger depicted the AAUP in World War I as fighting off overwhelming threats 
to academic freedom: “Suddenly, the gains for academic freedom that had painfully and 
gradually been won—the greater acceptance of the principle, the beginnings of a regime 
of academic law—were swept aside….Nothing in the experience of the professors 
prepared them to deal with the problem of loyalty in a time of national emergency” 
(Metzger, 1961, 222). But in reality, the AAUP’s report was a problem of its own 
making. The AAUP was not a victim of war hysteria, but an active participant in it. 
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The Consequences of Wartime Repression 
When even the AAUP would not support academic freedom, universities felt free 
to dismiss professors on the most tenuous of grounds. Allen Eaton at the University of 
Oregon was fired by trustees, despite being defended by the president and the faculty, 
because he attended a meeting of the People's Council for Peace and Democracy and 
wrote a letter to the newspaper about it (Gruber, 1975, 175). Leon Whipple of the 
University of Virginia was denounced by fellow faculty members for his pacifism 
expressed in public speeches and letters to newspapers (Gruber, 1975, 176). Ernst Feise 
was fired at the University of Wisconsin, where 90% of the faculty, as well as the 
president and the deans, signed a petition condemning Senator Robert La Follette's anti-
war stand, accusing him of giving "aid and comfort to Germany and her allies" and 
failing "loyally to support the government in the prosecution of the war” (Gruber, 1975, 
207). At the University of Michigan, C.E. Eggert, W.W. Florer, E.A. Boucke, John 
Dieterle, W.W. Kusterman, Herman Wiegand, and Richard Ficken were fired for crimes 
such as a “pro-German attitude” (Hollingsworth, 2000, 10). At the University of 
Nebraska, E.E. Hopt, C.E. Persinger, and G.W.A. Luckey were victims of the repression.  
At the University of Illinois in 1917, President Edmund James noted that one 
sacrifice in war was "that you keep your mouth shut while we are in a fight” (Swanson, 
1966, 316). Three faculty members at Illinois were dismissed after refusing to buy 
Liberty Bonds (Daily Illini, November 3, 1917). Philosophy teacher Carl Haessler was 
dismissed from the University of Illinois for his condemnation of the war and his 
pacifism. Refusing to serve in the armed forces, he was sent to Fort Leavenworth. Even 
supporting a pacifist could lead to retaliation. In 1918, Arthur Cole, another professor 
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who had his loyalty questioned, started a petition immediately after the armistice to 
support amnesty for Haessler and other prisoners (Grisso, 1980, 559). After Cole led the 
formation of a faculty union (associated with the American Federation of Teachers) in 
1919, the Board of Trustees reduced his appointment from three years to one year, and 
eliminated his pay hike. In 1920, when again they offered only a one-year appointment 
without a pay hike, Cole left the University (Grisso, 1980, 563).  
William Schaper, a professor of political science at the University of Minnesota, 
was fired because he had participated in antiwar demonstrations and signed a petition 
opposing war. However, Schaper never had spoken his "pro-German" views in class or 
tried to indoctrinate students. When war began, he stopped his antiwar activities and even 
urged several students to join the armed forces. But in 1917, an informant to the 
Minnesota Public Safety Commission accused Schaper and other faculty members of 
"infecting" the college with the "germ" of disloyalty. Because Schaper had several first 
cousins in the German army, he felt he "could not boost for the war," but he believed the 
law must be obeyed and no war activities hindered in any way. President M.L. Burton 
accused Schaper of being "the Kaiser's man" and within a few hours, the regents had 
dismissed him because "his attitude of mind...and his expressed unwillingness to aid the 
United States in the present war, render him unfit and unable rightly to discharge the 
duties of his position." The resolution declared that the war required "unqualified loyalty 
on the part of all teachers in the University” (Gruber, 1975, 178-79).  
Schaper, who could not get an academic position until 1925, wrote to a friend, 
"No one who has ever known me will ever doubt my devotion to my country. It was 
because of my intense Americanism that I tried to keep my country out of the European 
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war” (Gruber, 1975, 183). In 1938, the Minnesota regents admitted their error and 
reinstated Schaper as professor emeritus, awarding him $5,000 in reparations (Gruber, 
1975, 186). But such was the paranoia at the University of Minnesota during World War 
I that when an ardently pro-war professor's speech was grossly misreported in a 
Philadelphia newspaper, the Minnesota regents and President Burton raced to fire him 
until the faculty intervened to point out the mistakes (Gruber, 1975, 184). 
At Columbia University, the loyalty crusade even preceded the war. In 1916, 
Charles Beard was brought before the trustees, charged with defending a speaker who 
had said "to hell with the flag" at a public meeting. Although Beard refuted the false 
charges, he was interrogated for half an hour about his beliefs. Beard and all political 
science faculty were warned against any teaching "likely to inculcate disrespect for 
American institutions” (Gruber, 1975, 189). Faculty members Leon Fraser and Benjamin 
Kendrick were called before the trustees to explain their remarks criticizing military 
training (Gruber, 1975, 189). In 1917, Columbia rescinded an invitation to pacifist Court 
Ilya Tolstoy. When faculty and students criticized this decision, a trustee committee 
began investigating whether subversive doctrines were being taught at the university 
(Gruber, 1975, 190). 
At the June 6, 1917 commencement, Columbia President Nicholas Murray Butler 
expressed the wartime change in academic freedom: "What had been tolerated before 
becomes intolerable now. What had been wrongheadedness was now sedition. What had 
been folly was now treason....There is and will be no place in Columbia University...for 
any person who opposes or counsels opposition to the effective enforcement of the laws 
of the United States, or who acts, speaks or writes treason." Butler concluded, "This is the 
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University's last and only warning to any among us...who are not with whole heart and 
mind and strength committed to fight with us to make the world safe for democracy” 
(Gruber, 1975, 199). Butler's condemnation of academic freedom was nothing new, since 
many ideas had been intolerable even before the war; in 1910, he told the Columbia 
Board of Trustees, "Men who feel that their personal convictions require them to treat the 
mature opinion of the civilized world without respect or with contempt may well be given 
the opportunity to do so from private station and without the added influence and prestige 
of a university's name” (Novick, 1988, 64). But before the war Butler had at least written, 
"If certain preconceived views must be taught and if certain preconceived opinions must 
be held, then the institution whose teachers are so restricted is not a university," although 
he also wrote that "a gentleman understands that it is neither necessary nor expedient to 
teach to the young everything which the experience and reflection of an older man may 
have taught him to believe." (Butler, 1914, 291, 294). Butler's invocation of the 
Gentleman Scientist Model, which called for a gentlemanly professor to censor certain 
truths in teaching students, made it much easier to demand a blanket censorship on anti-
war speech. Butler's 1917 proclamation signaled that the small steps toward academic 
freedom made in the past few years had been wiped away by the war. And Columbia did 
not hesitate to enforce its new view of treason. 
At Columbia, a Committee of Nine was established to determine "whether 
doctrines which are subversive of, or tend to the violation or disregard of the Constitution 
or the laws of the United States or of the law of the State of New York, or which tend to 
encourage a spirit of disloyalty to the government of the United States, or the principles 
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upon which it is founded, are taught and disseminated by officers of the University” 
(Metzger, 1961, 224). 
James McKeen Cattell, a leading psychology professor at Columbia for 26 years, 
was fired in 1917 by the trustees on the grounds of "sedition," "treason," and "opposition 
to the effective enforcement of the laws of the United States” (Gruber, 1975, 189). 
Columbia had tried three times earlier to make Cattell retire because of his criticisms of 
administration policy. It finally got a chance to get rid of him when he wrote a letter to 
three congressmen in support of "a measure against sending conscripts to fight in Europe 
against their will” (Gruber, 1975, 196). Defending conscientious objectors was 
considered treasonous behavior.  
Henry Wadsworth Longfellow Dana, assistant professor of comparative literature, 
was fired for encouraging student agitation against the Conscription Act while it was 
pending. Leon Fraser, instructor in politics, was dismissed for making some critical 
remarks about the Plattsburg military camp (Metzger, 1961, 228). In disgust at the firings 
and the conduct of the trustees, Charles Beard and three others professors resigned. But 
they were not in the majority. According to Gruber, "There is every indication of 
considerable faculty agreement that the opinions and activities of the two men were 
improper and injurious to Columbia University and to the nation” (Gruber, 1975, 204). 
Columbia was certainly not the only university to suppress anti-war activists. 
Emily Balch, a faculty member at Wellesley for 20 years, actively opposed American 
opposition. In 1917-18, she took a leave of absence to spare the college embarrassment, 
but in 1918 the trustees decided to delay a decision on her re-appointment, and a year 
later they refused a re-appointment and dismissed her (Gruber, 1975, 175). The Board of 
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Regents at the University of Texas unanimously voted in July 1917 to fire a political 
scientist who had helped found the People's Council of America for Peace and 
Democracy, a radical anti-war group (Goldstein, 2001, 127). Simon Patten was forced out 
of the University of Pennsylvania by trustees offended because of his defense of "German 
values," his economic and social ideas, and his "tactical error" of introducing a pacifist at 
a public meeting just before American intervention in the war (Gruber, 1975, 175). 
In 1918, Justice Department Bureau of Investigation detectives questioned a 
University of Southern California professor accused of favoring Germans in his lectures. 
Although the professor offered many examples of “highly patriotic” excerpts from his 
lectures, he “was cautioned that whenever he delivered a speech of any kind to be sure he 
delivered it in such ringing American terms that no one would question his loyalty” 
(Thomas, 2008, 36). 
In part because of the routine purging of radicals, college faculty were often 
deeply conservative. Four hundred faculty at the University of Wisconsin endorsed a 
petition denouncing Senator La Follette for his “unwise and disloyal utterances giving aid 
and comfort to the enemy” (Thomas, 2008, 124). In 1918, Professor Victor Lenher 
warned the Justice Department that the Wisconsin Forum (a student group which brought 
speakers to campus) leaned toward socialism, and advised them to investigate. After 
Jessica Colvin, a member of the Forum, wrote a sympathetic letter to a conscientious 
objector in prison, she was summoned to appear before investigators and asked if she 
held Socialist or pro-German views, even though she was a supporter of the war and 
noted that she had bought war bonds (Thomas, 2008, 124-5). 
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Only President Lawrence Lowell of Harvard resisted the tidal wave of repression, 
refusing to fire a pro-German professor whose dismissal would allow a $10 million 
bequest from a disgruntled alumnus (Metzger, 1961, 228-9). Few other colleges had the 
inclination or the deep pockets to resist the patriotic, anti-German sentiment which swept 
across the country. Even the language was suspect, as enrollments in German classes 
declined by 40% during the war (Cardozier, 1993, 122). 
Most colleges and universities not only suppressed dissenters, but threw 
themselves enthusiastically into the war effort. At the University of Chicago, 50 scientists 
urged President Judson to "offer the scientific laboratories and equipment of the 
University to the federal government for use in case of war." A petition signed by 153 
Chicago faculty and administrators expressed their support for "military, industrial or 
scientific service in case of war” (Gruber, 1975, 97). Bond campaigns were encouraged, 
and the United War Work Campaign Committee even urged faculty to use five minutes 
of class time to take collections from students (Gruber, 1975, 107). 
During World War I, an effective censorship machine went into action with the 
passage of the Espionage Act. More than 50 scholars helped a government surveillance 
effort, reading local foreign language newspapers and sending translations of any articles 
which "might be construed as advocating insubordination or opposition to the execution 
of the laws or regulations of the United States Government or halting the work of 
enlisting men in either the Army or the Navy” (Gruber, 1975, 157). 
The war also affected the curriculum, as many universities (beginning with 
Columbia) began instituting War Issues or Western Civilization courses designed to 
explain to students the legacy of the West which they would be defending in Europe. And 
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the stirrings of the first Red Scare were beginning. In the University of Michigan “War 
Aims” course, William Frayer warned students about "the wild excesses of the 
revolutionists," noting that "a surprising number" of them were Jews. Frayer declared that 
Bolshevik sympathizers "are everywhere," even "on the campus of the University of 
Michigan” (Gruber, 1975, 241). The fear-mongering during World War I about radicals 
and treasonous speech made repression in academia much easier to justify in the years 
that followed, when radicalism and the fear of the Soviet Union would become the 
dominant excuse for firing faculty. 
Academic Freedom in the 1920s 
Restrictions on academic freedom continued after the end of the war, and even 
after the Red Scare which followed in its wake. Although historian Page Smith claimed, 
"The twenties saw a sharp drop in the number of professors fired for unorthodoxy” 
(Smith, 1990, 131), there is little evidence to support this generalization. Fosse argued 
that in the 1920s, “The atmosphere of the university was charged with fear” (Fosse, 1951, 
21). Indeed, in academia it may be more accurate to consider the era between World War 
I and World War II as a continuous Red Scare, although the degree of repression 
certainly varied. 
In the 1920s, a journalism professor at Ohio State was fired for treating a coal 
strike favorably, and pacifist leader Nevin Sayre was barred from speaking at the 
University of Oklahoma (Goldstein, 2001, 180-181). A 1920 survey by the Intercollegiate 
Socialist Society, “Freedom of Discussion in American Colleges,” found that “an 
increasing number of schools were (1) prohibiting outside affiliations for political groups, 
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(2) placing increasing restrictions on speakers, and (3) censoring the faculty’s right to 
express liberal opinions” (Lipset, 1976, 162). 
In 1921, Vice-President Calvin Coolidge wrote an article on “Enemies of the 
Republic” beginning with the “Reds” in college. Coolidge worried that “college faculties 
rebel at the authority of presidents and trustees” (Lipset, 1976, 162). This may be the only 
case of a sitting Vice President publicly denouncing left-wing professors. Interestingly, 
Coolidge’s article was titled, “Are the Reds Stalking Our College Women?”(Coolidge, 
1921). Sexuality and radicalism went hand in hand to the critics of higher education. 
Subversives were seen as both sexual and political. 
A sex scare at Harvard occurred in 1920. On May 13, 1920, Harvard student Cyril 
Wilcox committed suicide a few weeks after suffering a nervous breakdown and being 
kicked out of college for poor grades (Paley, 2002). But shortly after his death, a letter 
written to him by fellow student Ernest Weeks Roberts made references to “faggoty 
parties” and homosexual activity at Harvard. Cyril’s brother tracked down some of the 
men in the circle of gay friends, and informed Harvard dean Chester Greenough. An 
anonymous Harvard student reported parties in Roberts’ room with crossdressing where 
“the most disgusting and disgraceful and revolting acts of degeneracy and depravity took 
place openly in plain veiw [sic] of all present” (Paley, 2002). Harvard created a secret 
court to track down gay students and spy on likely homosexuals on campus. The Court 
interrogated students about homosexuality and masturbation, and pressured students to 
name others. When one student outed philosophy assistant Charles B. Clark as gay, Clark 
was forced to withdraw from pursuing his Ph.D. and was not reappointed; President 
Lowell personally crossed out his name from Harvard’s records (Paley, 2002). 
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The secret Court would find 14 men guilty of homosexual activities, including 
four men not connected with Harvard. Seven college students were expelled from 
Harvard and even ordered to leave the town of Cambridge; Dean Greenough wrote one 
man’s father, “He has been ordered to leave Cambridge today. Consequences of 
disobedience of this order would be most serious” (Paley, 2002). A letter about their 
homosexuality was placed in the students’ Alumni Placement Service files, and one 
alumnus was blocked when he sought teaching jobs. When Joseph Lumbard (whom 
Harvard officials could not prove had committed any homosexual acts) sought to enter 
other colleges, Harvard contacted the deans to block his application. Brown University 
Dean Otis Randall expressed his gratitude to Greenough. “How frequently we uncover in 
the undergraduate life messes of this sort, and how disagreeable it is to deal with such 
matters!” Lumbard was re-admitted to Harvard a year later, became a federal judge, and 
later served on Harvard’s Board of Overseers (Paley, 2002). 
Another expelled student, Keith Smerage, wrote, “A human streak in me makes 
me feel rather sore at being one of eight expelled when I am one of at least ten times that 
number” (Paley, 2002). Smerage planned to attend Rutgers, but withdrew his application 
because Harvard officials threatened to out him. Eventually, Smerage became a traveling 
song-and-dance man until he committed suicide in 1930. His was not the only suicide. 
Eugene Cummings, a dental student interrogated in the scandal, committed suicide. The 
secret Court at Harvard became known only because the records accidentally were sent to 
the archives and a Harvard Crimson reporter saw an obscure reference to their records 
and then launched a six-month campaign to have them released (Paley, 2002). Similar 
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acts of repression against gay students must have been common at colleges around the 
country, but most of the cases will never be known. 
University of Illinois President David Kinley was a prominent example of how 
academic leaders were pressured to suppress subversives on campus. In 1894, Kinley had 
been the primary defender of his mentor Richard Ely at the University of Wisconsin. 
Although a University of Illinois economics professor, Kinley was vacationing in 
Madison during the summer, and he vigorously prepared the successful defense of Ely 
against charges of being a socialist (Hansen, 1998, 45-46). 
Yet by the 1920s, Kinley was a leading example of repression imposed by public 
college presidents. Kinley stated that academic freedom was "limited by the obligation 
which every member of the staff" had to observe. Parents of students, he felt, had the 
right not to have their children exposed to doctrines which might "undermine their health 
and...morality” (Rodnitzky, 1967, 189). In 1927, Kinley ordered a dean to tell a faculty 
member to “recall his request that the student read this book, and advise him that this is 
not the kind of thing which...should be assigned to undergraduate students at all." The 
book was James Joyce's Ulysses (Grisso, 1980, 568-9). In 1926, after Dean of Men 
Thomas Clark declared, "There is moral danger in the car," student automobiles were 
banned, and not until 1953 were they again allowed (Schwartz, 2010, 40). In January 
1926, Kinley suspended The Illini Magazine for the rest of the year after it ran an article 
insulting LaSalle, Illinois (Grisso, 1980, 566). Two students were removed for portraying 
the zinc smelting industry in an "unfavorable light” (ACLU, 1931, 28). After a 1928 
report by Paul Douglas, a professor of economics at the University of Chicago and later a 
senator from Illinois, urged the state to make ROTC voluntary, Kinley defended the 
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ROTC and even prompted the Dad's Association to denounce "slackers, communists, and 
bolsheviks" for causing "discord among the faculty and students” (Grisso, 1980, 608). 
Campus freedom, which Kinley had defended so forcefully three decades earlier when 
his teacher was threatened, became a disposable impediment to the orderly functioning of 
a university when he was in charge. 
Arthur Schlesinger, Sr., noted that a president of a state university "favors 
freedom of teaching in principle....He would even protect a professor from outside 
criticism up to a certain point. But if University appropriations are involved, then his 
allegiance is to the appropriation” (Novick, 1988, 66). And the threat of government 
control always lurked in the background. In 1921, then-Vice President Calvin Coolidge 
noted worriedly that Mary Calkins of Wellesley had been "said to have voted for Debs 
for President at the recent election” (Coolidge, 1921). President Harding's Commissioner 
of Education declared that in colleges there was "altogether too much preaching of these 
damnable doctrines of Bolshevism, Anarchy, Communism and Socialism." He added, "if 
I had it in my power I would not only imprison but would expatriate all advocates of 
these dangerous un-American doctrines. I would even execute every one of them--and do 
it joyfully” (Goldstein, 2001, 174). When the leading federal government official 
overseeing higher education was calling for the mass execution of socialist professors, it 
can hardly be irrational to surmise a massive amount of censorship and politically 
motivated firings on college campuses. 
Even college presidents who sought to suppress campus radicals were denounced 
for doing too little. In 1928, A.J. Muste, director of the Brookwood Labor College, was 
attacked for being “anti-religious” and because of the college’s “red tendencies.” The 
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reds did not agree; they criticized Muste, accusing him of firing left-wing teachers and 
expelling communist students (Kates, 2001, 95).  
A 1931 report by the ACLU, "The Gag on Teaching," identified numerous 
examples of censorship on college campuses. In 1928, a Federal Trade Commission 
investigation found "a close connection between public utilities and the academic 
profession" in the form of subsidies paid to schools of commerce and professors, and 
promotion of textbooks favorable to utilities. Political power was sometimes wielded 
more directly: In 1930, one of the largest purges in the history of higher education in 
America occurred when Mississippi Governor Bilbo "discharged 179 faculty members, 
replacing them by teachers personally pleasing to him” (ACLU, 1931, 17). 
The ACLU report also described a large number of instances where professors 
were censored. In 1926, two teachers in the Genesee, New York state Normal School 
were dismissed, apparently for their "progressive" political activities. In 1926, John 
Kirkpatrick was fired from Olivet College because his book, The American College and 
its Rulers, attacked the control of higher education by business interests. In 1927, 
philosophy professor Sol Auerbach was dismissed from the University of Pennsylvania 
because he praised Soviet Russia; Auerbach was informed that his department believed it 
"incompatible for a man to take a stand on a public issue and at the same time to retain 
the critical state of mind necessary for research in philosophy and teaching." In 1928, 
journalism professor Wesley Maurer was dismissed from Ohio University for publishing 
articles sympathetic to striking miners. A powerful coal operator was a member of the 
Board of Trustees. Walter Ludwig, a student pastor who showed sympathy to the miners' 
cause, was also fired at the end of the year. In 1929, psychology graduate student Fred 
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Woltman was fired from the University of Pittsburgh because he served as secretary of 
the local Civil Liberties Committee. In 1931, sociology professor Herbert Adolphus 
Miller was denied reappointment at Ohio State University because he supported the 
Indian nationalist movement and opposed compulsory military training (ACLU, 1931, 
23-25).  
However, even these numerous examples cannot convey the full scale of 
repression on college campuses. The ACLU report noted that some colleges "are so 
tightly controlled that no teachers are employed likely to raise issues, and student 
discussion of controversial matters in their own societies is not tolerated. In some places 
only 'safe and sane' men are hired. In others one-year contracts are made and tenure of 
office has been cut so that a troublesome man can be let out without raising the issue of 
his views. In some colleges a whole course has been eliminated or a department 
reorganized to get rid of too independent a teacher” (ACLU, 1931, 23). One example was 
an economics professor at Battle Creek College who was ordered to resign after he was 
accused of being a Socialist. When he refused, the administration backed down from its 
threat to fire him out of fear of a student strike, but later dismissed him by discontinuing 
his department (ACLU, 1931, 24). 
Faculty were not the only victims of censorship in the growing repression of the 
late 1920s. Colleges frequently suspended students for expressing liberal views and 
banned radicals from speaking on campus. Scott Nearing, Arthur Garfield Hays, and 
Clarence Darrow were banned from the University of Pittsburgh; Kirby Page, the pacifist 
editor of "The World Tomorrow" was prevented from speaking at the University of West 
Virginia and Oregon State College. John Nevin Sayre, chair of the Committee on 
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Militarism in Education, was not allowed to address students at the universities of 
Oklahoma, Wyoming, Indiana, and Missouri (ACLU, 1931, 26). At Detroit City College, 
the Detroit Employers' Association opposed attempts to allow Scott Nearing and ACLU 
director Roger Baldwin to speak. The employers' group pressured the administration not 
to allow the college hall to be used, and then pressured the city library to deny them a 
room. The dean of the college told students that if there was more publicity, "You will 
jeopardize your future” (ACLU, 1931, 27). 
Liberal and leftist students began to protest against campus strictures such as 
compulsory ROTC, and they often faced repression. The Liberal Club at Duke University 
was forbidden to discuss the case of Ella May Wiggins, a textile worker killed during a 
strike, because it was "controversial." At City College of New York, two students were 
suspended for expressing opposition to compulsory military drill, and discussion of the 
issue was banned from the student paper. A third student was suspended after being 
arrested for handing out pamphlets to announce a Communist demonstration. At the 
University of Minnesota, 36 students were suspended for opposing military training, 
although 24 were later reinstated after legal action was taken (ACLU, 1931, 27). When 
the Liberal Club at the University of Pittsburgh held a protest meeting and demanded the 
"unconditional release of Thomas Mooney and Warren K. Billings," it was disbanded and 
faculty adviser F.E. Woltman was dismissed. An AAUP report concluded, "The 
University had adopted a highly ambitious project for expansion and is dependent for 
funds partly on the local community and partly on the state government, in both of which 
the influence and peculiar point of view of certain big business and interests seem to be 
paramount." The University often persuaded faculty to avoid controversial subjects in 
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public by summoning professors to the chancellor's office and dismissing those who did 
not change their ways (ACLU, 1931, 28). 
Student newspapers were especially vulnerable to administrative control. The 
Junior College Collegian in Kansas City was suppressed after it printed student criticism 
of the college, and one student was expelled and four more suspended. The editors of a 
newspaper at the University of Washington were suspended after publishing an article on 
Lincoln. The editor of The Thresher, a student paper at Rice Institute, was dismissed for 
an "objectionable" article. At Baptist University, when the student paper demanded 
reinstatement of three professors fired for teaching evolution, the newspaper was 
suppressed. Clark University expelled three editors of Clark Monthly for an article which 
went unprinted when the president got hold of the galley proofs. When the Detroit City 
College Newspaper ridiculed the assistant dean, the editor was removed and the paper 
was put under the control of a faculty board of censors (ACLU, 1931, 28). 
In the 1920s, underground student newspapers, according to Oscar and Mary 
Handlin, “demanded not only the right to ask critical questions but also the right to give 
the answers” (Lipset, 1976, 163). In 1925, the New York World editorialized about the 
“revolt which is going on in colleges and universities all over the country.” According to 
the paper, “Always there are the same symptoms: the outlaw student paper, with its 
devastating satire and cartoons; the speeches, the meetings, the reprisals by the faculty, 
the mutterings of discontent in the student body” (Lipset, 1976, 167). However, it is 
notable that this account does not describe faculty as victims of suppression, instead 
calling them the leaders of reprisals against radical students. The repression of academic 
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freedom in the 1920s was not more noticeable because professors were generally so 
conservative that they rarely questioned the status quo. 
Evolution Under Fire Again: The Scopes Trial 
The 1920s also revived some of the older controversies over academic freedom, 
most notably evolution. Although the Scopes trial is remembered solely for its impact on 
K-12 schools, the law in question applied equally to higher education. The Tennessee 
Anti-Evolution Act passed in 1925 decreed: “it shall be unlawful for any teacher in any 
of the Universities, normals and all other public schools of the state which are supported 
in whole or in part by the public school funds of the state, to teach any theory that denies 
the story of the divine creation of man as taught in the Bible and to teach instead that man 
has descended from a lower order of animals” (Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363 (1927), 
363). 
Contrary to the popular impression, the Scopes trial was ultimately a defeat for 
academic freedom. Scopes, after all, was found guilty, albeit only symbolically. In the 
Scopes decision, Judge C. J. Green ruled in the case about the role of the teacher in a 
public school, “He was under contract with the state to work in an institution of the state. 
He had no right or privilege to serve the state except upon such terms as the state 
prescribed. His liberty, his privilege, his immunity to teach and proclaim the theory of 
evolution, elsewhere than in the service of the state, was in no wise touched by this law” 
(Scopes v. State, 364). 
The Scopes case was an early example of how freedom in the classroom could be 
ruled by the courts more restrictive than freedom to speak in public. This view of 
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academic freedom held that the classroom was a space owned by the state which could 
dictate what was taught there. 
The Scopes trial also magnified the differences between college professors and 
secondary school teachers. In 1920, the New York legislature passed the Lusk Laws, 
which required all public school teachers to get “a special certificate certifying that they 
are of good character and that they are loyal to institutions of the State and Nation.” As 
part of the law, “No person who is not eager to combat theories of social change should 
be entrusted with the task of fitting the young and old of this State for the responsibilities 
of citizenship” (Fosse, 1951, 20). The law was repealed in 1923. New York Gov. Al 
Smith later declared, “It deprived teachers of their right to freedom of thought and it 
limits the teaching staff of the public schools to those who lack the courage of the mind 
to exercise their legal rights to just criticism of existing conditions” (Fosse, 1951, 21). 
For college faculty, the suppression of K-12 teachers might drag down their 
academic freedom as well. As a result, the liberty of colleges and schools began to take 
separate tracks. The model of the Gentleman Scientist was rarely applied to the 
predominantly female, less educated teachers in K-12 schools who did little scholarly 
research. Academic freedom, sometimes defined as the freedom for all teachers, 
gradually became regarded as the exclusive province of college faculty. 
Goose-Stepping Through Academia 
Upton Sinclair's 1922 book, The Goose-Step, was an important example of the 
increased attention given to academic freedom. Sinclair’s book included a series of 
reports from his correspondents identifying problems with the suppression of dissent on 
college campuses. For example, Sinclair reported that the University of Iowa “is 
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controlled by the railroads which run this 'rock-ribbed' Republican state” and quoted a 
letter from a professor there, who wrote that his president is “politically a Harding 
Republican, and personally he has no curiosity about or sympathy with liberal thought of 
any kind. His attitude toward freedom of teaching in his faculty is a purely pragmatic 
one. Since his main job is to get funds from the state legislature, he does not propose to 
allow the ‘indiscretions’ of a professor to damage the cause of the university there. In 
other words, a professor can say anything he wants to in the class-room, if his students 
don't talk too much and thus arouse sentiment in the state unfriendly to the university. An 
‘injudicious’ remark might cost the university a half-million dollars in much needed 
appropriations” (Sinclair, 1922, 336). 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to document or verify these individual cases 
described by Sinclair, but they remain a valuable glimpse of intellectual freedom across 
the country. Sinclair’s key contribution was to identify how the larger economic structure 
supporting higher education influenced academic freedom. Sinclair observed, “So long as 
we have a system of private ownership of natural resources, we shall of course have to 
have trustees who represent money interests. But we should endeavor to pare down the 
powers of this special privilege group as much as possible; and especially all faculty 
members should set their face against the idea of any interference with teaching, or with 
the opinions or outside activities of the faculty, by monied men who represent ownership 
and not service in the institution” (Sinclair, 1922, 462). 
Sinclair feared that “the American college has not been organized on the 
principles of American government, but on those of American business; the college is not 
a state, but a factory” (Sinclair, 1922, 460). Sinclair was among the first to see the 
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management model of American higher education, and to critique it. For Sinclair, the 
danger of an occasional businessman suppressing academic freedom was very real, but 
the far greater threat of colleges structured as businesses. Indeed, Sinclair was not 
entirely opposed to wealthy businessmen serving as trustees: “if any rich man wants to 
come into a college and work for faculty control and academic freedom, for the right of 
service and true scholarship to guide our education, I will bid that man welcome” 
(Sinclair, 1922, 462). However, Sinclair argued: “The largest single group upon the board 
of a college should obviously be the faculty, who know most about the institution, and 
have its interests most at heart” (Sinclair, 1922, 461). This vision of faculty running 
Boards of Trustees never happened, but the idea of shared governance (based on faculty 
expertise in curriculum and hiring) gradually became adopted. Sinclair recognized that 
the structure and management of colleges had a powerful impact on academic freedom. 
The AAUP and the Rise of Tenure 
The AAUP also recognized the importance of institutional structure in protecting 
academic freedom. The Association of American Colleges (AAC), dominated by 
administrators, refused to embrace the AAUP’s 1915 Declaration of Principles. However, 
some leaders were sympathetic to the need for tenure. At the AAC’s annual meeting in 
1923, Dean C.N. Cole of Oberlin College defended the idea of tenure as “a policy by 
which teachers of tested competence, character and loyalty are lifted above the plane of 
annual, biennial or quinquennial appointments and put into the position of trusted partner 
appointed without term” (Metzger, 1990, 25). Plainly, Cole’s vision of tenure was 
compatible with the Gentleman Scientist model, although for Cole it seemed to be 
reserved for only a small number of trustworthy faculty rather than all professors. 
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The AAUP had also joined the American Council on Education (ACE), a 
coordinating group created in 1918 to enable higher education groups to work together 
for common goals. H.W. Tyler, who conceived of the idea for ACE and served as the 
AAUP’s representative, eventually took over the rotating presidency of ACE and seized 
the opportunity to hold a conference for collective agreement on principles of academic 
freedom and tenure. Under Tyler’s guidance, the conference could not reach common 
ground for all of these different organizations. But after the conference, the AAUP and 
the sympathetic AAC were able to agree on a joint statement about tenure released in 
1925 (Metzger, 1990, 26). 
The AAUP members were not fond of the 1925 Statement, which most of them 
deemed to be too much of a compromise with the AAC presidents. Tyler refused to send 
the Statement to local chapters for approval, fearing that they would reject it. At the 1926 
Annual Meeting of the AAUP, Lovejoy worked to persuade the delegates to endorse the 
Statement. In the end, the delegates gave “general approval” to the Statement, but added 
the caveat that its provisions “are to be interpreted as far as this Association is concerned 
in the light of its previous declarations on academic freedom and tenure” (Metzger, 1990, 
26). 
Many AAUP leaders were troubled by the compromises in the 1925 Statement. 
John Dewey, who had attended the 1925 conference, worried about the addition of 
“treason” to the crimes of “professional incompetence” and “gross immorality” (both 
from the 1915 AAUP Statement) which justified summary dismissal. Dewey feared that 
treason “might be employed in cases similar to those arising during the late war to justify 
the dismissal of teachers whose views on national policy were contrary to the patriotic 
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sentiments of the time.” Dewey had objected during the conference to the term, but the 
AAC representative claimed that if the word was removed it would be difficult to gain 
approval. Dewey eventually concluded that “treason” could not be removed “without 
sacrifice to the rest of the agreement, which as a whole seems to constitute a great 
advance” (Metzger, 1990, 27). 
Indeed, the 1925 Statement, for all of its flaws, represented a great advance for 
the AAUP. For the first time, an organization of higher education institutions (run by 
college presidents) had joined with the AAUP. And for the first time, such an 
organization had formally endorsed the concept of tenure. These two accomplishments 
marked an important step forward for the AAUP, and the Gentleman Scientist approach 
was essential in portraying a moderate position acceptable to the higher education 
establishment. 
However, the AAUP membership was less enthusiastic about the 1925 Statement, 
and although it provided an important first step, the AAUP was still a long way away 
from institutionalizing tenure and the principles of academic freedom. The “treason” 
clause in particular annoyed many members during the anti-subversive crusades of the 
1920s and 1930s, putting pressure on the AAUP to revisit the statement. But it was not 
until the late 1930s that the AAUP and the AAC came back together to negotiate a new, 
more powerful statement on academic freedom and tenure. 
It is difficult to estimate to what extent academic freedom was suppressed during 
the 1920s. The growth of the AAUP and the founding of the ACLU created a structure 
that had never previously existed for publicizing academic freedom cases, and the attacks 
on academic freedom were, for the first time, matched by an organized national 
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resistance. But the extraordinary amount of repression in academia went on despite the 
defenders of academic freedom. 
Professors and Race Relations 
The Great Depression made academic freedom even more vulnerable. The 
economic growth of the 1920s had made it possible for faculty who were fired to seek 
jobs elsewhere. But the economic decline of the 1930s put academic jobs at a premium, 
and turned dismissal from a faculty job into long-term unemployment. 
In the 1930s, liberal professors were under fire for a wide range of political stands 
deemed offensive to conservative administrators and trustees. In 1930, Ohio State’s 
trustees decided to dismiss professor Herbert A. Miller after a terminal year at Ohio State. 
According to Miller, “The President then investigated various allegations which had been 
raised as to the basis of their action: (1) My activities in India; (2) that I had been on the 
point of being dismissed from Oberlin when I came to Ohio State University in 1924; and 
(3) that my attitude on matters of Race were (sic) unsound” (AAUP, 1931, 467). Miller 
concluded, “It is my personal opinion that the race issue underlies much of the animus 
against me” (AAUP, 1931, 467). Miller was a kind of global troublemaker. In 1929-30, 
he traveled around the world and according to the trustees, “it was reported that he had 
been escorted by the Japanese police from a public meeting in Korea where he was 
making an address on matters forbidden by the Japanese authorities” (AAUP, 1931, 444). 
According to Miller, his crime was describing Czecho-Slovakia as a “republic,” which 
was a forbidden word (AAUP, 1931, 450). Worst yet, Miller traveled to India and on 
March 12, 1930, spoke at a gathering of independence supporters. The press accounts of 
Miller’s speech (which he denied) reported that he called Gandhi’s work a “noble 
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experiment” and urged “settling your differences in a genuine religious spirit.” Ohio 
State’s trustees and president were far less charitable: “here was an American professor, 
an employee of the university of a state whose nation was at peace with Great Britain, 
helping to incite the Hindus to civil disobedience” (AAUP, 1931, 445). 
Complaints about Miller’s views on race relations, his area of expertise, were also 
received by the university from students and outside pressure groups (AAUP, 1931, 452). 
The AAUP described his views as “liberal but not extreme,” defending him by claiming, 
“He did not advocate intermarriage (as sometimes reported) but emphasized rather the 
necessity for amicable relations” (AAUP, 1931, 453). Among Miller’s violation of social 
norms was this: “He gave teas to which both white and colored people were invited” 
(AAUP, 1931, 453). Miller argued that racism was a strong component of his firing: “As 
to how far the Board itself was affected by race prejudice there is but little definite 
evidence. It did refuse on three separate occasions, contrary to conventional action in 
such cases, to grant fellowship status to negro students who were regularly recommended 
by the Graduate School but whose stipend was provided by the Urban League. With 
respect to the visit at Wilberforce a trustee was quoted as saying, ‘He made his students 
dance with niggers.’"(AAUP, 1931, 454). 
Ohio State’s trustees carefully declared, “the Board wishes to emphasize the fact 
that members of the faculty of the Ohio State University have enjoyed, and now enjoy, 
wide latitude in expressing their opinions in the classroom” (AAUP, 1931, 443). The 
latitude, however, did not extend to the public sphere. And at the time, Ohio State refused 
to grant tenure to any employee, requiring them to follow annual contracts. Ohio State’s 
Board of Trustees did not embrace the concept of dissent. When some students and 
 183 
 
faculty criticized compulsory military training, the Board of Trustees responded in harsh 
terms on May 20, 1931: "The Board feels that the University should not be subjected to 
emotional criticism because of the unripe vociferations of a small group of students and a 
very few members of the Faculty who were under no compulsion to come here and are 
under none to remain unless they can subscribe to the fundamental purposes of this 
University” (AAUP, 1931, 448). At Ohio State and many other campuses, students and 
faculty faced a similar kind of repression when they sought to take political stands that 
embarrassed the university. 
The Anti-Subversive Crusade of the 1930s 
In the early 1930s, a new wave of student protest was matched by renewed efforts 
at censorship. In 1932, Columbia University President Nicholas Butler expelled Reed 
Harris because he was the muckraking editor of the Columbia Spectator (he attacked 
ROTC, the commercialism of football, and the college's food service), provoking a mass 
protest by 2,000 students and a one-day student strike (Cohen, 1993, 55, 62). According 
to Butler, the idea of academic freedom for students "has no meaning whatever. It relates 
solely to the freedom of thought and inquiry and teaching on the part of accomplished 
scholars” (Cohen, 1993, 59). Nevertheless, the protest convinced Butler to reinstate 
Harris in order to avoid bad publicity (Cohen, 1993, 65). However, in 1935 Butler did 
expel six anti-war activists in the medical school (Cohen, 1993, 132). And Butler never 
changed his views on academic freedom, declaring in 1940, "Before and above academic 
freedom of any sort comes university freedom, which is the right and the obligation of the 
university itself to pursue its high ideals, unhampered and unembarrassed by conduct on 
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the part of any of its members which tends to damage its reputation” (Goldstein, 2001, 
262). 
The rights of students were virtually nonexistent during this era. Courts held that 
colleges could expel students without a hearing, and the New York Court of Appeals 
upheld the expulsion of a Syracuse University student solely on the justification that she 
was not a "typical Syracuse girl” (Anthony v. Syracuse University, 1928). The Supreme 
Court unanimously upheld the right of land-grant colleges to expel students who refused 
to participate in the mandatory military training (Hamilton v. Regents of the University of 
California, 1934). Robert Cohen found at least 53 colleges which overtly restricted the 
free speech rights of students between 1933 and 1935, including Harvard, MIT, 
Columbia, and Berkeley (Cohen, 1993, 105). These included 14 campuses with violent 
attacks against student radicals, 17 colleges which banned anti-war meetings or student 
rallies, 8 campuses which banned radical organizations, 16 colleges which expelled or 
suspended students who held lawful protests, and 16 colleges which censored anti-war 
publication or student newspapers (Cohen, 1993, 370-1). 
At City College of New York from 1931-34, President Frederick Robinson 
expelled 43 students and suspended 38 more, as well as investigating the political beliefs 
and protest activities of hundreds. After one anti-fascist protest in 1934, sparked by 
Robinson's invitation to a delegation of Italian fascist students, 21 students were expelled, 
12 put on probation, and four suspended. In 1932, Robinson fired English instructor 
Oakley Johnson because he was a communist who had supported leftist students, and 
then sent police to attack students who held a rally in Johnson's defense (Cohen, 1993, 
108, 115). 
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Although CCNY had the most extensive record of repression, other universities 
took similar action. Other faculty firings included Donald Henderson at Columbia (a 
radical economics instructor whose appointment was not renewed in 1933), Herbert 
Miller at Ohio State, and Jerome Davis at Yale (Cohen, 1993, 244). In 1934 at Ohio 
State, President Rightmire suspended 17 students who resisted military drills. At the 
University of Michigan, President Ruthven expelled four anti-war leaders (Cohen, 1993, 
132). Roscoe Ingalls, head of Los Angeles Junior College, personally tried to stop a 
protest by yelling into microphones, blowing a whistle, and using police and the sprinkler 
system to disperse the students (Cohen, 1993, 106). At Berkeley, Dean Louis O'Brien 
organized conservative members of fraternities and the football team to disrupt a free 
speech demonstration by shouting down speakers, ripping down posters, and throwing 
rotten eggs and tomatoes (Cohen, 1993, 122-3). Berkeley also stifled a protest strike by 
having the 18 members of the strike committee arrested for distributing antiwar 
pamphlets on the grounds that these violated an ordinance "to prevent stoppage of the 
city drains” (Brax, 1981, 43). 
In 1934, UCLA provost Ernest Moore suspended the president of the student 
council and four other student leaders who were trying to create an open forum on 
campus; claiming that this would violate the university's political neutrality, Moore 
accused them of trying "to destroy the university" and turn UCLA into "a hotbed of 
Communism” (Cohen, 1993, 118). However, University of California president Robert 
Sproul (who nevertheless opposed the free speech forum) reinstated four of the students 
because after a week of investigation, he said, "I cannot find any evidence" that the 
students gave their approval to the National Student League or any radical group (Cohen, 
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1993, 125). The remaining student, Celeste Strack, was a radical organizer, but was 
finally reinstated because she had complied with all university rules by holding political 
meetings off campus (Cohen, 1993, 127). Moore noted privately that educators must 
"make battle plans" against the communist plot because taxpayers "will not any longer 
pay taxes to support institutions for the training of young people who are devoting 
themselves to the overthrow of our government” (Cohen, 1993, 119). Moore even urged 
the Governor to sponsor a bill prohibiting any "outside" organization from interfering in 
the work of schools, declaring, "We must smash this thing or the dry rot it spreads will 
kill us” (Cohen, 1993, 128). Moore was supported by the UCLA fraternities and 
sororities, who voted to support the administration "100 percent in any action taken in 
their drive to oust the radical element from the UCLA campus” (Cohen, 1993, 121).  
The fear of radicals was spread by the press. Roscoe Dorsey wrote in The 
National Republic, "There are few colleges or universities where parents may send their 
sons and daughters without their being contaminated with some phase of the vilest of 
Communistic and allied teaching” (Cohen, 1993, 239). When Sidney Hook helped 
organize the socialist American Workers Party in 1935, the Hearst Press led an 
unsuccessful national campaign to have him dismissed from New York University 
(Hook, 1990, 270). Hearst reporters frequently misquoted professors and posed as 
communist students to lure liberal professors into making radical statements (Cohen, 
1993, 129). The Chicago Hearst paper, the Herald Examiner, launched a campaign 
against campus radicals in a February 24, 1934 story, "U of C Prof Attacks US at 
Communist Rally," which called Robert Hutchins an "advisor to Moscow." It sent a 
young woman into the University of Chicago’s International House to try to dig up 
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information on the sex lives of faculty and students (she failed to find anything). One 
Hearst editorial, "Red Teachers," declared, "The danger lies in the teachers of 
communism in our colleges and schools” (Cohen, 1993, 239).  
Yet all the evidence suggested this was not true. A survey of 1930s student 
activists found that only 21.6% reported that a faculty member, often merely a liberal, 
had helped foster their political action, while another 20% had encounters with 
conservative faculty who tried to stifle dissent (Cohen, 1993, 240-2). As Cohen notes, 
"About the rarest experience of all was encountering teachers who explicitly incorporated 
Marxist ideas into their lectures and other regular classroom activities” (Cohen, 1993, 
245). 
But there was a liberal ethic among the social science faculty; a 1937 survey 
found that 84% supported New Deal liberalism (Cohen, 1993, 243). Surveys showed that 
students in the 1930s left college with more liberal views than when they entered (Brax, 
1981, 15). However, in general, professors in the classroom were very conservative and 
most of the radicalism was extracurricular. In one survey of teachers, 35% said they 
"would deliberately omit from textbooks facts that might lead to criticism of the social 
order on the part of the young” (Cohen, 1993, 400). The ethic of the Gentleman Scientist 
still reigned. As Cohen notes, "the legislative offensive against faculty radicals was 
misdirected because academia had already done its own purging” (Cohen, 1993, 130). 
The federal government also worked with college administrators against 
radicalism on campus. From the mid-1930s to 1941, the FBI collected in its files "the 
names of two thousand students" actively involved in the student movement at the 
University of Chicago. An unknown informant in the Dean's office provided the FBI with 
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the membership list of the American Student Union (Cohen, 1993, 99). This cooperation 
with the FBI occurred at virtually every college, and Cohen estimates that the names of 
more than a thousand informants from this period are in FBI files, but are deleted by FBI 
censors even today (Cohen, 1993, 336). At the University of Michigan, president 
Alexander Ruthven told the FBI that student radicals were "definitely troublemakers" and 
promised to "furnish all available details" on their activities to the FBI (Cohen, 1993, 
100). Robert Cohen, who found at least 43 leading colleges which gave information to 
the FBI, usually from high-ranked officials, noted: "In more than 3000 pages of FBI 
documents covering the student movement of the Depression decade, I did not find a 
single case in which a college or university administrator refused to cooperate with the 
FBI. None expressed any concern that informing on students might constitute a violation 
of their rights” (Cohen, 1993, 366). 
State governments also formed an important part of the anti-subversive 
movement, often conducting investigations of both private and public universities and 
carrying the implicit threat. In 1934-35, legislators called the University of Wisconsin an 
"ultra liberal institution in which communistic teachings were encouraged and where 
avowed communists were welcome” (Goldstein, 2001, 232). In 1933, attempts were 
made in the Illinois legislature to control expenditures at the University of Illinois, and 
also to implement faculty oaths to fight the menace of "bolshevism, revolution, and red 
anarchy” (Stephens, 1948). At an April 12, 1935 National Student Strike against "war, 
Fascism, and ROTC," only 2.3 percent of the University of Illinois participated, 
compared with an average of 21.3 percent nationwide (DeMartini, 1974, 337-9, 341). 
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Nevertheless, the Illinois State Senate a few days later called for a commission to 
investigate "reported communist teachings" at the University (DeMartini, 1974, 343). 
The University of Illinois tried to stop even the small degree of activism which 
existed. In March of 1934, the University denied recognition of the National Student 
League. A few months later, a group known as Campus Forum was also denied 
recognition after it sponsored a symposium which included the passage of resolutions 
(DeMartini, 1974, 333). By 1938, removal of notices from unrecognized groups was a 
common means of censorship (DeMartini, 1974, 358). 
Public universities were not the only ones subject to investigations. On April 13, 
1935, drugstore mogul Charles Walgreen wrote a letter to University of Chicago 
President Robert Hutchins withdrawing his niece from the College because "I am 
unwilling to have her absorb the Communist influences to which she is assiduously 
exposed." Walgreen accused Frederick Schuman, assistant professor of political science, 
of preaching free love and said that two course syllabi taught Marxism. But as historian 
William McNeill notes, "Walgreen's charges were absurd. Chicago's professors were 
nearly all conservatives” (McNeill, 1991, 64). Because of Walgreen's complaints, the 
Illinois legislature established a committee to examine the "subversive Communistic 
teachings and ideas," focusing on three professors. But since none of them were actually 
communists, the committee voted 4-1 to exonerate the university. Walgreen was so 
chagrined by Robert Hutchins' testimony that he established a Walgreen Foundation for 
the Study of American Institutions at the University of Chicago with a $550,000 gift 
(McNeill, 1991, 65). 
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Radicals were not the only group to face discrimination, nor its worst victims. 
Racism was widespread on American campuses. The University of Illinois' Daily Illini 
reported in 1932, "Negro students are barred from all campus confectionaries and eating 
establishments. The Home Economics Cafeteria is the only public place at which they 
may eat. They are segregated at shows and semi-public gatherings” (Cohen, 1993, 207). 
In 1935, the University of Minnesota Board of Trustees ruled that blacks would continue 
to be excluded from the men's dormitory (Cohen, 1993, 207). Cohen noted that during the 
1930s at the University of Chicago and other universities, "segregation in dormitories and 
rooming houses prevented blacks from living on or even near campus. Campus 
communities regularly excluded blacks from restaurants, shops, recreational facilities, 
social clubs, and athletic competition” (Cohen, 1993, 206). Even at black colleges, 
radical efforts to protest discrimination were often opposed. When Ishmael Flory 
organized a protest at Fisk University against the lynching of a black teenager a few 
blocks from campus, Thomas Jones, the white president of Fisk, expelled him, with the 
support of the faculty (Cohen, 1993, 218). 
Although the Red Scare of 1933-35 eventually faded, the efforts to suppress 
radicals continued. In April 1937, Martin Dies led the campaign for a resolution passed in 
the House to establish the Special Committee on Un-American Activities which would 
examine "the extent, character, and object of un-American propaganda activities in the 
United States" and "the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American 
propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks 
the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by the Constitution” (Smolla, 
1992, 364). From this committee would come the era of McCarthyism. 
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Repression continued on college campuses in the late 1930s and 1940s. When 
Communist Party leader Earl Browder tried to speak on campuses in the fall of 1939, he 
was banned at Harvard, Oberlin, Brooklyn College, and the University of Chicago 
(Cohen, 1993, 307). In 1940, Arkansas' Commonwealth College folded after its property 
was seized for a lawsuit based on a charge of anarchy, due to the school's failure to fly 
the American flag and its display of the hammer and sickle (Goldstein, 2001, 257-8). 
The president of Western Washington College of Education was fired in 1939 for 
allegedly tolerating subversive activities (Goldstein, 2001, 256). But most administrators 
took a hard line against radicals. In 1941, during an investigation by the state legislature, 
University of Oklahoma president William Bizzell proudly declared, "I believe that the 
University faculty is as conservative as any in the country, and I believe the same applies 
to the student body” (Goldstein, 2001, 257). As Representative Claud Thompson said 
about a suspect mathematics professor, "What I still want to know is what he is doing as 
a mathematics teachers messing around with government?"(Goldstein, 2001, 257). 
Nevertheless, the University was cleared of the charges. 
The repression of radicals during the 1930s had a profound impact on academics 
of all views. Edward Shils pointed out that "they had a very intimidating effect. Even at a 
university where academic freedom was as assured as it was at the University of Chicago, 
and where there was so little sympathy with communism, some of the teachers thought 
that they should step carefully lest they be attacked” (Shils, 1993, 203). Throughout its 
history, the American university had always failed to live up to the ideals of academic 
freedom which developed by fits and starts. The repression during World War I and the 
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anti-radical crusades of the 1920s and 1930s set the stage for the crackdown on leftists 
during the Cold War. 
Bertrand Russell and Campus Morality 
A turning point in academic freedom came in 1940. That year marked the 
adoption of the AAUP’s fundamental doctrine on academic freedom and tenure. But it 
was also the year in which famed philosopher Bertrand Russell was prevented from 
teaching logic at City College of New York, and the first court decision in America 
mentioned academic freedom. 
Russell was called “a desiccated, divorced, and decadent advocate of sexual 
promiscuity” (Edwards, 1957, 210). Bronx Borough President James Lyons threatened to 
eliminate the $7.5 million appropriation for city colleges unless Russell was fired, 
declaring that “the colleges would either be godly colleges, American colleges, or they 
would be closed” (Edwards, 1957, 213). The New York State Legislature unanimously 
adopted a resolution asking the Board to rescind Russell’s appointment, declaring that 
“an advocate of barnyard morality is an unfit person to hold an important post in the 
educational system of our state at the expense of the taxpayers” (Edwards, 1957, 217). 
Charles Keegan of the City Council called Russell an “avowed Communist” and urged 
that board members should be dismissed if they tried to put Russell on the faculty. The 
Council voted 14-5 to ask the mayor to reorganize the board and appoint new members 
(Edwards, 1957, 250-1). 
But ultimately, it would be the judicial system that demanded the firing of 
Russell. Jean Kay, a citizen of Brooklyn with no connection to City Colleges, filed suit 
declaring that “it was contrary to public policy to appoint as a teacher anyone believing in 
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atheism” (Edwards, 1957, 219). A New York judge revoked Russell’s appointment as “an 
insult to the people of the City of New York” and “in effect establishing a chair of 
indecency” (Edwards, 1957, 221).  
As would often happen in the future, academic freedom was seen as being 
inapplicable to sexual questions. Judge McGeehan wrote, “While this court would not 
interfere with any action of the board in so far as a pure question of ‘valid’ academic 
freedom is concerned, it will not tolerate academic freedom being used as a cloak to 
promote the popularization in the minds of adolescents of acts forbidden by the Penal 
Law” (Kay v. Board of Higher Education, 1940, 829). Nor was academic merit given any 
consideration. Judge McGeehan declared, “It is contended that Bertrand Russell is 
extraordinary. That makes him the more dangerous” (Kay v. Board of Higher Education, 
1940, 829). 
In his decision, Judge McGeehan denounced Russell for “his immoral character” 
attacking “the filth which is contained in the books” Russell had written, such as urging 
“temporary childless marriages” for college students (Kay v. Board of Higher Education, 
1940, 826-7). Judge McGeehan argued that though he found Russell’s views on 
masturbation, nudity, religion and politics to be despicable, the court could not intervene 
for these reasons. And, although Russell endorsed the crime of adultery, this, the judge 
noted, was only a misdemeanor (Kay v. Board of Higher Education, 1940, 830). What 
ultimately justified judicial intervention was “Russell's utterances as to the damnable 
felony of homosexualism, which warrants imprisonment for not more than twenty years 
in New York State.” Judge McGeehan quoted Russell’s writings: "It is possible that 
homosexual relations with other boys would not be very harmful if they were tolerated, 
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but even then there is danger lest they should interfere with the growth of normal sexual 
life later on” (Kay v. Board of Higher Education, 1940, 831). 
Here, Russell was expressing a homophobic view, that homosexual behavior by 
boys should not be tolerated, because it may be harmful and it would interfere with 
“normal” sexual development. However, Russell (in words not quoted by the judge) had 
condemned the laws punishing homosexual behavior. It is not clear if the judge simply 
misread Russell and assumed that he was open-minded toward homosexuality, or if the 
judge felt that Russell’s condemnation of homosexuality was insufficiently harsh. 
The Russell case showed that sexuality cannot be segregated from political forms 
of academic freedom. Any kind of subversive thinking, whether political or sexual, was 
merged together in the crusades against academic freedom. One interesting aspect of the 
Russell case is the way that homosexuality has been forgotten. Today, when Russell’s 
case is mentioned, it is typically asserted that Russell was fired for discussing “trial 
marriages” or adultery (Johnson, 1994). Even at the time of Russell’s firing, the topic of 
homosexuality was avoided. A commentator in the Yale Law Review defended Russell, 
declaring: “The statutes which outlaw rape and abduction seek to protect chaste females 
under eighteen. As report has it there are at City College no chaste females…there are no 
females at all” because “Women are barred from the School of Liberal Arts, where Dr. 
Russell would have delivered his lectures…” (Hamilton, 1941, 785). 
Judge McGeehan’s decision was ultimately never challenged. Mayor La Guardia 
simply struck the lectureship from the budget without saying a word, and prevented an 
appeal of the decision, refusing to allow the Board to get their own counsel. Courts 
prohibited Russell himself from appealing the decision (Edwards, 1957, 255). 
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To the academic world, the Russell case was a deep embarrassment because it 
involved an internationally admired scholar. John Dewey noted, “As Americans, we can 
only blush with shame for this scar on our repute for fair play” (Edwards, 1957, 258). 
The AAUP’s Statement of Principles was in part academia’s revenge for the insult to 
Russell, and its force for self-protection. 
The firing of a prominent scholar like Russell showed how vulnerable academic 
freedom was in America. The Russell case also foreshadowed more anti-subversive 
crusades. The investigation of Russell was among the early anti-subversive campaigns 
that would reign supreme during the era of McCarthyism. In response to the controversy 
over Russell, the Rapp-Coudert Committee was formed in New York, which would serve 
as a forerunner for McCarthyism. Although there had been previous anti-subversive 
legislative investigations, the Rapp-Coudert Committee was the first that led to mass 
firings. By 1942, 40 professors were fired or did not have their contracts renewed because 
of accused links to Communism or refusing to divulge their views (Ollman, 1984, 45). As 
Marjorie Heins noted, “The Rapp-Coudert investigation made it dangerous for scholars of 
history, literature, sociology, science, or religion to write or teach about Marxism, 
socialism, the Soviet Union, revolution, and indeed social change of any kind” (Heins, 
2013, 115). 
The Rapp-Coudert Committee revealed an early hint of what the McCarthy Era 
would bring to academia: a relentless attack on radicals in academia. It also revealed the 
powerlessness of the AAUP and other defenders of academic freedom in the face of a 
political crusade. 
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The 1940 Statement of Principles 
While anti-subversive movements were roiling academia, the AAUP was 
embarking on its most ambitious effort to establish tenure and protect academic freedom: 
the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure. Developed and 
issued in conjunction with the American Association of Colleges, the 1940 Statement 
soon became of the most important documents in the development of higher education in 
America, and the foundation of campus protections for academic freedom. The words of 
the 1940 Statement became written into the policies of universities across the country. 
For the AAUP, the 1940 Statement was most important because it established the “7-year 
rule” for tenure. 
But part of the reason for the widespread acceptance of the 1940 Statement was 
its devotion to the ideology of the Gentleman Scientist Model, which made its words 
much more palatable to colleges. The introductory comments spoke of “duties correlative 
with rights” and rejected individual rights in favor of “the common good” (AAUP, 1940). 
The 1940 Statement of Principles granted “full freedom” in research, which was 
the area closest to the scientific ideal and which had caused the least controversy. But 
teaching and extramural utterances faced greater restrictions. Unlike the “full” freedom of 
research, faculty had “freedom in the classroom in discussing their subject, but they 
should be careful not to introduce into their teaching controversial matter which has no 
relation to their subject” (AAUP, 1940). 
The most extensive restrictions in the 1940 Statement came in the area furthest 
from scientific expertise: extramural utterances. The 1940 Statement declared, “When 
they speak or write as citizens, they should be free from institutional censorship or 
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discipline, but their special position in the community imposes special obligations” 
(AAUP, 1940). 
Warning that “the public may judge their profession and their institution” by their 
words, the 1940 Statement required gentlemanly behavior: “they should at all times be 
accurate, should exercise appropriate restraint, should show respect for the opinions of 
others, and should make every effort to indicate that they are not speaking for the 
institution” (AAUP, 1940). The 1940 Statement of Principles was a great achievement of 
the Gentleman Scientist Model, but soon its flaws would become exposed by the Cold 
War. 
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CHAPTER V 
MCCARTHYISM AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM 
 
The 1940 Statement of Principles brought the Gentleman Scientist Model into the 
mainstream of campus life. But outside universities, the politics of the Cold War and the 
fight against Communism soon began to intrude upon campus life. The McCarthy Era, 
and the failure of the AAUP and higher education institutions to protect academic 
freedom, would reveal the flaws of the Gentleman Scientist Model, and eventually pave 
the way for the rise of the Liberty Model.  
The Good War: World War II 
Unlike World War I, the entrance of America into the Second World War brought 
no reports of campus repression. Cardozier notes that in World War II, "excesses were in 
no way comparable to those of World War I, particularly on college campuses” 
(Cardozier, 1993, 216). But academic freedom was still infringed. In 1943, Notre Dame 
reportedly dismissed an associate professor of philosophy who had spoken publicly in 
favor of Russia against anti-Semites and Fascists, and who refused to submit his speeches 
for prior review. Anti-war protest was rarely suppressed, but this was mainly because few 
people opposed the war. However, Cardozier notes, "There were several well-known 
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cases of infringement of academic freedom during the war--as before and since--but most 
of them dealt with questions unrelated to the war, such as lewd textbooks and the 
teaching of socialism” (Cardozier, 1993, 216). 
The key reason for the lack of repression during World War II was the nearly 
unanimous support for the war. Pearl Harbor and the threat of Nazi Germany shocked 
even the most radical critics of the US government. Only a small number of religious 
pacifists opposed the war, and they had little connection to colleges, so campuses were 
never perceived as centers of dissent. Also, the war effort was so overwhelming that it 
effectively distracted most of the usual censors from focusing attention on colleges. 
It is more difficult to say that organizations such as the AAUP were effective in 
promoting the ideal of academic freedom and free expression in America, or that this 
movement was effective in promoting intellectual liberty on college campuses. The 
McCarthy Era certainly challenged the idea that academic freedom was constantly 
progressing. 
The McCarthy Era on Campus 
During the late 1940s and early 1950s, the McCarthyist crusade led to more than a 
hundred faculty members being fired from their jobs, and many more intimidated into 
silence. It remains the most shameful period in the history of American higher education, 
as administrators and sometimes even faculty actively joined in the purges and blacklists. 
The name “McCarthyism” can give the misimpression that the repression of 
dissent in the late 1940s and 1950s should be blamed on one man. Sen. Joseph McCarthy 
was more a symbol of the era that bears his name, and far from the only perpetrator of 
injustice. The House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) began in 1938, and 
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was made a permanent congressional body by a narrow 207-186 vote on January 3, 1945 
(Fosse, 1951 24). But with the end of World War II, the Cold War began and the anti-
communist crusade in America gained momentum. 
With regard to academic censorship, McCarthy himself was a relatively minor 
figure, merely adding professors to his list of usual suspects. McCarthy and the hearings 
he led focused on government employees, and occasionally Hollywood. Professors were 
simply too obscure and deemed too harmless to be regarded as a real threat by McCarthy, 
although they proved to be a useful whipping post and occasionally were dragged into 
hearings through the guilt-by-association tactics employed by McCarthy. 
Sen. McCarthy had openly attacked professors, claiming that 28% of top 
collaborators in the Communist-front movement were college faculty. He said 3,000 
professors had committed "guilt by collaboration” (Lewis, 1988, 12). McCarthy also 
raised the threat of "radicals" corrupting students: "Countless times I have heard parents 
throughout the country complain that their sons and daughters were sent to college as 
good Americans and returned four years later as wild-eyed radicals." He told his readers 
that the educational system must be "scrubbed and flushed and swept clean" if "America 
and Western civilization are to live” (Lewis, 1988, 12). 
Contrary to common belief, the academic witchhunt of the McCarthy Era was not 
directed primarily at Communists, but at left-leaning liberals. Most of the professors 
dismissed by colleges and universities were not Communists, and many of them never 
had been Communists. Of those who were Communists, none fit the stereotype of the 
mindless party propaganda machine, incapable of independent thought or dissent, who 
sought violent revolution. Communist professors never were a threat to America. Not a 
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shred of evidence against a dismissed teacher involving any illegal activity was ever 
shown. No evidence against a "subversive" teacher for indoctrinating students was ever 
produced. 
Loyalty Oaths and the Communist Threat 
Although McCarthyism was aimed far beyond Communists, they were the first 
threat targeted. However, because there were few Communists after World War II 
actually employed at colleges, the risk seemed small. The AAUP report of Committee A 
for 1947 described it as a “comparatively fair weather year”: two complaints of 
interference with academic freedom, three teachers dismissed without due process, and 
eight-to-ten cases of indirect dismissal (Fosse, 1951, 26). 
The key reason for the lack of political firings was the refusal to hire 
Communists. The journal School Review noted at the time, “Probably not a single known 
Communist was appointed to a college or university faculty during 1949, and probably a 
score or even a hundred people who were known to have close Communist affiliations 
were denied appointment for that reason alone” (Fosse, 1951, 129). 
States took the early steps in enforcing loyalty. In 1948, Texas enacted a law 
ordering state college presidents to dismiss any teacher or student discovered to be a 
Communist (Fosse, 1951, 126). From these early attempts to ban Communists, it was 
only logical to create loyalty oaths that required new hires to disavow Communist beliefs.  
Earl McGrath, the US Commissioner of Education, criticized loyalty oaths, but 
noted, “we should be willing and ready to sign loyalty oaths if present pressures of public 
opinion require them” (Fosse, 1951, 115). But the National Education Association (NEA) 
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delegates overwhelmingly supported the ban on Communists, and the NEA announced 
that it would not defend any avowed communists who were dismissed (Fosse, 1951, 116). 
Although the AAUP failed, to its later regret, to investigate institutions that 
violated academic freedom during the McCarthy Era, the early stand of the AAUP was 
quite notable. As Fosse noted, “Criticism of the premise that all Communists had 
surrendered their intellectual integrity came from a minority of educators in public 
schools and the American Association of University Professors” (Fosse, 1951, 129).  
At the University of California, 31 faculty refused to sign the loyalty oath in 1949 
and were fired (Stewart, 1950). In the case of Tolman v. Underhill (1952), the California 
Supreme Court reversed the loyalty oath, but only on the narrow grounds that the 
legislature could not impose a special oath for faculty beyond the existing one for all state 
employees. The courts viewed loyalty oaths was great suspicion, but the Red Scare went 
far beyond loyalty oaths. 
The Attack on Dissent 
Political dissenters, and not just Communists, were the victims of the witchhunt. 
In many cases, faculty were fired purely for the political candidates they supported. 
Defenders of Henry Wallace for President in 1948 were especially susceptible to 
retribution. At Oregon State College, economics professor L.R. LaVallee was fired after 
working for the Wallace campaign, with the president concluding, "Why should the state 
pay a man who is trying to destroy the state in the interests of a foreign power whose 
interests are diametrically opposed to ours?"(Lewis, 1988, 209, 250). At the University of 
Miami, three professors in the Wallace for President Club were fired for "budgetary 
reasons” (Lewis, 1988, 209). Religion and philosophy instructor George Parker was 
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dismissed by Evansville College on April 8, 1948, less than a month after he had been 
given a contract for the next year, and two days after he presided at a meeting of Henry 
Wallace supporters. Parker was charged with actions “not generally considered by the 
majority of the constituency as beneficial to our society” (AAUP, 1949, 109). President 
Hale fired him for failing "to show good judgment" and because he "had seriously 
jeopardized the college” (Selcraig, 133; Lewis, 1988, 210). Wallace and his Vice 
Presidential candidate Glen Taylor were prohibited from speaking in 1948 at the 
University of Cincinnati, University of Iowa, University of Missouri, University of 
California, and University of Michigan (Goldstein, 2001, 313). 
The anti-Communist movement suppressed all radicals who deviated from the 
conservative, patriotic doctrines of the times, and controlled liberals by accusing them of 
socialistic thinking. By turning dissenters into traitors, the anti-subversive movement 
tried to make criticism of conservative ideology forbidden in America. The dismissal of 
Communists was justified by the unproven claim that all Communists were forced to 
adhere to the party line on all issues, which denied the possibility of free thought as a 
precondition of academic freedom. J. Edgar Hoover noted in 1953, "No element of 
academic freedom is involved in the question of barring Communists from teaching jobs. 
A person, in order to be a teacher, ought to have a free intellect. You cannot have a free 
intellect if you are a Communist” (Bollinger, 1955). A national survey found that 89% of 
people said a Communist professor should be fired. Even among college teachers, 45% 
felt Communists should be fired, and only 35% disagreed (Lazarsfeld & Thielens, 1958, 
431). 
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Many of the leading academic liberals of the era believed in the a priori 
disqualification of Communists. Harry Gideonse, who was investigated as a possible 
subversive by the Illinois legislature in 1935, declared in 1953, when he was president of 
Brooklyn College: "anyone who has embraced a totalitarian party line has also 
automatically adopted a form of human conduct which is itself—by definition—
subversive of the standards of a free society dedicated to truth” (Gideonse, 1953, 588). 
Richard Hofstadter refused to condemn the University of Washington for firing 
Communists: "I dislike these Stalinists so--and I wonder what they would do for us or to 
us if they had control of things” (Novick, 1988, 326). Liberal historian Arthur 
Schlesinger, Jr. called them "contemptible individuals who have deliberately lived a 
political lie, pretending to be American liberals while secretly responding to the dictates 
of a foreign nation and of a totalitarian conspiracy” (Lewis, 1988, 45). By 1949, Paul 
Gates, the New York campaign treasurer for progressive candidate Henry Wallace, 
refused to defend the right of Communists to speak at Cornell: "The position of the 
American Communists is so utterly indefensible in terms of morality that I am not willing 
to make a fight for them on matters of civil liberties and freedom” (Novick, 1988, 323). 
Others explicitly defended the anti-Communist witchhunts. Arthur Bestor urged 
the firing of every Communist because he was "no longer an intellectually free agent” 
(Novick, 1988, 326). Perhaps the most famous of these defenses was Sidney Hook's 
Heresy, Yes, Conspiracy, No. Hook sought a liberal "middle ground" between the most 
conservative anti-subversives and those who defended Communists. According to Hook, 
the most extreme anti-Communists had "attacked as a menace to American freedom and 
security men and ideas that are not only non-Communist but sometimes anti-Communist” 
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(Hook, 1953, 9). However, he said, the other side tended to "dismiss too lightly the 
conspiratorial character of the Communist movement” (Hook, 1953, 10). 
Hook complained that any suggestion of professors being silenced was a 
"hysterical outcry” (Hook, 1953, 79). Robert Hutchins had written in 1951, "Everywhere 
in the U.S. university professors, whether or not they have tenure, are silenced by the 
general atmosphere of repression that now prevails” (Hook, 1953, 61). Hook responded 
that except for "a few members of the Communist Party," "no professor who was in the 
habit of speaking up five years ago has been silenced” (Hook, 1953, 61). As evidence that 
teaching was not "a terrorized profession," Hook pointed out that AAUP investigations 
had not increased during the Cold War period. But Hook ignored the fact that the 
McCarthy Era was a period when the AAUP simply failed to defend professors against 
the witchhunts, largely due to the incompetence of its leadership and the fear of opposing 
the anti-subversive movement (Hook, 1953, 63-64). 
Unlike Hook, the AAUP defended the rights of communists. The AAUP declared, 
“The teacher has a right to be a Communist as long as other citizens have that right” 
(AAUP, 1948, 120). According to the AAUP, “The evidence that the Communist Party in 
the United States is subservient to the dictates of international communism, which means 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, is not conclusive” (AAUP, 1948, 123).  
Actual evidence was unnecessary to Hook, who argued that anyone who remained 
a Communist provided "prima facie evidence that he is a hardened conspirator and that 
he accepts its orders and directives." Covering all bases, Hook concluded that anyone 
who was a Communist without being a "hardened conspirator" would be "ineligible on 
grounds of lack of intelligence for any responsible job” (Hook, 1953, 89). In doing so, 
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Hook removed any need to evaluate Communist professors individually. Since American 
Communists were members of "the international Communist movement" which is "a 
clear and present threat to the preservation of free American institutions and our national 
independence," they met the "clear and present danger" test Hook offered for revoking 
free speech rights (Hook, 1953, 109). 
Hook also argued that "it is certainly overwhelmingly probable that members of 
the Communist Party attempted to indoctrinate whenever they could do so” (Hook, 1953, 
186). The fact that no evidence of indoctrination was ever presented by Hook or any 
other Communist witchhunter, despite the thousands of students who must have taken 
classes taught by these Communists, showed how fragile the illusion of the 
"paramilitary" Communist was. When Hook noted that the 1,000 Communist teachers in 
New York City would mean that "every year one hundred thousand students in New 
York City alone would be subject to educationally pernicious indoctrination," he was 
inadvertently proving the opposite, since one suspects that at least one of these students 
would complain about the indoctrination (Hook, 1953, 209). 
Hook made three errors. First, he misrepresented the conduct of Communist 
teachers and literally accepted the doctrine of guilt by association, despite the absence of 
evidence of indoctrination. Even in the case of open Communists, this assumption of a 
"Communist party line" was dubious. A hearing at private university in June, 1953 
investigated a leftist philosophy professor who called himself "a non-Party Communist 
with qualifications" and expressed disagreement with some actions of the Soviet 
government (Lewis, 1988, 326). The idea that American Communist professors obeyed a 
party line was simply not supported by any data. 
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Second, Hook misunderstood the anti-Communist movement, believing that if 
liberals took the lead in the witchhunt they could control its abuses. Instead, anti-
Communist liberals like Hook simply added ammunition to the attacks. Since Communist 
Front groups were equated with Communism, anyone who had signed a radical petition 
or belonged to a peace group became, in the minds of witchhunters, a Communist subject 
to all of the punishments Hook supported. 
Finally, Hook, like many other liberals of the time, failed to see that the main 
victims of the witchhunt were never Communists, but radicals and liberals who 
challenged conservative ideology. By attacking the Communists who were being thrown 
out of universities, rather than the witchhunts going after them, many liberals gave their 
implicit approval to the McCarthyist cause. While intellectuals like Hook argued about 
whether a few active Communists ought to be teachers, they ignored the vast apparatus of 
repression against former Communists and non-Communist leftists. The mid-1950s 
Lazarsfeld & Thielens study noted, "almost all such incidents involved charges of past 
Party membership, most often in the 1930s” (Lazarsfeld & Thielens, 1958, 69). By 
focusing on the "Communist problem," Hook and others helped obscure the 
pervasiveness of McCarthyism. By joining the witchhunt and offering only half-hearted 
criticism of its excesses, Hook and many liberals aided a massive campaign of repression. 
The McCarthy Crusade 
Ellen Schrecker (1986) made two key arguments that changed the historical 
understanding of McCarthyism in academia: First, she noted that most of the victims of 
McCarthyism in higher education were not Communist Party members (because so few 
Communists actually taught in colleges), but instead were ex-communists or principled 
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liberals who refused to cooperate with McCarthyesque investigations. Second, Schrecker 
found that colleges and universities, far from resisting McCarthyism, actually cooperated 
and even instigated many of the efforts to remove dissenting faculty. 
The myth of McCarthyism told in higher education was that colleges were victims 
of outside political forces, which they heroically fought off but could not always defeat: 
As Roger Geiger put it, "McCarthyism was essentially imposed on universities from 
outside” (Geiger, 1993, 38).  
Schrecker shattered that myth, instead telling a story of administrators and faculty 
who were complicit with McCarthyism and failed to protect the ideal of academic 
freedom. Schrecker found: "Professors and administrators ignored the stated ideals of 
their calling and overrode the civil liberties of their colleagues and employees in the 
service of such supposedly higher values as institutional loyalty” (Schrecker, 1986, 340). 
Schrecker concluded, "The academy's enforcement of McCarthyism had silenced an 
entire generation of radical intellectuals and snuffed out all meaningful opposition to the 
official version of the Cold War. When, by the late fifties, the hearings and dismissals 
tapered off, it was not because they encountered resistance but because they were no 
longer necessary. All was quiet on the academic front” (Schrecker, 1986, 341).  
Although earlier scholars had hit upon similar findings (Selcraig, 1982), 
Schrecker was the first to analyze McCarthyism in higher education nationally and 
understand the close links between colleges and the anti-Communist crusade nationwide. 
Schrecker was condemned by conservative critics, but her findings were largely 
confirmed by Lionel Lewis in his systematic 1988 book Cold War on Campus. Lewis 
(1988) studied 126 cases on 58 campuses where professors were investigated for their 
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beliefs, and concluded that "academic authorities were as much a threat to faculty and to 
their academic freedom as were the ominous political forces off campus” (5). Fewer than 
20% of the professors still had their jobs after the investigation was complete; the rest 
were fired or resigned under the pressure (Lewis, 1988, 61). Professors were investigated 
for being summoned before HUAC and other legislative investigating committees, for 
participating in the 1948 Wallace campaign, for refusing to sign a loyalty oath, and even 
for signing petitions asking amnesty for Communists convicted under the Smith Act 
(Lewis, 1988, 49).  
Rarely did colleges show much support for academic freedom. Lewis noted, "In 
only three instances did an institution stand firm behind someone who could easily have 
been sacrificed without extensive repercussions” (Lewis, 1988, 76). Lewis concluded, 
confirming Schrecker’s theory, that "external pressures were of little significance 
compared to internal imperatives to remove so-called radicals from the faculties of 
colleges and universities” (Lewis, 1988, 267).  
Even when professors were not fired, the intimidation of radicals was readily 
apparent. Professors managed to save their jobs only when they cooperated with the 
university, never discussed unorthodox ideas in their classes, and avoided further 
controversy. The AAUP claimed that there was "nothing in the nature of teaching 
profession which requires the automatic exclusion of Communists, and the attempt to 
exclude them would threaten our educational system" (Lewis, 1988, 102), but the AAUP 
refused to print an account of any specific case during the McCarthy Era, and only 
investigated one firing of a professor, so that, as Metzger put it, "the first postwar 
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academic purges committed in the name of national security had gone unreported and 
unreproved” (Metzger, 1986, 29).  
Many colleges followed the line of the Association of American Universities, an 
organization of the top 35 universities, which declared in 1953 that "since present 
membership in the Communist Party requires the acceptance of these principles and 
methods, such membership extinguishes the right to a university position” (Lewis, 1988, 
15).  
Radicals in the colleges were often regarded as a disease to wipe out. Former 
communist and FBI witness Louis Budenz wrote in the American Legion magazine in 
1951, “Uncover a red doing his stuff on a college faculty and a hue and cry is raised over 
‘academic freedom’: as though these people had a God-given right to infect our children 
with their made-in-Moscow virus” (Kille, 2004, 27).  
Colleges and universities usually cooperated with state legislators and 
investigative committees, often in extensive ways. A representative of the California 
senate committee testified before a U.S. Senate committee that in one year, cooperation 
between California college presidents and the state senate committee led to the removal 
of more than 100 faculty, and a procedure was established to encourage the hiring of 
intelligence agents and to screen applicants before they were hired (Lewis, 1988, 255).  
This cooperation was not limited to public colleges and universities. Robert 
Cohen, although unanimously recommended by the Philosophy Department and Yale 
College for an appointment, was rejected after an FBI-connected informant told 
administrators of Cohen's political activities (Diamond, 1992, 153). The FBI noted in its 
files that Yale had decided that "it is much better to look men over and know exactly 
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what they are before they are appointed, and that it is much easier to get rid of them by 
not appointing them than after they have been once appointed” (Diamond, 1992, 207).  
On March 26, 1953, J. Edgar Hoover ordered FBI field offices to launch an 
immediate investigation of "Communist subversion" at 55 colleges and universities 
(Diamond, 1992, 243-4). The FBI already had cooperative relationships with many 
colleges. University of Washington president Raymond Allen asked an FBI agent if "it 
would be possible in certain cases for the Bureau to furnish the University information 
concerning members of the faculty or applicants for faculty positions” (Diamond, 1992, 
251). In 1950, a UCLA administrative officer told the Los Angeles Times that "he 
checked FBI records in connection with interviews of applicants for faculty positions at 
UCLA” (Diamond, 1992, 259). George Stoddard at the University of Illinois--shortly 
before being fired by conservative trustees who attacked his liberal views--declared that 
while politicians "shout themselves hoarse about communism in the university, those of 
us in charge have worked quietly through our own security officers, the FBI, the State 
Department and the military establishments to make sure that no Communists are on the 
staff” (Diamond, 1992, 265). 
And for many faculty who lost their jobs during the McCarthy Era, the blacklist 
would continue for more than a decade. Barrows Dunham was cited by the House for 
contempt in 1953, and was eventually acquitted by a federal district court. But he was 
dismissed by a unanimous vote of the Temple University Board of Trustees because the 
"false use of Constitutional privilege" violated his "cardinal duty" to the university 
(Schrecker, 1986) Like many other victims of the McCarthy witchhunt, Dunham was 
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kept out of regular employment for fifteen years (Schultz & Schultz, 1989, 129; 
McCumber, 2001). 
The overall impact of McCarthyism cannot be easily gauged, since many teachers 
were quietly dismissed. In 1947, the president of Ohio State admitted dismissing two 
faculty members who had "Communist leanings." The president of Western Illinois State 
Teachers College privately said that one "liberalist" was dismissed and another resigned. 
The University of Illinois refused to renew two leftists' contracts (Selcraig, 1982, 146). If 
more than 100 faculty in California in one year were removed because of the 
McCarthyite crusades of the 1950s, then the total number of faculty nationwide directly 
affected with the loss of their jobs must have numbered far into the thousands during the 
McCarthy Era. 
William F. Buckley's Yale 
One of the formative works of the anti-Communist crusade in the universities was 
William F. Buckley's 1952 book, God and Man at Yale, a book still widely admired in 
conservative circles for its rejection of academic freedom. Buckley attacked Yale 
University because he believed it had failed to enforce a conservative ideology on its 
faculty and students; the problem for Buckley was not a lack of freedom on campus, but 
an excess of it. Buckley complained, for example, that the Religion Department did not 
have "a remarkably pro-religious bias” (Buckley, 1951, 9). He attacked the presence of 
an atheist professor because students might become "full of suspicions and doubts about 
religion" and a sociology professor who "subverted the faith" of students (Buckley, 1951, 
13, 17). 
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Religion was not the only faith which Buckley felt was inadequately indoctrinated 
at Yale. Buckley criticized the American Studies department because it did not follow a 
major donor's demands for it to support "the preservation of our System of Free 
Enterprise" and be "opposed to a system of State Socialism, Communism and 
Totalitarianism” (Buckley, 1951, 101). Buckley added about the Economics department, 
"of the nine full professors in the department, only four are forthright defenders of 
individualism” (Buckley, 1951, 99). Buckley believed that Yale would not be set right 
until every economist on its faculty defended "individualism" against mainstream 
Keynesian theories of economics. 
Individuals, Buckley wrote, do not have any academic freedom, except the 
freedom to quit: "no freedom has been abridged so long as he is at liberty to quit his job" 
and can "seek employment at a college that was interested in propagating socialism” 
(Buckley, 1951, 187, 189). Of course, no college was formally propagating socialism in 
the 1950s (nor are any today), so Buckley was effectively supporting a blacklist of 
"socialist" thinkers from universities. As Buckley bluntly put it, "the attitudes of the 
faculty ought to conform to the university's” (Buckley, 1951, 181). 
Buckley supported strong measures to remove "the predominance of leftism at 
Yale” (Buckley, 1951, 112). He complained about President Seymour (who in 1937 
urged a return to Christian values and who also refused to knowingly hire a Communist) 
because Seymour did not "exorcise the extreme secularism" at Yale by getting rid of 
liberal faculty (Buckley, 1951, 43, 225). 
Buckley's criticisms of Yale bear a remarkable similarity to later attacks on 
political correctness. The complaint of "too many radicals" is frequently heard, with the 
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accompanying fear that students might not learn the proper patriotic values and will 
instead be corrupted by feminism, Marxism, and the other evils of academia. For 
Buckley, the dangers were Keynesianism and liberal religion, but his attack on radicalism 
is echoed in the current opposition to multiculturalism. Remarkably, Buckley's Yale of 
the 1950s, where liberals supposedly dominated and "many students manage to cruise 
through without learning very much"(Buckley, 1951, 32) has now been reinterpreted into 
a Golden Age of higher education, while Buckley's hope for a purge of leftist professors 
by conservative trustees and administrators continues to be the guiding philosophy of 
some who want to take over colleges and universities. 
The AAC Joins the Crusade 
The American Association of Colleges (AAC), a major administrative higher 
education organization, was much worse than the AAUP in its response to McCarthyism. 
In March 1953, the AAC issued its anti-Communist statement, declaring that a scholar 
“must have integrity and independence” and Communists should be fired for failing to 
meet this standard. 
The AAC statement had an immediate impact. The Reno Evening Gazette cited it 
in an editorial on “Academic Freedom” on April 10, 1953 that proclaimed, “The 
universities have the right and obligation, as their leaders declared, to weed out Reds on 
their staffs” (Kille, 2004, 26). This was no theoretical claim. The University of Nevada 
was at that very moment attempting to purge liberal faculty. 
In 1952, Minard Stout was appointed president by the Board of Regents of the 
University of Nevada. According to J. Dee Kille, “The leadership of the board made it 
clear to their new president that he was to bring a small cadre of outspoken faculty 
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members into line” (Kille, 2004, 4). Chairman Silas Ross had declared in 1945 that 
faculty should “stick to their classes” and not be involved in governing the university 
(Kille, 2004, 7). 
Stout’s plan to purge dissidents was aided by state legislators, who heard 
“persistent reports that ‘something is wrong at the University of Nevada,’” and decided to 
investigate (Kille, 2004, 16). On March 10, 1953, a legislative investigating committee 
was given one week to examine the university, and its report blamed a “small dissident 
group” of faculty for the problem (Kille, 2004, 17). 
That month, five tenured faculty (Frank Richardson, Thomas Little, Robert 
Gorrell, Charlton Laird, and Robert Hume) all received identical letters from Stout firing 
them for “engaging in ‘disturbing activities’ over a period of ‘several years.’”(Kille, 
2004, 17). Ironically enough, one of the “disturbing activities” was accusing the 
administration of mistreating the faculty. 
The five appealed in court, and charges were dropped against all but Richardson, 
the president of the campus AAUP chapter, who had challenged Stout’s efforts to lower 
admissions standards (Kille, 2004, 32). Richardson was found guilty of distributing an 
article on campus by Arthur Bestor titled, “Aimlessness in Education” (Kille, 2004, 18). 
Richardson was dismissed in June 1953, and novelist Walter Van Tilberg Clark, a 
lecturer in the department, resigned in protest (Kille, 2004, 32). Because Harold Brown, 
chair of the Department of Education, believed that Richardson had a right to distribute 
the article, he was punished by being stripped of the job as director of the summer school 
(Kille, 2004, 21). All five faculty were left off the university’s salary list, and were told 
they would have to sign a letter agreeing to the Board’s authority over them. (Kille, 2004, 
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19). These faculty had been given no salary increases, while large increases were given to 
faculty who testified against Richardson (Kille, 2004, 20). 
McCarthyism and the Gentleman Scientist Model 
The McCarthy Era marked the beginning of the breakdown in the Gentleman 
Scientist Model as a functional system for protecting academic freedom. Academics were 
widely united in opposing the loyalty oaths that violated the gentlemanly norms of trust 
in higher education. However, this viewpoint did not prevent the mass firings at the 
University of California, or the wide sweep of loyalty oaths across the country. 
Sidney Hook’s attacks on communist professors also reflected the remnants of the 
Gentleman Scientist Model. By denouncing communists not as a political threat but 
because of their alleged inability to engage in free scientific thought, Hook stood firmly 
behind this traditional ideal of academic freedom. But the reality was that professors were 
being widely dismissed for their political ideologies, not because they were narrow-
minded. The Gentleman Scientist Model not only failed to protect professors during the 
McCarthy Era, it was being used as the foundation for attacking academic freedom. 
In contrast to the Gentleman Scientist Model of academic freedom stood the 
Liberty Model. According to the Gentleman Scientist Model, professors had the right to 
express themselves politely in their fields of scholarly knowledge. But the Liberty Model 
represented a much broader sense of academic freedom, in which professors were free to 
express their ideas on all political issues, even if it offended critics and embarrassed their 
institutions.  
By 1953, the House Un-American Activities Committee under chairman Harold 
Velde had cost the jobs of hundreds of teachers and professors (Schultz & Schultz, 1989, 
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127). Lloyd Barenblatt and Chandler Davis served prison terms for refusing to answer 
questions in front of HUAC. Even the U.S. Supreme Court refused to protect the free 
speech rights of Communists during the early McCarthy Era, declaring in the Barenblatt 
case that it "has consistently refused to view the Communist Party as an ordinary political 
party," and so allowed the government to act in a manner that "in a different context 
would certainly have raised constitutional issues of the gravest character” (Barenblatt v. 
US). 
However, the reaction against the excesses of McCarthyism on campus would 
lead to dramatic changes in the idea of academic freedom. The U.S. Supreme Court made 
a dramatic shift toward protecting civil liberties, and for the first time academic freedom 
became one of those judicially-enforced liberties. 
Before the Supreme Court rulings of the late 1950s and early 1960s, private 
institutions were sometimes regarded as having the strongest protections for academic 
freedom, since they were more insulated from public opinion. Legislators intent on 
punishing leftist professors could not directly control private colleges, and had little 
funding power to take away. Donors could certainly influence private institutions, but 
individual donors held relatively little power. But McCarthyism hit both private and 
public colleges. 
However, the judicial reaction to McCarthyism led the U.S. Supreme Court to 
transform the First Amendment and fulfill its meaning of protecting freedom of speech 
by created a right to academic freedom under it. Suddenly, the protections of academic 
freedom were much stronger in public colleges, where a professor fired for his political 
speech could file a lawsuit demanding reinstatement under the First Amendment. No 
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longer were professors at public colleges dependent upon censure and moral 
condemnation to maintain academic freedom. Private colleges competing for faculty 
needed to offer similar protections of academic freedom, and as a result began to develop 
more legalistic systems of due process following the AAUP guidelines. 
Under the Gentleman Scientist Model, academic freedom depended upon the 
good faith of honorable administrators following unwritten academic norms. But a 
system based on honor simply did not work well. It was far to easy to get rid of 
troublesome faculty, and the Gentleman Scientist Model offered too many reasons to 
justify the firing of professors who deviated from academic norms. The Liberty Model 
did not suddenly appear, nor was it methodically created according to a detailed analysis. 
Instead, like the Gentleman Scientist Model it eventually replaced, the Liberty Model 
grew gradually, by the accumulation of smaller principles and practices. 
The Liberty Model was a reaction to the failures of the Gentleman Scientist 
Model during the late 1940s and 1950s, when colleges and national organizations failed 
to defend academic freedom. It was also inspired by a series of Supreme Court case 
defending freedom of speech, including in academia. The repression of the McCarthy Era 
helped spark a new era of academic freedom, one that would never permit widespread 
political firings to prevail again in academia. But the fight to establish this new model of 
academic freedom in 1960s would not be won easily. It took a decade of struggle and 
debate before the Liberty Model would replace the Gentleman Scientist approach as the 
dominant idea of academic freedom. 
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Academic Freedom After McCarthyism 
The Gentleman Scientist Model of academic freedom had been falling apart, brick 
by brick, for years. The age of McCarthyism exposed how vulnerable academic freedom 
truly was on American campuses. The failure of the AAUP and other organizations to 
protect intellectual freedom during the McCarthy Era alarmed academics. One of the first 
responses was the 1958 Statement on Procedural Standards in Faculty Dismissal 
Proceedings, which was produced by a joint committee of the AAUP and the Association 
of American Colleges, and approved by both organizations in 1958. This lengthy 
document noted that “One persistent source of difficulty is the definition of adequate 
cause for the dismissal of a faculty member” (AAUP, 1958). The statement observed that 
“considerable ambiguity and misunderstanding persist throughout higher education, 
especially in the respective conceptions of governing boards, administrative officers, and 
faculties concerning this matter” (AAUP, 1958). 
The procedural recommendations in the statement called for a faculty committee 
“elected by the faculty” to investigate the fitness of a faculty member, and if formal 
proceedings are needed, a faculty committee would conduct a hearing. It opposed all 
temporary suspensions unless “immediate harm” was threatened. (AAUP, 1958). It called 
for a right of counsel by the faculty member. It noted that “acceptance of the committee's 
decision would normally be expected.” And it urged that “public statements...should be 
avoided so far as possible until the proceedings have been completed.” (AAUP, 1958). 
Overall, the 1958 Statement was a weak response necessitated by compromise 
with the AAC. It was meant only as a guide to colleges, not an official statement of what 
colleges needed to do. And while it emphasized faculty control, the administration and 
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the governing board always had the option of rejecting faculty advice. More importantly, 
the 1958 Statement did not alter the standards used for dismissing faculty. Although the 
1958 Statement revealed some early, tentative steps toward the Liberty Model (by 
providing procedural rights for faculty and a right to counsel), the changes were small. 
The flaws of the Gentleman Scientist Model were apparent, but in the late 1950s, the 
AAUP still lacked the consensus to move away from it. 
Sexual McCarthyism 
In 1950, Sen. Joseph McCarthy denounced “those Communists and queers who 
have sold 400 million Asiatic people into atheistic slavery and have American people in a 
hypnotic trance, headed blindly toward the same precipice.'' At one secret 1953 session of 
McCarthy’s witchhunt, Roosevelt University trustee Eric Kohler was asked if he was gay, 
and then was asked, "Do you have any facts or do you know whether any of the members 
of that board have homosexual tendencies?”(Kohler, 1953). Sexuality and communism 
were intertwined in the anti-subversive campaigns of the McCarthy Era.  
Like the repression of gays in government service during the McCarthy Era 
(Johnson, 2004), colleges and universities commonly engaged in discrimination. The 
most extensive attacks on gays and lesbians in education occurred in Florida, where for 
nearly a decade the infamous Johns Committee investigated and fired more than a 
hundred teachers in public schools and state colleges. By April 1963, 71 teachers had 
their teaching certificates revoked, and 39 professors and deans had been dismissed from 
universities. Hundreds of teachers were investigated, questioned, and harassed, and an 
untold number of students were expelled from college (Johnson, 2004). 
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In 1956, the Florida Legislature gave seven of its members $50,000 and the power 
to investigate all organizations they considered a threat to the state (Braukman, 2012). 
The Florida Legislative Investigative Committee was authorized to investigate anyone 
"whose principles or activities include a course of conduct on the part of any person or 
group which could constitute violence or a violation of the laws of the state” (Braukman, 
2012). With this broad mandate, the Florida Committee went after the state's most 
marginal groups--blacks, Communists, and homosexuals. 
In 1957, Senator Charley Johns became chairman of the year-old Committee, 
focusing on "race groups and Communist infiltration." The Johns Committee--nicknamed 
for its segregationist chairman--began its work by attacking the NAACP. The committee 
declared in 1959 that the NAACP "has been the prime target of communist penetration 
for the past 30 years” (Woods, 2004, 122). 
But the Johns Committee met strong and effective resistance from civil rights 
activists. NAACP employees refused to answer the investigators' questions and refused to 
turn over membership lists. The Johns Committee prevailed in a Florida Supreme Court 
ruling, but the NAACP appealed the ruling to the federal courts. The NAACP effectively 
blocked the committee's intrusive questioning, although many depositions were taken and 
reports compiled about NAACP activities. Facing resistance from civil rights activists, in 
1958 the Johns Committee began to turn its attention to a more vulnerable target: 
homosexuals. 
In 1959, the Johns Committee called the presence of homosexual faculty and 
students at the University of Florida "absolutely appalling." According to the gay and 
lesbian magazine Mattachine Review, 15 instructors and staff were dismissed and 
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homosexual tendencies and practices were found among 27 teachers (Mattachine Review, 
July 1959, 22). At the University of Florida, campus police used "young special agents" 
to loiter in campus toilets (Mattachine Review, March 1960, 19). But most of the students 
and teachers were identified by other gays and lesbians under interrogation from 
investigators. 
The number of "practicing homosexuals" in schools and colleges "is much more 
substantial than is generally believed," warned a 1961 report of the Johns Committee. 
Even the most innocuous behavior was viewed suspiciously by the Johns Committee. In 
one case, a gay University of Florida senior identified a professor as possibly gay when 
he was interrogated in 1958: "He wears those French berets and he wears walking shorts 
and rides a bicycle in them. He may just be eccentric” (Anderson, 1993). Attacking the 
University of South Florida in an August 1962 report, the Johns Committee accused it of 
using "intellectual garbage" such as J.D. Salinger's Nine Stories and Gatland and 
Dempster's The Inhabited Universe (because it was too evolutionary) (Mattachine 
Review, October 1962, 2). 
Ironically, the Johns Committee folded in 1965 after it produced the report, 
"Homosexuality and Citizenship in Florida," which was banned in Dade County because 
it included pictures of men kissing and boys wearing underwear (it ended up being sold 
in some adult bookstores). Florida’s sex scare brought down its own investigating 
committee. 
Although Florida had the most extensive public repression of gays and lesbians, 
practically all colleges and universities discriminated against homosexuals. It is 
impossible to know how many teachers were fired and students expelled because of 
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sexual orientation. Historian John D'Emilio reports just a few examples from "the gay 
and lesbian academic grapevine": "In 1959, at a small midwestern college, a student told 
her faculty adviser that one of her friends was a homosexual. The adviser informed a 
dean, who called in the student in question and pressured him into naming others. Within 
twenty-four hours, three students had been expelled; a week later, one of them hung 
himself” (D'Emilio, 1983, 149). Around 1960, "a faculty member at a Big Ten school 
was arrested in mid-semester on a morals charge....The police alerted the administration, 
and the professor was summarily told to leave the campus. He never appeared before his 
classes again” (D'Emilio, 1983, 149). D'Emilio adds, "At an elite college in the Northeast, 
male students in the 1960s were in the habit of training a telescope on the windows of the 
women's dormitories. In one instance, they spied two female students erotically engaged. 
The women--not the men--were disciplined” (D'Emilio, 1983, 149). In 1962, a 
psychology professor at Long Beach State College committed suicide after he was 
arrested on a morals charge and fired by his college (Mattachine Review, February 1962, 
32).  
The fear of male homosexuality spread even to women’s colleges. Newton Arvin, 
a gay Smith College professor, was arrested September 2, 1960 for possession of 
photographs of nude men in his home (Werth, 2001, 5). Although a faculty committee 
ruled that Arvin’s conduct did not justify dismissal, several trustees wanted to fire any 
professors involved in the scandal. In the end, Arvin was forced to resign, and two other 
professors who had been convicted were fired (Werth, 2001, 250, 262). 
It is notable that the numerous heterosexual male professors at Smith who slept 
with their own students received, at worst, a warning if they were too flagrant in their 
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behavior (Werth, 2001, 270). It was not the protection of female students at Smith that 
motivated the crackdown, but the fear of any sexual subversion. 
The AAUP rarely investigated any sexual cases, even when due process rules 
were violated, and sexuality is a category seemingly removed from the protections of 
academic freedom by the AAUP’s Statement of Principles. 
Yet the concept of academic freedom in America also has been shaped by 
disputes over sexuality. The 1940 AAUP Statement of Principles identified the very 
worst academic crime, which justified immediate dismissal without further payment of 
salary, as “moral turpitude,” a vague term which encompassed serious criminal actions 
but also various kinds of sexual misconduct. It would be a controversy over sexuality, not 
politics, that ultimately pushed the AAUP to alter its most fundamental principles of 
academic freedom, and rapidly shift from the Gentleman Scientist Model to the Liberty 
Model. 
How Leo Koch and His Letter Changed Academic Freedom 
The man whose controversial actions pushed the AAUP to transform the concept 
of academic freedom was an assistant professor of biology at the University of Illinois in 
Urbana named Leo Koch. Koch’s problems began when he wrote a letter on March 16, 
1960 in response to a Daily Illini article published that day. Koch was responding to a 
forum titled “Sex Ritualized,” which lamented how unfortunate men are obliged to be 
“smooching” with women in a sorority “until the one o’clock ‘dong’ relieves the males 
from their chivalrous duty.” The authors reported, “Men are not so concerned with a girl 
as a living individual—as an organic complexity of personality and character, emotion 
and intellect, and passion and reason—as they are concerned with her as a simple female 
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sex unit.” They argued that “male-female relations on campus” have “stultified into a 
predetermined ritual” (Koch, 1960). 
Koch's letter, which was over 2500 words long, chided the student newspaper for 
omitting “any reference to the social meleu which compels healthy, sexually mature 
human animals into such addictions (of which masturbation is likely the least 
objectionable) to unhealthy and degenerative practices” (Koch, 1960). 
Koch noted in his letter, “Any one who insists on speaking about sex in public, 
say the orthodox moralists, (unless it is condemned soundly) must be a sexual deviate (a 
Queer) in their orthodox view.” Koch added, “The second, and by far the more important, 
hazard is that a public discussion of sex will offend the religious feelings of the leaders of 
our religious institutions. These people feel that youngsters should remain ignorant of sex 
for fear that knowledge of it will lead to temptation and sin” (Koch, 1960). 
Koch wrote against “a double standard of morality which accepts as respectable 
premarital sexual experience for men but not for women.” Double standards were the 
focus of Koch's letter, which blamed “the hypocritical and downright inhumane moral 
standards engendered by a Christian code of ethics which was already decrepit in the 
days of Queen Victoria.” Koch attacked “the widespread crusades against obscenity 
which are so popular among prudes and puritanical old-maids” (Koch, 1960). 
Not satisfied with insulting religion, Koch urged a “mutually satisfactory sexual 
experience.” Koch wrote, “college students, when faced with this outrageously ignorant 
code of morality, would seem to me to be acting with remarkable decorum, and 
surprising meekness, if they do no more than neck at their social functions.” Showing no 
meekness himself, Koch concluded: “With modern contraceptives and medical advice 
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readily available at the nearest drugstore, or at least a family physician, there is no valid 
reason why sexual intercourse should not be condoned among those sufficiently mature 
to engage in it without social consequences and without violating their own codes of 
morality and ethics” (Koch, 1960). 
He signed the letter, “Leo F. Koch, Assistant Professor of Biology.” Koch's letter 
was published on March 18, 1960, and the firestorm began. There were banner headlines 
in the Chicago Tribune and other papers (David Danelski, personal communication, 
2004). Belden Fields noted, “A right-wing anti-communist former missionary to China, 
whose daughter was a student at the university, campaigned in the state legislature and 
among other parents to pressure the university to fire Koch. The missionary claimed that 
Professor Koch was part of a communist conspiracy to destroy the morals of our youth” 
(Fields, 2001). A pamphlet denouncing Koch called his letter “an audacious attempt to 
subvert the religious and moral foundations of America” (Goddard, 1960). 
The pressure was on the University of Illinois administration, and they quickly 
buckled. On March 28, the Executive Committee of the College of Liberal Arts and 
Sciences voted 5-0 that Koch’s letter was irresponsible and justified his removal from 
classes. On April 6, the same committee voted 5-1 to urge his dismissal, although the 
committee was split on paying his contract. On April 7, President Henry formally fired 
Koch from his job, and he never taught again. 
Henry declared that Koch’s views were “offensive, repugnant and contrary to 
commonly accepted standards of morality and his espousal of these views could be 
interpreted as an encouragement of immoral behavior and that for these reasons he should 
be relieved of his University duties” (Koch v. Board of Trustees). 
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The immediate firing of a professor for allegedly espousing “immoral behavior” 
might seem to be a clear-cut violation of academic freedom, but in 1960 the question of 
freedom in extramural utterances was still up in the air. 
Koch had few supporters on campus. On April 18, 1960, the Urbana-Champaign 
Senate Committee on Academic Freedom held a hearing, and issued a report on May 13, 
1960. The six-member committee was united on two points: they hated Koch's letter, and 
they disliked the administration's violation of due process procedures, because the lack of 
a faculty hearing was “contrary to the standards of proper procedure in dismissal cases” 
(Urbana-Champaign Senate Committee, 1960, 5).  
Campus AAUP leader Victor Stone described some of the members of the Senate 
Committee, many of whom were strongly prejudiced against Koch: E.I. Rabinowitch, co-
editor of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, “was appalled that anyone would question 
authority.” Gilbert Fett, in engineering, according to Stone, “wasn’t a political activist,” 
but he strongly defended Koch “speaking on principle.” Stone noted, “Glenn Salisbury 
believed that he was not made dean of the College of Agriculture because he had not 
controlled the committee,” even though Salisbury was one of the three members who 
strongly opposed Koch (Stone, personal communication, 2004). 
The report from the committee noted, “This committee holds firm belief that the 
concept of academic freedom is fundamental to a democratic society, because it is only 
through the freedom to pursue truth without fear of reprisal or censure and through the 
unfettered competition of ideas that the democratic society can progress to higher 
intellectual and moral levels. This freedom cannot be reserved only for those who agree 
with majority beliefs and those who have the wisdom to be right. To so restrict academic 
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freedom would render it meaningless” (2). After this promising start, the committee went 
on to argue for restrictions on academic freedom that would render it meaningless: “A 
faculty member does not have the right to urge students, or any one else, to engage in 
illegal or immoral behavior or to violate University regulations” (3). The report added, 
“the faculty member, in keeping with his University association and his position as a man 
of learning, has the obligation to be accurate, to exercise appropriate restraints, and to 
show respect for the opinions of others” (3). Citing the AAUP documents, the committee 
declared: “Academic freedom does not mean unlimited license in either conduct or 
speech” (3). 
The committee concluded, “Koch did commit a breach of academic responsibility, 
not because he publicly expressed controversial views on sexual mores, but because of 
the way in which he expressed them” (4).  
At one point, the committee defended Koch's letter against some of the 
accusations being made against him: “it urges society to condone certain sexual behavior, 
and does not urge readers to engage in such behavior.” However, the report noted, “it 
could be interpreted…as encouraging students to engage in premarital sexual relations. 
Professor Koch did show poor judgment in publishing, in a student newspaper, a letter 
that lent itself to such interpretation” (4). It was a strange sort of logic, to blame Koch for 
something he had not written merely because what he had written could be 
misinterpreted. The Senate committee was worried about public relations, and reported 
that there was “a lengthy commentary by a Chicago publicist suggesting that Professor 
Koch’s letter and its writer were subversive” (2).  
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Still, the committee recognized the importance of “meaningful academic 
freedom”: “this freedom cannot be real unless its bearers have no doubts about their 
rights to exercise it and do not feel compelled to assume the attitude, ‘I had better be 
careful.’”(6). 
The six-member Senate committee was evenly divided as to Koch's academic 
freedom, however: “Three members of this committee came to the conclusion that the 
discharge would be so excessive a penalty as to constitute a violation of Professor Koch’s 
academic freedom” (7). The other three felt that “Koch’s action was a sufficiently clear 
violation of academic responsibility to invalidate his claim to the protection of academic 
freedom” but added that academic freedom at the university “would not be served by his 
discharge” (8). The entire committee urged “that Professor Koch be reprimanded for his 
action and admonished to act in keeping with the dignity and responsibility of a scholar, 
but not be discharged.” The committee also called for a revision of university statutes (8). 
According to the University of Illinois statutes at the time: “Cause for discharge 
shall consist of conduct seriously prejudicial to the University through deliberate 
infraction of law or commonly accepted standards of morality, neglect of duty, 
inefficiency or incompetency” (8). The Board of Trustees could also discharge faculty for 
other reasons “under exceptional circumstances” for “conduct which is clearly prejudicial 
to the best interests of the University” (8). This kind of vague language would allow any 
professor to be fired for almost any reason. And the resentment toward the 
administration's failure to consult the faculty before punishing Koch spurred the Senate 
Committee to make a more critical view of the university's actions. 
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Although the Koch case dealt purely with extramural utterances, there were hints 
that Koch's approach to his letters was mirrored in the classroom. The University of 
Illinois Senate committee noted how Koch claimed that he used a “shock treatment 
approach” in his teaching and in the letter (6). Still, the AAUP's sharp distinction 
between responsibility in the classroom and in extramural comments was often lost upon 
academia's external critics.  
The Senate committee also addressed the issue of Koch's professional 
identification: “Professor Koch believes that although he has signed the letter ‘Assistant 
Professor Biology’ (How else, he said, could he have identified himself?), he was not 
expressing himself as a representative of the biology department. But he considered that 
he wrote the letter as a biologist” (7). Koch’s specialty was the study of moss, so it would 
be hard for him to claim any particular expertise in human sexuality (Stone, personal 
communication, 2004). Koch was a well published scholar with dozens of articles. He 
was also “a real liberal” active on issues such as the atomic bomb, racial equality, and 
women's rights, who believed in “humanism as a religion” (Danelski, personal 
communication, 2004). 
The Senate committee invoked the language of the Gentleman Scientist Model: 
“In his role as citizen, the faculty member has the same freedoms as other citizens, 
without institutional censorship or discipline, although he should be mindful that 
accuracy, forthrightness, and dignity befit his association with the University and his 
position as a man of learning” (9). This gentlemanly call for “dignity” that befits a “man 
of learning” reflected the contempt toward faculty who expressed controversial views: “It 
is the opinion of this committee that Professor Koch’s letter did constitute a breach of 
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academic and professional responsibility. The letter is not a reasoned, detached document 
marshalling evidence or reason in support of a view held by the writer. It is rather an 
impassioned message” with “overstatement and ridicule” (14). 
However, the key issue facing the AAUP and academia in the Koch case was not 
whether Koch would be condemned for his impassioned views, but whether he deserved 
to be punished with the loss of his job. The question was whether the “dignity” required 
by the Gentleman Scientist Model was merely a moral guide for faculty, or an 
enforceable job requirement. 
Koch was not an ideal victim. One could imagine the AAUP responding to one of 
the many cases where faculty in the South were dismissed for their civil rights activism, 
which would make it almost impossible for anyone to defend the remnants of the 
Gentleman Scientist Model in the face of the injustices of Jim Crow.  
Victor Stone was a leader of the AAUP at the University of Illinois and defended 
Koch, but Stone encountered problems with the national AAUP. The AAUP president 
was traveling in Asia at the time, and one person in the national AAUP office that Stone 
dealt with was a “traditionalist” and “very snobbish.” This individual believed that the 
AAUP “should not be doing this on behalf of an assistant professor.” The resistance 
continued, Stone said, “until I raised holy hell” and the AAUP sent in a committee to 
investigate (Stone, personal communication, 2004). 
Stone noted, “I thought he was irresponsible, personally” and reported that “in 
other letters he had been intemperate” with “attacks on organized religion.” But Stone 
considered this particular letter a “very temperate, carefully drafted letter” (Stone, 
personal communication, 2004). 
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Although Koch was technically an assistant professor who had been teaching at 
the University of Illinois since 1955, he was informed in 1959 that he would not receive 
tenure, and agreed to sign a two-year terminal contract. The University told him, "Your 
professional advancement will best be served in a position which provides greater scope 
for your special interests than does your present program” (Leo Koch v. Board of 
Trustees, 1962). But the Koch case was about a larger question of whether faculty could 
be free to speak out. Koch claimed, “The majority of professors are badly suppressed. 
You can't step out of line, and that's a very bad situation” (Goddard, 1960). This 
fundamental truth about academia would cause the AAUP to transform some of its basic 
principles. 
How Leo Koch Altered the AAUP 
An AAUP ad hoc committee led by famed First Amendment scholar Thomas 
Emerson argued, “as applied to a faculty member having definite or indefinite tenure, 
making public utterances on matters of general concern to the community, the standard of 
‘academic responsibility’ is not a valid basis for reprimand, dismissal, or other official 
discipline” (AAUP, 1963). 
However, Emerson’s interpretation was not fully accepted. Committee A declared 
in response, “In light of Committee A’s understanding of the 1940 Statement, together 
with the legislative history of the document and its ‘interpretation,’ the Committee 
disagrees with the authors of the report that ‘the notion of academic responsibility, when 
the faculty member is speaking as a citizen, is intended to be an admonition rather than a 
standard for the application of discipline” (AAUP, 1963, 41). 
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If Committee A and much of the AAUP was not quite willing to give up the 
“responsibility” standard, the Koch case still appalled them. The firing of a professor, 
without any due process, for writing one controversial letter to the editor, was shocking. 
Committee A went on to call Koch’s dismissal “outrageously severe and completely 
unwarranted” and criticized the violation of due process (AAUP, 1963). Much like the 
Faculty Senate Committee, Committee A wanted to condemn both the University of 
Illinois and Koch for their actions. 
The Koch case helped push forward the protection of controversial extramural 
statements under the umbrella of academic freedom. It did so not only by revealing the 
schism within the AAUP over the subject, but also by providing a key example that was 
difficult to dismiss. Those who wanted “responsibility” to remain as an academic 
freedom standard had to grapple with the fact that abuses like the Koch case were almost 
inevitable. 
Despite all of the internal disputes over the theory of academic freedom, 
Committee A was united in condemning the University of Illinois' failure to follow due 
process and the extreme punishment given to Koch. 
Censure of the University of Illinois 
The censure in the Koch case had an immediate effect at the University of Illinois. 
According to Stone, President Henry would “never forgive” the national AAUP for 
censuring his institution. But in the wake of the censure, the University of Illinois moved 
to change its policies. The three senates from the University of Illinois system were 
brought together, financed by the administration, to propose changes. Stone noted, “we 
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emerged from that with the best statutes on academic freedom and tenure in the country” 
(Stone, personal communication, 2004). 
With the changes in place, the University of Illinois sought to end the censure. 
Stone reported, “I did intervene to ask the national to remove it.” The key problem was 
the lack of compensation or reinstatement for Koch. Stone noted, “I wished for it” but “I 
was convinced we would never, never get any compensation” and “it could be an endless 
deadlock” (Stone, personal communication, 2004). Instead, with the amended statutes, 
the AAUP removed the sanction and the AAUP paid Koch a year's salary. 
The first beneficiary of the new protections for academic freedom at the 
University of Illinois was Revilo P. Oliver. Oliver, Stone reported, “had fortified his 
basement to resist the communist hordes” and was “expelled from the Birch Society 
because he was too extreme,” even though Oliver had helped to found the John Birch 
Society. (Stone, personal communication, 2004). When Oliver publicly expressed his 
view in 1964 that John F. Kennedy “was executed by the Communist Conspiracy because 
he was planning to turn American” or “as part of systematic preparation for a domestic 
take-over,” there was widespread outrage (Oliver, 1964). But this time, the University of 
Illinois' policies protected academic freedom, and Oliver did not lose his job. The Board 
of Trustees condemned Oliver, but did not fire him. Oliver spent 32 years as a professor 
of Classics at the University of Illinois.  
For Leo Koch, the results of his case were much different. He never got another 
job in academia. Danelski reported that to make money, Koch “began to sell 
books…bordering on the obscene,” with titles like The Housewife Guide to Promiscuity. 
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Koch's marriage broke up, and Koch left for a job in Santa Cruz, California, growing 
mushrooms (Danelski, personal communication, 2004). 
Trouble followed Koch. In 1963, Koch took a job as a science instructor at the 
left-wing Camp Summerlane in North Carolina, where his presence sparked rumors of 
nudism and free love, and the camp was attacked in a violent raid by townspeople and 
state troopers. The local Asheville Times reported: “Violence flared at Summerlane 
Camp—a summer hideaway tucked back in a mountain cove--when outraged citizens of 
the Rosman and Brevard areas invaded the camp last night and this morning to protest 
alleged immorality and nudism on the part of the campers” (Elliston, 2008). Jon Elliston 
(2008) recounted the scene: “camp counselors who’d been beaten bloody tried to 
regroup. A gymnasium was burning to the ground; a cabin smoldered. A camp bus, its 
front window shattered, leaned in a ditch while its driver tried to pull himself together 
after bullets had been fired right by his head.” A letter before the attack from Leo Koch to 
his daughter noted how racial integration was a key factor: “A group of local yokels has 
told us that if we bring any 'niggers' here they will kill them” (Elliston, 2008). Ironically, 
the camp had been unable to recruit any black children. Koch himself wrote about the 
attacks, and noted the reports of “atheistic” activity and “sexual promiscuity,” but added 
that race was the underlying fear (Elliston, 2008). The same hysteria about sexuality and 
religion that had cost Koch his job at the University of Illinois resulted in the burning and 
closure of a summer camp.  
Koch in Court 
Leo Koch had far less luck seeking legal redress for his firing. Even getting a 
lawyer was a struggle. David Danelski, an attorney who taught civil liberties in the 
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Political Science department, defended Koch. Danelski recalled that he became involved 
in the Koch case when “this guy came into my office and said, ‘I’m Leo Koch. I need you 
to help me.’”(Danelski, personal communication, 2004). Danelski said he would find him 
a lawyer. But after searching through the University of Illinois law school and local 
lawyers, and being rejected at every turn, Danelski represented Koch himself because 
“nobody would take his case.” Later, an ACLU lawyer joined him. To help cover 
incidental expenses in the case, Danelski asked colleagues for money: “I would get 
envelopes under the door with $20 in them, and a note saying, ‘I can’t tell you who I 
am.’” Danelski noted, “I was willing to lose my job, too” (Danelski, personal 
communication, 2004). 
When the Board of Trustees met to fire Koch, Danelski reports that an 
administrator told him, “They had two votes. They voted whether to fire you.” The Board 
felt that Danelski was being disloyal to the university by defending Koch. According to 
Danelski, “it never affected my career negatively.” However, he was called in by the 
Political Science department chair because at the time he was being given a month’s pay 
in the summer after his first year of teaching, a tradition at the University of Illinois to 
help new teachers turn a dissertation into a book, and this happened to coincide with his 
defense of Koch: “They said I shouldn’t be doing this.” The University of Illinois 
attorneys convinced the Board of Trustees that Danelski was fulfilling an attorney’s duty 
to Koch, so that he would have legal representation (Danelski, personal communication, 
2004). 
However, Koch's lawsuit against the University of Illinois failed. The Illinois 
Supreme Court ruled, “When the plaintiff entered into his employment contract with the 
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University of Illinois, he voluntarily agreed to the University's rules and procedures for 
determining the causes of discharge, the quasi-judicial framework for determining the 
existence of those causes and the procedure whereby he might be discharged as a result of 
those causes” (Koch v. Board of Trustees, 343). According to Danelski, “the corrupt 
Illinois judicial system buried the case” (Danelski, personal communication, 2004). 
The Illinois State Supreme Court ruled that “no constitutional issues were 
involved” and an appellate court dismissed the case. Murphy called the decision 
“palpably incorrect” and said it “simply demonstrates a judicial reluctance to recognize 
that a professor may have the same freedom of speech as other citizens” (Murphy, 1964, 
37). But the reality was that academic freedom as a fundamental right had not yet been 
clearly identified by the U.S. Supreme Court, and the University of Illinois policies did, 
effectively, give the Board of Trustees the power to fire any professor for any reason they 
wanted. 
Koch compared his case to the Scopes Trial and said, “I expect it to reach the 
Supreme Court, and I hope it does. Some kind of precedent has to be established” 
(Goddard, 1960). But on January 13, 1964, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear 
Koch's appeal. Koch's hope of changing the legal status of academic freedom fell short. 
But it was within the AAUP that Koch's case would have the greatest impact. 
The Critics of Koch 
Some commentators on academic freedom showed little sympathy for Koch's 
plight. Van de Haag (1964) declared that “Koch’s shopworn utopia scarcely commands 
sympathy. (He proposed reducing extra-marital sexual relations among students to 
cathartic gymnastics drearily—but sanitarily—performed under university auspices.) Yet 
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he would not have been dismissed had he expressed himself in favor of pre-marital 
chastity. Thus he was fired for professing dissent views. Academic freedom was 
violated” (88). 
Van de Haag also wrote: “A case for the dismissal could be made in terms of lack 
of discretion….His letter to a student paper might well be understood by students, and 
more likely by their parents, as an authoritative expression of proposed university 
educational policy” (Van de Haag, 1964, 88). Van de Haag didn’t explain exactly how 
one professor’s opinion, obviously expressed as such, and so clearly opposed to 
conventional wisdom, could be taken as official policy. 
Van de Haag criticized Koch using the language of the Gentleman Scientist 
Model: “Koch should have foreseen the potential harm his letter would cause the 
university—a harm clearly not offset by any potential scientific or practical merit. If he 
was unable to understand these likely effects, or deliberately disregarded them, he might 
not be intelligent enough or discreet enough for his position” (Van de Haag, 1964, 88). 
Van de Haag regarded “scientific” work as valuable enough to merit controversy, but not 
an ideological expression of a personal opinion. And the notion that a professor must be 
“discreet” to be employed as a faculty member was the embodiment of the gentlemanly 
tradition. However, Van de Haag admitted that this view did not “justify dismissal out of 
hand” (Van de Haag, 1964, 88). And that was precisely the problem with what remained 
of the Gentleman Scientist Model: if its language was allowed to remain in place as an 
enforceable provision, then faculty would be vulnerable to the whim of administrative 
retaliation for almost any controversial speech. As Van de Haag noted, the Koch case 
showed “the vulnerability of American universities, and the consequent precariousness of 
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the academic freedom they grant” (Van de Haag, 1964, 88). For the followers of the 
Gentleman Scientist Model, Koch was guilty of endangering academic freedom by trying 
to exercise it too freely when universities were vulnerable to a public backlash. It was a 
point of view shared by many in academia, including the AAUP, but this ideal of 
academic freedom was beginning to change. 
The 1964 Statement on Extramural Utterances 
The Koch case led to a substantial change in the University of Illinois’ procedures 
on academic freedom. But more importantly, it forced the AAUP to confront the flaws 
and contradictions in its guiding philosophy. The key issues surrounding the Koch case 
laid bare the fault lines in the AAUP's approach to academic freedom, and in the 
Gentleman Scientist Model itself. Although bitterly divided about Koch himself and his 
letters, the AAUP recognized that it could no longer accept the threat of administrators to 
punish professors for their comments as citizens. Just after Committee A was expressing 
its ambivalence about Koch in 1963, the AAUP was moving forward with a new 
approach to extramural utterances. 
By 1964, the early revolution in academia was beginning. The Free Speech 
Movement had shocked Berkeley, as well as the rest of higher education. In 1963, 
Committee A had been unwilling to give up the concept of “responsibility” for Leo Koch. 
By 1964, the AAUP as an organization embraced a radical new statement on extramural 
utterances that reflected the beginning of the end for the Gentleman Scientist Model and 
the rise of a new model, the Liberty Model. 
The Statement on Extramural Utterances rejected the notion of a common 
academic ethic that bound the behavior of all professors, on and off campus, that had 
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formed the basis of the Gentleman Scientist Model. In its place was a radical 
individualism of the Liberty Model which held that each professor was accountable only 
to the conscience of the individual. 
The Committee A Statement on Extramural Utterances, approved in October 
1964, marked one of the most fundamental changes in the AAUP's approach to academic 
freedom. The 1964 Statement began with an important restatement of the 1940 Statement 
of Principles, claiming that it “asserts the right of faculty members to speak or write as 
citizens, free from institutional censorship or discipline” while adding that it “calls 
attention to the special obligations of faculty members arising from their position in the 
community: to be accurate, to exercise appropriate restraint, to show respect for the 
opinions of others, and to make every effort to indicate that they are not speaking for the 
institution” (AAUP , 1964, 32). 
This opening summary did not quite fit the actual language of the 1940 Statement, 
which declared: “When they speak or write as citizens, they should be free from 
institutional censorship or discipline, but their special position in the community imposes 
special obligations” (AAUP, 1940, 4). The 1964 Statement changed “should be free” into 
“the right of faculty members to speak.” For the first time, the AAUP was using the 
Liberty Model language of the “right” to free speech. And the 1964 likewise transformed 
the original 1940 language of “imposes special obligations” into “calls attention to the 
special obligations of faculty members.” The 1940 Statement had emphasized an 
equivalence between the freedom of faculty to speak as citizens and the obligation 
imposed to be accurate and restrained. The 1964 Statement changed this into a 
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fundamental right of faculty to speak and a special obligation which rested on the 
conscience of individual faculty rather than being imposed by the institution.  
In effect, the AAUP was unilaterally changing the meaning of the 1940 Statement 
in a dramatic way that had never been intended—and which Committee A had itself 
rejected only a year earlier in the Koch case.  
However, Committee A explicitly recognized a problem with this revision in the 
1964 Statement: the fact that the AAUP and the AAC agreed at a November 8, 1940 
meeting to an interpretation of the 1940 Statement allowing the administration to file 
charges “if it feels that a faculty member has failed to observe the above admonitions and 
believes that the professor's extramural utterances raise grave doubts concerning the 
professor's fitness for continuing service” (AAUP, 1964, 32).  
Van Alstyne called this a “trade-off” with the AAC in 1940 “to cultivate public 
confidence in the profession by laying down a professionally taxing standard of 
institutional accountability for all utterances of a public character made by a member of 
the profession” (Van Alstyne, 1972, 155). 
The 1940 Statement of Principles brought the AAUP credibility and institutional 
acceptance, but it did so at the price of creating a dangerously vague standard of 
“responsible” behavior that would frequently be used to attack academic freedom in the 
decades to follow. The compromise of 1940 may have been necessary at a time when 
academic freedom was still vulnerable and the AAUP was anxious to have institutions 
adopt its standards for tenure and due process. 
To get around this power, Committee A simply redefined the terms: “The 
controlling principle is that a faculty member's expression of opinion as a citizen cannot 
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constitute grounds for dismissal unless it clearly demonstrates the faculty member's 
unfitness to serve. Extramural utterances rarely bear upon the faculty member's fitness for 
continuing service” (AAUP, 1964, 32). Moreover, Committee A added a new 
requirement that the faculty member's “entire record” must be weighed in judging a 
professor unfit to serve (AAUP, 1964, 32). To reinforce the defense of faculty, the 1964 
Statement established that the “unfitness” of a faculty member must be judged by a 
faculty committee. 
The 1964 Statement made subtle changes in wording to the official AAUP 
position, but it amounted to a transformation in the organization's approach to extramural 
utterances. Instead of the 1940 Statement's standard of “raise grave doubts” about a 
professor's fitness, the 1964 Statement required evidence that “clearly demonstrates” 
unfitness for the job, a nearly impossible standard to meet considering that Committee A 
had just declared that extramural utterances rarely have any connection to a professor's 
fitness to serve. 
The 1964 Statement concluded, “In a democratic society freedom of speech is an 
indisputable right of the citizen. Committee A will vigorously uphold that right” (AAUP, 
1964, 32). As the AAUP's enforcers of academic freedom, Committee A was declaring 
that they would no longer defer to institutions in interpreting the vague language of the 
1940 Statement on extramural utterances. 
But the Committee A Statement, although deeply influential (it is the only 
Committee A statement published in the AAUP's Redbook of important statements), did 
not represent the entire AAUP. Nor did it represent the official stand of other 
organizations, such as the AAC, who had a vital role in the 1940 Statement and its 
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embrace by colleges across the country. The AAUP had begun a dramatic step down the 
road toward the Liberty Model. But unless it could convince the rest of academia to 
follow, one statement by Committee A could transform academic freedom. 
1966 Statement on Professional Ethics 
The Liberty Model values of the 1964 Statement on Extramural Utterances were 
extended only two years later in the 1966 Statement on Professional Ethics. The key 
paragraph of the document, later quoted in full in the 1970 Interpretive Comments, was 
this: “As members of their community, professors have the rights and obligations of other 
citizens. Professors measure the urgency of these obligations in the light of their 
responsibilities to their subject, to their students, to their profession, and to their 
institution. When they speak or act as private persons, they avoid creating the impression 
of speaking or acting for their college or university. As citizens engaged in a profession 
that depends upon freedom for its health and integrity, professors have a particular 
obligation to promote conditions of free inquiry and to further public understanding of 
academic freedom” (AAUP, 1966, 171). 
This marked an even more radical embrace of the Liberty Model and rejection of 
the Gentleman Scientist approach. Having “the rights and obligations of other citizens” 
was crucial, because although it retained the word “obligations,” the 1966 Statement 
eviscerated its enforcement. Other citizens, after all, had the rights of free speech, but no 
legally enforceable obligations of the kind that proved so onerous under the 1940 
Statement. The only obligation was a moral one imposed by individual conscience and 
collective critique, not an enforceable obligation through formal discipline and sanction. 
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An enforceable right and an enforceable obligation cannot co-exist. One cannot 
simultaneously have the enforceable right to speak and the enforceable obligation not to 
speak. The Gentleman Scientist Model, embraced in the 1940 Statement of Principles, 
created enforceable obligations for extramural utterances. During the 1960s, the AAUP 
moved to the Liberty Model's approach of enforceable rights to extramural utterances 
instead. 
The lack of enforcement in the 1966 Statement was re-emphasized in the phrase, 
“Professors measure the urgency of these obligations...” By giving the individual 
professor the power to “measure” an obligation, the 1966 Statement was seeking to 
remove it from the realm of administrative control altogether. To further emphasize the 
fact that professors no longer could be punished for their speech as a citizen, the 1966 
Statement declared that maintaining the “conditions of free inquiry” was the highest 
obligation (AAUP, 1966). 
If anyone tried to interpret the 1966 Statement on Professional Ethics as still 
requiring professors to meet obligations in their extramural utterances, the fact that there 
was an “obligation” to promote free inquiry would surely counteract it. How could any 
professor have an obligation to keep silent when free inquiry was itself an obligation? 
The 1966 Statement did maintain the ancient prohibition on “speaking or action 
for their college or university” in their extramural utterances. But that requirement only 
really restricted faculty under the old Gentleman Scientist Model, where mentioning 
one's campus affiliation was regarded as an attempt to take cover under the protections of 
scientific inquiry. Under the Liberty Model, listing a campus affiliation was simply a way 
of clarifying who you were and where you worked; it no longer implied any claim of 
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university endorsement. It was a kind of phantom limb of the Gentleman Scientist Model, 
retaining the same formal language but without the baggage that had allowed it to be 
abused in the past. 
The 1966 Statement put no special burden on controversial topics. To the 
contrary, it declared: “Their primary responsibility to their subject to seek and to state the 
truth as they see it” (AAUP, 1966, 171). Controversy, a dangerous threat to the institution 
under the Gentleman Scientist Model, was a beneficial and desirable part of education 
under the Liberty Model. 
The 1966 Statement also began to expand the boundaries of academic freedom. In 
listing the responsibilities of professors as teachers toward their students, it noted: “They 
protect their academic freedom.” This was the first official recognition by the AAUP of 
the academic freedom of all students, suggesting a much broader notion of the idea than 
the Gentleman Scientist Model ever had. The Liberty Model's ideal of academic freedom 
for all had begun to replace the special privileges of professors. 
Another part of the 1966 Statement raised one critical part of academic freedom 
that the AAUP's statements had largely overlooked, the right to criticize one's own 
institution: “Although professors observe the stated regulations of the institution, 
provided the regulations do not contravene academic freedom, they maintain their right to 
criticize and seek revision” (AAUP, 1966, 172). This provision also offered an unusual 
example of how far the AAUP was straying from the old Gentleman Scientist Model. By 
declaring that professors could rightfully and intentionally violate campus regulations if 
those limits violated academic freedom, the AAUP was striking out new territory for 
academic freedom. 
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The 1964 Statement on Extramural Utterances and the 1966 Statement on 
Professional Ethics were radical shifts in policy for the AAUP, although they attracted 
little publicity in a campus climate where dramatic shifts in student rights, campus 
protests, and academic culture were occurring. Moreover, although these statements 
reflected a new idea of academic freedom for the AAUP, the 1940 Statement remained as 
a monument to the Gentleman Scientist Model fully in force at most campuses and as the 
official policy of the AAUP. The AAUP needed to tackle the 1940 Statement directly, 
and update the way academic freedom was interpreted under it. 
Revisiting the 1940 Statement 
When the AAUP sought to reform the 1940 Statement in the late 1960s, it 
encountered a problem: the leading associations of colleges and universities were not 
interested in expanding academic freedom by addressing the “responsibility” standards. 
Indeed, their main interest in revisiting the 1940 statement was to remove the “7-year 
rule” for tenure and allow colleges to hire faculty for additional years without providing 
them with tenure. 
For the AAUP, the 1940 Statement was flawed, but the dangers of undermining 
tenure by creating a new statement could be even more hazardous. If the widely adopted 
1940 Statement was abandoned, it could be replaced by something worse, or colleges 
could simply retain the older language indefinitely. The very success of the AAUP in 
getting the 1940 Statement adopted by universities and written into campus codes now 
proved to be a barrier to further progress when the AAUP wanted to alter its fundamental 
model of academic freedom. 
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To deal with this, the AAUP adopted a compromise: an “interpretation” of the 
1940 Statement of Principles, which would allow the AAUP to update the meaning of the 
language without actually undertaking the burden of getting a consensus for a new 
statement or its adoption at colleges around the country. This innovative solution allowed 
the AAUP to make its new approach to academic freedom immediately adopted and 
enforced more effectively. 
A joint committee of the AAUP and the AAC met in 1969 to reevaluate the 1940 
Statement. What is most surprising about what this committee produced is not that the 
AAUP was adopting a dramatic shift in its approach to academic freedom, but that the 
administrator-oriented AAC would go along with these changes virtually without 
opposition. 
However, by 1969, campus protests and disruptions had gained national attention 
and spread to campuses across the country. Administrators were themselves invoking the 
language of the Liberty Model to argue against campus strikes, disruptions of speakers, 
and attempts to ban military research and ROTC on campus. In comparison with the 
turmoil on campus, the Liberty Model approach of the AAUP no longer seemed so 
radical. Faced with the infamous 1968 takeover of the administration building at 
Columbia University, the Gentleman Scientist Model seemed like an impossible dream to 
maintain. 
The 1970 Interpretive Comments 
The 1970 Interpretive Comments marked the most dramatic turn in the AAUP's 
history when it came to academic freedom. And the text of the document made it clear 
that change was happening. The 1970 Comments argued, “the 1940 Statement is not a 
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static code but a fundamental document designed to set a framework of norms to guide 
adaptations to changing times and circumstances” (AAUP, 1970b). The notion of an 
evolving understanding of academic freedom represented only the first challenge to the 
Gentleman Scientist Model and its vision of academic freedom as a permanent, 
unchanging ideal.  
The 1970 Comments included a recognition of “relevant developments in the law 
itself” and quoted the Supreme Court's direct recognition of academic freedom as “a 
special concern of the First Amendment” in the 1967 case of Keyishian v. Board of 
Regents. 
But the majority of the 1970 Comments consisted of footnotes to the existing 
1940 Statement, amendments in meaning which nevertheless often transformed all 
previous interpretations of the words or effectively nullified them altogether. 
The 1970 Comments noted that the AAUP and other professional organizations 
had made numerous statements “providing guidance to professors in their utterances as 
citizens” (AAUP, 1970b). This comment had two important implications. First, it 
suggested that the proper place for addressing extramural utterances was in the realm of 
professional ethics, not institutional enforcement. Second, it used the word “guidance” 
rather than enforcement, indicating that the ethos of the 1964 Statement on Extramural 
Utterances was being incorporated into—and directly countering—the 1940 Statement. In 
fact, the 1970 Comments quoted the 1964 Statement at length. 
But the 1970 Interpretive Comments did not stop at extramural utterances, as it 
might have if it had been done in 1964. Instead, the 1970 Comments took direct aim at 
the heart of the Gentleman Scientist Model: the condemnation of controversy in the 
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classroom. The 1970 Comments footnoted the infamous 1940 Statement that “Teachers 
are entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing their subject, but they should be 
careful not to introduce into their teaching controversial matter which has no relation to 
their subject.” The 1970 wording declared: “The intent of this statement is not to 
discourage what is 'controversial.' Controversy is at the heart of the free academic inquiry 
which the entire statement is designed to foster” (AAUP, 1970b). Of course, the intent of 
the 1940 Statement was precisely to discourage controversy. But the 1970 Comments 
were trying to change the intent, and strictly narrow its application: “The passage serves 
to underscore the need for teachers to avoid persistently intruding material which has no 
relation to their subject.” The 1970 Comments eliminate any special prejudice against 
“controversial matter” and adds a critical provision that the teacher must be guilty of 
“persistently intruding material”; the 1940 Statement had effectively allowed a ban on 
even the smallest deviation from the subject matter. 
The 1940 Statement had originally declared, “Limitations of academic freedom 
because of religious or other aims of the institution should be clearly stated in writing at 
the time of the appointment.” At the time, this was considered a significant advancement 
because it compelled religious colleges to declare any limits on academic freedom in 
advance and not restrict them further while a professor is employed. But the 1970 
Comments declared, “Most church-related institutions no longer need or desire the 
departure from the principle of academic freedom implied in the 1940 Statement, and we 
do not now endorse such a departure” (AAUP, 1970b). Not only did the 1970 Comments 
claim that most religious colleges did not wish to have any exemption from academic 
freedom, but it withdrew any such special treatment even for religious colleges that 
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wanted to maintain the 1940 Statement standards. This footnote not only showed how 
radical the changes were in the 1970 Interpretive Comments, but also the fact that they 
could overturn completely provisions in the 1940 Statement. 
Another radical shift from the Gentleman Scientist Model to the Liberty Model in 
the 1970 Comments can be found in its declaration, “Both the protection of academic 
freedom and the requirements of academic responsibility apply not only to the full-time 
probationary and the tenured teacher, but also to all others, such as part-time faculty and 
teaching assistants, who exercise teaching responsibilities” (AAUP, 1970b). The 
Gentleman Scientist Model relied on expertise as the basis of academic freedom. But the 
1970 Interpretive Comments were clearly founded upon the Liberty Model, where the 
professional role of the college teacher justified academic freedom. The extension of 
these protections to “teaching assistants” also marked the first time that the AAUP had 
ever suggested academic freedom applied to graduate students.  
This statement in defense of all college teachers was all the more extraordinary 
because it was made at a time when the overwhelming majority of faculty were tenured 
or on the tenure track. This showed that the clause protecting all teachers was not 
motivated by a shift in the economics of the profession, but a new ideological approach to 
the idea of academic freedom itself. 
The Gentleman Scientist Model was dead, and the 1970 Interpretive Comments 
delivered the killing blow. In its place was the new Liberty Model, founded upon the 
ideal of freedom for all teachers and researchers, not merely for scientific experts who 
obeyed the rules. 
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The 1970 Interpretive Comments were not without its flaws. By allowing the 
older language to remain in the Statement of Principles, the danger of abuse was still 
there. Despite the clear declaration to the contrary in the 1970 Interpretive Comments, 
many colleges would continue to use the “responsibility” language to justify punishment 
of professors for their controversial speech. But the fact that the 1970 Interpretive 
Comments were also endorsed by the Association of American Colleges gave heightened 
importance to their language. 
The 1970 Statement on Freedom and Responsibility 
The 1970 Statement on Freedom and Responsibility by the AAUP Council 
recognized the need for the AAUP to provide ethical guidelines for faculty in the face of 
the greater restraints on administrators who typically took the lead in disciplining faculty. 
The AAUP Council argued that “Evaluation of students and the award of credit must be 
based on academic performance professionally judged and not on matters irrelevant to 
that performance, whether personality, race, religion, degree of political activism, or 
personal beliefs” (AAUP, 1970a). 
Still, this statement did invoke some of the old language that the AAUP had 
largely disparaged in its 1970 Interpretive Comments: “It is the mastery teachers have of 
their subjects and their own scholarship that entitles them to the classrooms and to 
freedom in the presentation of their subjects” (AAUP, 1970a). While the 1970 Statement 
on Freedom and Responsibility might seem like a partial step back to the Gentleman 
Scientist Model in its language, the truth is that it sought a voluntary model for improving 
faculty behavior. In fact, the contradictory aspects of the 1970 Interpretive Comments 
and the 1970 Statement on Freedom and Responsibility only make sense if the AAUP 
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was making a sharp divide between policy statements for how institutions should act, and 
ethical advice for professors. With the 1970 Interpretive Comments, the AAUP sought to 
free faculty from the repressive interpretations of administrators about how they should 
act. With the 1970 Statement on Freedom and Responsibility, the AAUP Council wanted 
to show that liberty did not mean complete freedom to do anything you wanted in the 
classroom. The AAUP was evoking its ancient aim of improving the way faculty 
behaved, but sought to do so without the harsh remedies that were often used. Beyond the 
assertion of faculty control over the disciplinary process for professors, the 1970 
Statement on Freedom and Responsibility argued at length for “preventive” rather than 
“disciplinary” action, and urged the faculty to take “a more positive role as guardian of 
academic values against unjustified assaults from its own members” (AAUP, 1970a). 
But the key was the final line of the statement, calling for “adherence to basic 
norms of professional responsibility so long as such efforts are consistent with principles 
of academic freedom” (AAUP, 1970a). In the debate between academic rights and 
responsibilities, one where the Gentleman Scientist Model had struck an uneasy balance, 
the Liberty Model espoused by the AAUP in 1970 made clear that the rights of academic 
freedom must always prevail, and responsibility would be debated and encouraged within 
that realm of freedom. 
The Revolution in Academic Freedom 
The decade of the 1960s marked a revolutionary change in how academic 
freedom was understood, one that paralleled the dramatic changes in the nature of the 
university. The Civil Rights Movement helped to spark a new age of activism on campus 
 253 
 
that, fueled by opposition to the Vietnam War, forced the AAUP and colleges across the 
country to rethink how they approached academic freedom. 
From the time of Leo Koch's letter in 1960 to the Kent State massacre a decade 
later, the idea of academic freedom underwent the most dramatic changes in the history 
of the concept. And the AAUP's changes as an organization were equally dramatic. 
In 1960, the AAUP was in a backward, weakened state. The failure to stop 
McCarthyism or even lead a forceful opposition had humiliated the organization, leading 
to a belated mea culpa in 1956 with several long-delayed reports on some of the worst 
firings. Worst of all, McCarthyism had exposed the flaws in the organization's principles 
of academic freedom. As an institution, the AAUP was ready for change and new ideas. 
By 1970, the AAUP was a dramatically modernized organization. Along the way, 
it had embraced the 1964 Statement on Extramural Utterances, the 1967 Joint Statement 
on the Rights of Students, and the revolutionary 1970 Interpretive Principles. 
The social changes that had shaken the AAUP and all of academia had 
devastating consequences to the AAUP's membership numbers. The Gentleman Scientist 
Model that was falling apart had also sustained the AAUP's high membership levels as 
the voice of the profession. By 1970, the academic profession was divided onto itself, and 
the AAUP no longer held any high ground as the sole voice of faculty. The AAUP could 
never have sustained the membership of such a high proportion of academics as 
disciplinarity came to dominate the profession and faculty saw themselves increasingly as 
researchers in a particular field rather than members of the academic profession. Nor did 
the AAUP seem as essential for faculty by 1970 as courts began to recognize the rights of 
free speech for faculty at public colleges. 
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For many of these changes, the AAUP was simply swept along, unable to resist 
the tide of academic revolution in the 1960s. Unionization was almost an accident, forced 
upon the AAUP by the activism of a few chapters, against which the AAUP had only 
tradition rather than sound principles to oppose. Unionization was the most controversial 
stand of the AAUP, and the final break with the Gentleman Scientist Model that sparked 
a dramatic decline in membership. But the AAUP's radically modified principles on 
academic freedom also played a role in alienating some members.  
No one can ever know if the shift from the Gentleman Scientist Model to the 
Liberty Model caused the AAUP's membership drop. It's more likely that the AAUP's 
evolution in its principles of academic freedom was a necessary response to remain 
relevant to the group's members. If the AAUP had held onto to the Gentleman Scientist 
Model, it would have suffered a long and steady decline toward irrelevance. 
The full embrace of the Liberty Model with the 1970 Interpretative Comments did 
not solve the problems afflicting higher education. Academic freedom, now as then, is 
under regular attacks and requires constant vigilance. Economic shifts in the academic 
profession in the 1970s and beyond, as dramatic as the expansion that helped make the 
Liberty Model dominant, threatened the idea of tenure itself as the core protection for 
most faculty, and without this bedrock principle academic freedom grew more 
vulnerable. 
Nor did the 1970 Interpretive Comments end the debate about the meaning of 
academic freedom. The Liberty Model may have gained a temporary supremacy, and 
revolutionized higher education in ways that could not wholly be reversed, but the threats 
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to academic freedom remained. Within the AAUP itself, more conservative times caused 
the organization to back off from its more radical principles. 
The Liberty Model never achieved the kind of widespread acceptance that the 
Gentleman Scientist Model had enjoyed for so many years. The Professional Model 
evolved as an alternative approach that emphasized the “academic” part of academic 
freedom, where the Liberty Model emphasized the “freedom” side. 
As for the professor who helped push the AAUP toward dramatic change, Leo 
Koch may have lost his job, lost in the courts, and only received half-hearted support 
from his colleagues and the AAUP in defending academic freedom. But ultimately, 
Koch's view of the rights of a faculty member prevailed only a few years later. Koch 
would be the last professor whose extramural utterances were held to the Gentleman 
Scientist standard of academic responsibility by Committee A.  
Koch later had a job teaching in a private school, and then working in gas station 
in New York. Danelski lost track of Koch in 1967, when the former star biologist was 
working in a junkyard in the Mohave Desert (Danelski, 2004). Koch's movements after 
that have been lost to history. But the importance of his case to the AAUP and to the 
meaning of academic freedom were fundamental.  
Koch died in Glendale, California in 1982, a forgotten man. But his vision of 
academic freedom became the one embraced by the courts, the AAUP, and colleges 
around the country. As Koch declared in 1960, “My view is that academic freedom 
should become a full and equal parallel to freedom of speech” (Goddard, 1960). Koch 
lost his case, his job, and his career, but his vision of academic freedom ultimately 
prevailed. 
 256 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION: OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY, IMPLICATIONS, AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
This chapter presents an overview of the present study including brief statement 
of the problem, purpose of the study, research questions, summary, implications for the 
study, and recommendations for future research. 
Overview of the Study 
This study sought to understand the meaning and history of different theories of 
academic freedom in America, and how these theories have evolved over the past 
century. This study examined the origins of the concept of academic freedom in America 
and how the idea of academic freedom evolved during the past century. 
Statement of the Problem 
In this study definition of academic freedom reflected different interpretations of 
the meaning of academic freedom. Understanding the history of academic freedom is 
critical to the development of policies and institutions which can protect the intellectual 
inquiry that is the core purpose of higher education. 
The purpose of this historical study of academic freedom in American higher 
education was threefold: 
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1. To explore the ideal and practice of academic freedom and how they changed 
during the past century;  
2. To define academic freedom in a way that can protect the values of intellectual 
inquiry that under gird the concept of academic freedom; and  
3. To suggest how conflicts within higher education over academic freedom can 
be resolved. 
Research Questions 
This study was guided by the following research questions: 
1. What were the origins of the concept of academic freedom in America?  
2. How has the idea of academic freedom reflected changing circumstances in 
American colleges and universities during the 20th Century? 
3. How has the definition of academic freedom, both in its ideal and its practical 
application, evolved over the past century, and what are the implications of this change? 
Summary and Conclusions 
Academic freedom is a battleground. The combatants in today's arguments about 
the university each invoke academic freedom as their justification, and appeal to 
dramatically different conceptions of academic freedom. Examining the history of 
academic freedom in America, and how it evolved over the past century, reveals the 
foundations of this debate over the meaning of academic freedom. One of the key 
findings of this study is that academic freedom is not a static concept, invented in its final 
form in 1915 by the AAUP and then gradually accepted over time. Instead, academic 
freedom is an idea undergoing constant change and debate, particularly within the AAUP, 
during the past century. 
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Conservative critics of the university often invoke an idea of academic freedom in 
its earliest existence, when it was severely limited and struggled for survival with a series 
of compromises by its defenders (Horowitz, 2006, xxvi). Liberal critics of the university 
invoke an idea of academic freedom which evolved over the years and was finally 
formalized in the 1960s, but which struggles to survive in an era of growing 
administrative control and the corporate restructuring of the university away from the 
tenure-track model (Nelson, 2010, Gerber, 2014). 
The vision of academic freedom embraced by many of today's conservative critics 
of academia is called the Gentleman Scientist Model of academic freedom. It represents 
the earliest formalization of what academic freedom meant, and dominated the ideals of 
the AAUP in its earliest form. The vision of academic freedom embraced by many on the 
left is called the Liberty Model. It reflects an idea of academic freedom that protects 
individual rights, defends political speech, and requires due process. In between is a more 
moderate version of academic freedom, the Professional Model, which emphasizes the 
collective power of faculty and the embrace of professional values in academia. 
The problems facing academic freedom today are not simply the result of inept or 
cynical application of the idea of academic freedom. The problems are also rooted in a 
philosophical debate over the core meaning of academic freedom that has been going on 
for more than a century. Understanding that philosophical debate requires not only a 
thorough investigation of the opposing sides in the contemporary argument, but a study 
of the history which undergirds these arguments, a history of academic freedom that is 
often forgotten along the way or reduced to a handful of anecdotes which fail to inform 
today's disputes over academic freedom. 
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Future Research 
Because of the broad scope of academic freedom, this study could only focus on a 
small part of its history. There are many areas for future study of the topic, including 
specific historical events and periods. In particular, the 1960s and early 1970s represent a 
crucial turning point in academic freedom, and although many histories of higher 
education during this period have been written, no comprehensive history of academic 
freedom during this tumultuous time has yet appeared. Although this study focused on 
many aspects of the AAUP, it did not attempt an institutional history of the AAUP, which 
no one has systematically researched. 
This study also did not examine the legal definitions of academic freedom in 
depth. Although the decisions of courts about academic freedom cases reflect a force 
outside of the academia, these legal cases had a dramatic influence on how academic 
freedom was understood, and played a critical role in the creation of certain approaches 
to academic freedom, such as the concept of “institutional academic freedom.” This study 
did not explore the complex origins of “institutional academic freedom” and why it 
should not be considered one of the core competing theories of academic freedom, and it 
did not address how legal theories of academic freedom influence the AAUP and how 
individual thinkers approach the moral concept of academic freedom.  
Race, Gender, and Academic Freedom 
As a concept, the Gentleman Scientist Model was never the neutral and unbiased 
ideal that it pretended to be. Buried deep within this model were assumptions about race 
and gender that shaped the meaning of academic freedom. 
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Metzger noted about the AAUP statements, “The persona idealized in these 
documents looked a lot like the white Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, middle-class men who 
produced it. But the values these academics gave praise to—civility, collegiality, 
rationality, tolerance, scholarly poise, mutual respect—were not, I would argue, 
ethnocentric; they were—dare one say so in this era of perspectivalism?—universal” 
(Metzger, 2000, 81). In reality, none of these concepts exist in a universal, neutral sense. 
The meaning of words such as “civility” “collegiality” “rationality” and “scholarly” may 
have been perceived and intended as universal, but they were rarely codified in reality 
with equal application to all groups. Thus, we need to study how this rhetoric surrounding 
academic freedom was actually used and applied to different groups on campus. 
In all of the discussions about academic freedom, the systematic exclusion of 
African-Americans, Jews, and women from many parts of academia were never 
mentioned. The Gentleman Scientist Model was strictly an individualist approach to 
academic freedom. Even among liberal-minded members of the AAUP who strongly 
opposed segregation and discrimination in all its forms, it never occurred to anyone to 
describe this bigotry as a violation of academic freedom. 
Yet for the individuals burdened by discrimination, the impact was exactly the 
same as a violation of academic freedom: an unjust denial of job opportunities for 
ideological reasons that had no basis in academic merit. Overwhelmingly, the victims of 
what were framed as violations of academic freedom were white, male, Christian, and 
privileged.  
One reason why few members of underrepresented groups can be found in the 
traditional history of academic freedom is that they may have lacked the power to take 
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controversial stands. Well aware of the discrimination they faced, these individuals 
would be less likely to speak out publicly in ways that would have assured their 
dismissal. But the most prominent reason why few members of underrepresented groups 
are discussed in the history of academic freedom is simply their widespread exclusion 
from academia. The massive violations of academic freedom against underrepresented 
groups, ironically enough, prevent them from being visible in the history of academic 
freedom. Thus, future studies could examine the history of underrepresented groups in 
academia, and identify examples of attacks on academic freedom that have largely been 
ignored. 
The growing literature on race, gender, class, and sexuality has barely impacted 
the field of academic freedom, and new concepts are needed to re-examine the past from 
neglected perspectives. One aim of this dissertation is to broaden the categories of 
academic freedom and go beyond the traditional theories and anecdotes about academic 
freedom. Tierney (1993). noted, “We must constantly remind ourselves that previous 
ideas of community often based themselves on notions that absented women, people of 
color, and others from the community” (548). The same is true of the idea of academic 
freedom. By re-examining the history of academic freedom to reveal what (and who) was 
excluded from its protections, a clearer picture will emerge of how academic freedom 
often did not live up to its theoretical billing. 
Additional Areas for Future Research 
Typically, academic freedom addresses only tenure rights and the political 
expressions of faculty in public. Future study of academic freedom should also include 
rarely analyzed historical topics, such as student rights to free expression. The question of 
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whether students have academic freedom is hotly contested in the literature, and this 
study did not examine student rights in depth. 
The transformation of the professoriate has had dramatic effects on academic 
freedom, with the growth in non-tenured faculty, and the question about to what extent 
academic freedom protects members of these groups. The decline in the importance of 
tenure, as adjunct faculty increasingly replace tenure-track positions, raises the question 
of how academic freedom is being affected (Gerber, 2010). The AAUP’s entire history 
has focused on tenure and academic freedom as deeply interconnected, but the actual 
consequences for academic freedom caused by the decline of tenure has not been 
systematically studied. 
Unionization of faculty on campus has been a central focus of the AAUP in recent 
decades as it has become a collective bargaining group. Although studies have been done 
of unionizing in higher education and the AAUP’s role, one missing element is the 
question of whether academic freedom includes the right to unionize on campus. Another 
topic rarely examined is whether unionized campuses increase the academic freedom 
protections for faculty, both in policies and in practice.  
In addition, academic freedom studies typically focus on elite universities, 
ignoring the majority of colleges where faculty work and students study. By looking at 
community colleges, religious colleges, and other institutions in addition to the elite 
universities that receive the most media and scholarly coverage, a more accurate picture 
of academic freedom in American higher education can be described. 
The subjective nature of academic freedom and the violations of it also raise the 
question of whether academic freedom can ever be studied using quantitative criteria. 
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This study could not attempt to make a quantitative measure of academic freedom over 
time, but attempting to measure what academic freedom is would make be a dramatic 
step in understanding the history and current state of academic freedom. 
Finally, this study focused almost exclusively on academic freedom in the United 
States. But because most research on academic freedom examines the United States, the 
question of how academic freedom is understood, interpreted, and protected in other 
nations has been largely neglected in the literature about freedom on campus. The global 
understandings of academic freedom are among the most important aspects of the future 
of international higher education. 
Implications for the Study 
Although this study examined the history of academic freedom in America, it also 
provided a theoretical and historical model for understanding many current controversies 
involving academic freedom. The dismissal of Steven Salaita at the University of Illinois 
in 2014 revealed the ongoing importance of these academic freedom models to 
understanding the conflicts on campus, and how these different models often guide 
radically different approaches to academic freedom. 
Salaita was attacked for writing tweets that harshly condemned the Israeli 
government and its supporters. The logic of the University of Illinois Board of Trustees 
and Chancellor Phyllis Wise in overturning Salaita’s appointment before final approval 
reflected the continuing influence of the Gentleman Scientist Model.  
Wise wrote, “What we cannot and will not tolerate at the University of Illinois are 
personal and disrespectful words or actions that demean and abuse either viewpoints 
themselves or those who express them” (Wise, 2014). The University of Illinois Board of 
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Trustees wrote, “Disrespectful and demeaning speech that promotes malice is not an 
acceptable form of civil argument if we wish to ensure that students, faculty and staff are 
comfortable in a place of scholarship and education” (Kennedy, 2014). Words like 
“disrespectful,” “demean,” and “civil,” when used for academic evaluation, are hallmarks 
of the Gentleman Scientist Model. 
And as with many academic freedom cases over the past century, the invocation 
of the “civility” tenets of the Gentleman Scientist Model may have been a cover for a 
decision motivated by politics and economics. Emails uncovered by the Freedom of 
Information Act revealed that many large donors threatened to withhold money if 
Salaita’s appointment was confirmed, and Chancellor Phyllis Wise regularly met with 
development officials to assess the economic damage of a Salaita appointment, but had 
almost no meetings with academic officials to scrutinize Salaita’s academic qualifications 
for the job (Jaschik, 2014). One of the key failings of the Gentleman Scientist Model was 
that it allowed political pressure to influence decision-making under the guise of 
promoting “gentlemanly” behavior.  
Under the Professional Model, Salaita’s tweets should have been protected 
extramural utterances since they occurred outside of his academic work. With respect to 
extramural utterances, the Professional Model and the Liberty Model are identical in 
protecting professors in their role as members of the public. The fact that Salaita was not 
hired reflected the fact that the Gentleman Scientist Model has an ongoing influence on 
higher education, even though the AAUP abandoned it a half-century ago.  
It is notable that Cary Nelson, one of the leading advocates of the Liberty Model, 
prominently argued for Salaita’s firing (Nelson, 2014). Nelson, an outspoken opponent of 
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critics of Israel such as Salaita, contended that normal academic freedom rules do not 
apply to hiring decisions. If Salaita had already been hired with a finalized contract, 
Nelson argued, then his academic freedom would be fully protected (Nelson, 2014). 
Thus, Nelson did not embrace the Gentleman Scientist Model instead of the Liberty 
Model; he simply argued that academic freedom does not apply to hiring decisions. But 
this argument would eviscerate important aspects of academic freedom; it would, for 
example, allow administrators to announce a total ban on hiring communists. 
Nelson’s reasoning effectively abandoned the Liberty Model in the Salaita case, 
but Nelson did not alter his academic freedom model in general. However, one 
advocate’s failure to follow a model does not negate the model itself. A large number of 
professors spoke out in defense of Salaita’s academic freedom and in particular his right 
to speak on political matters, reflecting the influence of the Liberty Model within the 
profession. 
The University of Illinois’ sudden invocation of “civility” as a core value in hiring 
decisions, something unmentioned in the University of Illinois Statutes, suggested that 
history was repeating itself in the Salaita case. 
In this study, it was argued that the University of Illinois’ decision to fire Leo 
Koch for his extramural utterances marked a dramatic turning point for the meaning of 
academic freedom and prompted the AAUP to abandon the Gentleman Scientist Model 
and embrace the Liberty Model. Will the firing of another scholar by the University of 
Illinois, more than a half-century later, have a similar effect on the path of academic 
freedom? The Salaita dismissal has provoked an outpouring of outrage and petitions to 
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condemn and boycott the University of Illinois, something rarely seen in the recent 
history of higher education. 
For years, the American professoriate relied upon the AAUP to be the defender of 
academic freedom, trusting the organization to investigate and speak out when violations 
occur. The Salaita case might be an indication that faculty recognize that academic 
freedom is too important to be left to the AAUP exclusively to protect. The defense of 
academic freedom requires new organizations that can reinforce the concept, union 
organizing to protect faculty rights, and new techniques for protecting academic freedom. 
Attacks on tenured faculty such as Salaita are only the slowly-melting tip of the 
iceberg of academic freedom. Because tenured faculty are the most visible, and threats to 
their academic freedom are announced and explained, they receive the overwhelming 
attention from the AAUP, the media, and faculty colleagues.  
The most dramatic long-term threat to academic freedom comes from the 
increasing reliance of higher education on adjunct faculty, who can easily be discarded 
without an explanation if they cause controversy. The corporatization of higher education 
means that tenure is eroding, and with it goes many of the traditional institutional 
protections of academic freedom. The question is whether academic freedom will slowly 
disintegrate under these pressures, or whether its defenders can mobilize a new social 
movement to defend it by reinforcing the idea that academic freedom is more important 
than ever. 
To understand future threats to academic freedom, it is necessary to look at the 
past and examine how the idea of academic freedom has evolved. 
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